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Preface
Over the last four decades, formal barriers to trade and capital have been substantially
reduced which has fostered the international economic integration. Improvements in
transportation and communication reduced firm’s costs and enabled firms to start or
expand foreign activities. One outstanding feature of this period is the increased flows
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Figure 1 illustrates the sum of inward and out-
ward FDI relative to gross domestic product (GDP) (FDI-to-GDP ratio) for selected
countries and groups of countries during the period of 1990 to 2012. Within this pe-
riod, the FDI-to-GDP ratio increased from 19.7% to 65.8% in the world, on average.
In line with this observation, multinational enterprises became much more apparent
over time. In the year 1993, the number of multinational parent corporations counted
37.000. These parent firms controlled over 200.000 foreign affiliates worldwide. By
2006 the number of parent firms increased to 78.000 with control of 778.000 foreign
affiliates. Thus, the number of foreign affiliates per parent rose from 5.4 to 10.0, on
average, indicating an wide-ranging dispersion of foreign activity.1 This development
is accentuated by Antra`s (2003) who states that roughly one third of world trade is
within firms. Kobetsky (2008) estimates that intercompany trade amounted to about
60% of world trade in 2006. These figures give a clear indication of the economic im-
portance of multinational enterprises.
For governments there are many reasons why they want to attract FDI. The pres-
ence of multinational firms can lead to technology transfer and diffusion. Local firms
can improve their productivity by copying multinational firms’ technologies result-
ing, for example, in a higher rate of employment. In addition, entrance in the foreign
market leads to more competition which forces local firms to use their resources more
efficiently (Blomstro¨m and Kokko, 1998). Empirical studies also found that multina-
tional enterprises pay higher wages to their employees (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997;
1See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment
Reports 1994, 2007.
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Figure 1: Total FDI stocks 1990-2012
Source: own illustration based on WIR 2013, Annex Table 07 and 08.
Girma et al. 2001). Apart from that the government has the opportunity to raise
additional tax revenues from these firms.
For firms there are several determinants that are decisive for the location of FDI. Head
et al. (1995) find that firms of the same industry tend to cluster in particular regions
in order to profit from pecuniary and technological externalities, i.e. agglomeration
effects. Head and Mayer (2004) use data on Japanese-owned affiliates to test whether
market size has an effect on the location of FDI. They conclude that a 10% increase in
market potential of a region increases the probability of that region to be chosen by 3%
to 11%. Cheng and Kwan (2000) identify that, inter alia, good infrastructure and low
wage costs have a positive effect on FDI. Furthermore, as governments are interested
in collecting tax revenues, also a country’s tax system plays an important role for firms.
Importantly, the tax system affects firms’ decisions on three different stages.2 First,
once the firm decided to produce abroad, the effective average tax rate is the relevant
measure for thefirminwhichcountry to setupanewaffiliateas this captures the impact
2I neglect a prior decision in which firms choose whether to export or to produce abroad as
tax considerations are immaterial at this stage, see, for example, Helpman et al. (2004).
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of the tax on total profits. Second, conditional on this decision, the firm chooses how
much capital to invest. The optimal investment will be reached when the expected
rate of return of the investment net of taxes is equal to the effective capital cost. It is
therefore the effective marginal tax rate which is decisive. Third, conditional on the
level of investment, the firm opts for the amount of realized profits it wants to report
in the host country. At this stage, the statutory tax rate, precisely the difference in
tax rates of the host country and the destination countries, i.e. those countries where
profits are potentially shifted, is the important determinant for this decision of the
firm. Thus, if firms react elastically to changes in these tax rate measures, countries
have an incentive to compete against each other on all three dimensions.
There is empirical evidence that all three tax variables affect the firm’s decisions.
First, Devereux and Griffith (1998) find that a one percentage point increase in the
effective average tax rate in the UK would lead to a reduction in the probability of a
US firm choosing to produce there by around 1.3 percentage points. Second, Grubert
and Mutti (1991) analyze the sensitivity of U.S. investors in 33 countries with respect
to foreign effective tax rates. Their finding is that a reduction in the host country’s
tax rate from 20% to 10% increases U.S. affiliates’ net plant and equipment in the
country by 65%. Similarly, Hines and Rice (1994) show that a 1%-point reduction
in the foreign tax rate is associated with approximately 3% greater use of capital by
U. S. investors. Third, Clausing (2003) investigates the impact of tax influences on
intra-firm trade prices. She finds that firms manipulate transfer prices in order to shift
income into low-tax countries. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) suggest that at the
margin more than 65% of the additional revenue from a unilateral tax increase is lost
due to a decrease in the reported income tax base.
Based on these empirical findings it is very likely that countries have an incentive to
beggar-thy-neighbor, i.e. to attract FDI, capital and profits at the cost of other coun-
tries by, for example, cutting their tax rates. There is a large body of contributions
arguing that tax competition will lead to inefficiently low tax rates and public expendi-
ture levels (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986; Wildasin, 1989; Bucovetsky
and Wilson, 1991). These models have been extended in several ways. For example,
Bucovetsky (1991) analyzes tax competition when countries differ in size; Brueckner
(2000) investigates tax competition when labor is mobile within the country; Kind
et al. (2005) analyze the effects of changes in the economic integration; Krautheim
and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) allow for heterogeneity of firms. However, the general
message still remains that tax competition drives tax rates to an inefficiently low level.
3
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Figure 2 displays changes in the corporate income tax rates in selected countries of
the European Union. While all of these countries had tax rates above 30% in 1995,
by 2012 seven out of the ten countries reduced their tax rates below 30%. The two
countries with the most drastic decline in this period are Ireland and Germany. Those
countries reduced their tax rate by 27.5%-points respectively 27%-points. A similar
development can be observed by looking at the EU-27 countries. In the period from
1995 to 2013 statutory corporate tax rates fell from 35.3% to 23.2%, i.e. by 12.1 %-
points, on average.3 Empirically, Slemrod (2004) stresses that the corporate tax rate
is insulated from a country’s revenue needs and that the decline in corporate tax rates
is due to international competitive pressures. Devereux et al. (2008) find that there
is indeed a strategic interaction in the setting of corporate tax rates in the OECD
countries. Although statutory tax rates and also the dispersion of corporate tax rates
Figure 2: Corporate income tax rates in selected EU countries 1995-2012
Source: own illustration based on Eurostat 2013 - Taxation trends in the European
Union, Table 4.
have fallen since the 1980s4, there is still a considerable variation across countries.
3See Eurostat 2013, Table 4.
4See table 1 in Slemrod (2004).
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Figure 3 displays statutory corporate tax rates of 159 countries in the year 2013.
Across the sample corporate tax rate vary from 0% on the Bahamas to 40% in the
United States with an (unweighted) average rate of 23% and a median of 25% (Egypt).
The existence of tax havens, e.g. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Jersey and the Maldives, which do not tax corporations at all, invites
multinational firms to take advantage of the substantial tax differences. However,
apart from these mostly small and aﬄuent countries that impose a very low statutory
tax rate, there are countries in Europe which introduced a preferential tax regime. By
2013, eleven countries have implemented an Intellectual Property Box regime, which
grants a lower than statutory tax rate if firms locate their intellectual property in this
country. Among these countries are Belgium (statutory tax rate: 33.99%, preferential
tax rate: 6.8%), France (33.33%, 15.5%), Luxembourg (29.22%, 5.84%), Malta (35%,
0%), and Spain (30%, 15%) which generally have a very high statutory tax rate.5
Multinational firms can pursue several strategies to minimize their global tax pay-
ments. One strategy is to manipulate transfer prices by deviating from the true arm’s-
length price, i.e. the price at which two unrelated and non-desperate parties would
agree to a transaction. Particularly, this strategy is attractive if the market price of
the traded good is not observable which is true for patents, trademarks, brands and
copyrights.6 Another strategy is to shift profits via financial transactions. Precisely,
affiliates in a low-tax country give loans to affiliates in high-tax countries in order to
benefit from the interest depreciation tax shield.7
Governments try to combat profit-shifting by taking several actions. Almost all coun-
tries have included general anti-avoidance regulations mainly based on the arm’s-
length principle to their national tax law. In addition, some countries have also
introduced specific transfer pricing regulations containing documentation require-
ments or the required disclosure.8 However, for intangible assets there exists no
market price. Therefore governments started also to implement controlled-foreign-
corporation (CFC) rules. These CFC rule give governments the opportunity to tax
resident multinationals’ passive income if some conditions are met although the tax-
exemption principle is applied. Additionally, the application of thin capitalization
5For an overview of Intellectual Property Box regimes, see Evers et al. (2013).
6Between 1990 and 2012, royalties and license fee receipts increase by 770% from US $27 billion
to US $235 billion, see UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013, table 2.
7Egger et al. (2010) find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher
debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country.
8For an overview of Transfer Pricing Regulations, see Zinn et al. (2014)
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Figure 3: Corporate tax rates 2013
Source: own illustration based on European Tax Handbook (2013), Global Corporate
Tax Handbook (2013) and the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide (2013) provided by
Ernst & Young.
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rules limit the amount of internal interest payments that is deductible for tax pur-
poses to counter the incentive to change the financial structure just for tax reasons.
This dissertation consists of four chapters with focus on the effects of corporate taxa-
tion on the second and the third stage of firms’ decisions. The first two chapters are
concerned with governments actions against profit shifting. Chapter 1 considers opti-
mal taxation of multinational firms and asks the question when CFC rules are part of
the optimal tax mix. In contrast to chapter 1, chapter 2 analyzes the optimal thin cap-
italization rule under imperfect capital markets with heterogenous firms. Chapters 3
and 4 take different approaches. The center point of these chapters is the existence
of corporate losses. In the absence of any possibility to offset losses against profits
of other entities across the border, firms only have the options of carrying the losses
backward or forward. According to Cooper and Knittel (2006) tax return data for
U.S. corporations to investigate how firms use corporate tax losses. They find that
approximately 25% to 30% percent of the losses are never used. In contrast to purely
domestic firms multinational firms have a third option to use corporate losses. Alike
with profits, they can just shift the losses to an affiliate that has a positive taxable
income. Chapter 3 empirically tests this behavior and examines which strategies are
more convenient. Chapter 4, again theoretically, focuses on the question of how the in-
troduction of a coordinated form of cross-border loss relief will affect the governments’
non-cooperative tax choices.
In the following, I will give a brief overview of the lines of argument developed in each
chapter. All chapters a based on self-contained papers which can be read separately
and are based on co-authored papers except for chapter 2.
Chapter 1 identifies the conditions under which binding controlled-foreign-corporation
(CFC) rules are part of the optimal tax mix chosen by governments. By introducing
CFC rules, the parent country of a multinational firm reserves the right to tax the
income of the firm’s foreign affiliates, if the tax rate in the affiliate’s host country is
below a specified threshold. This chapter shows that this is the case when the financial
structure of the multinational firm responds elastically to the introduction of the CFC
rule, outweighing the negative effects on the firm’s investment decision in the parent
country, and on the profits of the home-owned firm in the parent country’s welfare
objective. It also shows that if the government is mostly interested in maximizing
tax revenues, a tighter CFC rule is associated with a tighter thin capitalization rule
in its policy optimum. This chapter is based on unpublished work carried out jointly
with Prof. Dr. Andreas Haufler, University of Munich, and Prof. Dr. Dirk Schindler,
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Norwegian School of Economics.
Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of thin capitalization rules when firms have limited ac-
cess to external funding. In the absence of financial frictions, the purpose of thin
capitalization rules is to limit multinational firms’ possibilities to engage in tax plan-
ning via debt shifting. This chapter illustrates that governments choose more lenient
thin capitalization rules when credit market frictions are severe. The analysis thus
provides an explanation why financially less developed countries are more generous
regarding the tax deductibility of internal interest payments. Furthermore, we show
that an earnings stripping rule is more appropriate to solve the underlying policy con-
flict than a safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. Mardan (2014) is the basis of this chapter.
Chapter 3 studies the flexibility of multinational firms to revert their tax-avoidance
mechanisms within a tax year, in order to shift in profits instead of shifting profits
to low-taxed profit centers when running losses. Using data of Norwegian firms, this
chapter shows that transfer pricing gives substantial flexibility to adjust profit shifting
ex post (at the end of the tax-year). In contrast, there is no evidence for flexibility
in the capital structure. Importantly, the chapter delivers an explanation for the
puzzle, why estimated effects of tax incentives on the use of internal debt are so low.
If firms are inflexible in adjusting their capital structure, i.e. they have to adjust
their tax-management strategies ex-ante (at the beginning of the tax-year), it is the
expected tax rate differential that is decisive and not the statutory tax differential.
This chapter is based on unpublished work carried out jointly with Arnt O. Hopland,
Ph.D., Norwegian School of Economics, and Prof. Dr. Dirk Schindler, Norwegian
School of Economics.
Chapter 4 analyzes the effects of introducing a coordinated cross-border tax relief in
a setting where multinational firms choose the size of a risky investment and host
countries non-cooperatively choose tax rates. Following recent court rulings this has
become a major policy issue in Europe. It shows that coordinated cross-border loss
compensation may intensify tax competition when, following current international
practice, the parent firm’s home country bases the tax rebate for a loss-making sub-
sidiary on its own tax rate. In equilibrium, tax revenue losses may thus be even higher
than is implied by the direct effect of the reform. In contrast, tax competition is mit-
igated when the home country bases its loss relief on the tax rate in the subsidiary’s
host country. This chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Dr. Andreas Haufler,
University of Munich (Haufler and Mardan, 2014).
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Chapter 1
An economic rationale for
controlled-foreign-corporation
rules
1.1 Introduction
Controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules have become an increasingly important pol-
icy instrument for governments in their attempt to curb profit shifting by multinational
companies and to protect national corporate tax bases. CFC rules apply to so-called
‘passive income’ like interest payments and royalties which can easily be placed in
affiliates in tax havens without having a substantial physical presence there.1 By clas-
sifying an affiliate whose primary activity is to provide equity or patent services to
other affiliates in the same corporate group as a ‘controlled-foreign-corporation’, the
tax authority in the parent country of the multinational thus reserves the right to tax
the profits of the affiliate in the tax haven by adding the affiliate’s income in the tax
haven to the profits declared in the parent country. CFC rules therefore override the
tax-exemption principle that most countries now apply for the taxation of multina-
tional firms.2 Typically, CFC rules stipulate a minimum tax rate that must be levied
This chapter is based on joint work with Andreas Haufler and Dirk Schindler.
1See Dischinger and Riedel (2011) for evidence that patents are placed in low-tax countries
and Reuters (2012) for a case study of tax avoidance in the United Kingdom.
2Under the tax-exemption method, the parent country does not tax the profits of foreign
affiliates of a resident MNC. This scheme is applied by most OECD countries, with the prominent
exception of the United States. See Becker and Fuest (2010) for a recent discussion and analysis.
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in a host country, in order to avoid additional taxation in the parent country. In do-
ing so, CFC rules reduce the tax gain for multinationals from placing valuable assets
like equity or patents in a tax haven.
In recent years, there has been an active policy discussion surrounding CFC rules. In
its so-called Cadbury-Schweppes decision, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
tried to ban CFC rules for affiliates that operate within the European Economic Area
and belong to multinationals that are headquartered in a European-Economic-Area
country. At the same time, however, the OECD in its ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting’ calls for introducing and strengthening CFC rules in its member
countries (OECD, 2013, action 3). Moreover, several recent empirical analysis (Ruf
and Weichenrieder 2012; Egger and Wamser, 2011) have shown that CFC rules are
effective in changing multinational firm’s decision.
In the theoretical literature, however, CFC rules have so far been left out of the analy-
sis of how governments respond to profit shifting by multinational firms. Importantly,
the theoretical case for CFC rules is by no means clear. CFC rules only apply for
domestic multinationals (i.e., multinationals that are headquartered in the country
introducing the CFC rules), and they do not affect the activity of domestic affiliates
of foreign-based multinationals. Hence, to protect the national tax base from both
debt shifting and abusive transfer pricing, it should be better to enforce strict thin-
capitalization rules. Thin capitalization rules restrict the amount of tax-deductible
internal debt (i.e., borrowing from related affiliates) for domestic affiliates of both
domestic and foreign multinationals and will therefore curb profit shifting in all multi-
national entities operating in the country. In contrast, CFC rules bind all affiliates
worldwide of domestic multinationals only. Therefore, tight CFC rules reduce the for-
eign profits of domestic multinationals and provide (potentially) positive externalities
on tax revenues in other countries. Hence, the question arises of why countries uni-
laterally implement such rules that seem to be inferior to thin-capitalization rules in
protecting the national tax base, and which harm the foreign activities of domestic
multinationals.
In this chapter, we identify theconditionsunderwhichbindingCFCrulesarepartof the
optimal taxmixchosenbygovernments. For thispurposewe setupamodel of twosmall
countriesandacontinuumof taxhavenswhichdiffer in their (exogenous) taxrates. The
model has three types of firms, domestic firms, domestic multinationals, and foreign
multinationals, all choosing their investment levels in the home country. The domestic
and foreign multinationals in addition choose the tax-optimized financial structure of
10
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their investment. This implies that investments in the home country are financed by
internal loans from an affiliate in the tax haven, provided that the interest cost of these
loans are tax-deductible in the home country. The home country’s government can tax
all firms by means of the statutory corporate tax rate and can additionally use both a
thin-capitalization rule and a CFC rule to control the choices of multinational firms.
Our analysis delivers the following results. In the tax policy optimum, the home gov-
ernment permits multinational firms to engage in some debt shifting to a tax haven, in
order to reduce the effective cost of capital and increase investment by multinationals
in the home country. This implies that some tax discrimination in favor of multina-
tional firms will take place in equilibrium.3 However, for any given level of internal
debt permitted by the thin-capitalization rule, multinational firms will still have an
incentive to engage in further, and costly, debt shifting to the tax haven. This incen-
tive arises from the statutory tax rate differential between the home country and the
tax haven, and cannot be affected by the thin-capitalization rules. Since lowering the
statutory tax rate involves tax revenue losses from all firms, a binding CFC rule will
be the preferred instrument to control this margin. A binding CFC rule will then re-
sult in the government’s policy optimum, if the MNC’s internal debt choice responds
elastically to the introduction of the CFC rule, and if it outweighs the negative effects
on the domestic MNC’s investment decision and on the profits of its foreign affiliates.
We also analyze the relationship between the thin-capitalization rule and the CFC rule
in the government’s policy optimum. We show that a greater home bias of the domes-
tic MNC leads to a tighter CFC rule and to a more generous thin-capitalization rule,
if governments are mostly interested in maximizing tax revenues. The reason is that
the domestic MNC’s home affiliate reacts less elastic to changes in the effective capi-
tal costs. Thus, the government can be stricter in its CFC rule in order to reduce the
excess leverage of the domestic MNC, without decreasing the investment too much.
This incentive is strong if the profits shifted via excessive leveraging are large. Due
to a decline in the excess leverage, the tax base of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate
increases which gives the government an incentive to be less strict in the thin capi-
talization rule in order to attract investments of all MNCs in the country. Again this
effect is strong if the reduction in the excess leverage is large which corresponds to an
initially high level of excess leverage.
3Note that, at least within the European Economic Area, thin-capitalization rules cannot be
designed in a way to discriminate between domestic and foreign multinationals, see the Lankhorst-
Hohorst ruling of the ECJ in 2002.
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Theexisting literatureonCFCrules is largely empirical. EggerandWamser (2011)and
Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) analyze the effects of the German thin-capitalization
rule on the investment and financing decisions of German multinationals. Ruf and
Weichenrieder (2013) examine whether, and how, these patterns have been affected
by the Cadbury-Schweppes decision of the European Court of Justice. To the best of
our knowledge, the only theoretical contribution is Weichenrieder (1996). He analyzes
the effect of CFC rules on capital investment and shows that CFC rules increase capital
costs and decrease (foreign) investment of domestic multinationals. His analysis does
not model debt shifting (nor transfer pricing) explicitly, however, and it does not derive
optimal tax policies towards multinationals.
In comparison to CFC rules, thin-capitalization rules have received some more atten-
tion in the recent literature. From a theoretical perspective, Hong and Smart (2010)
and Haufler and Runkel (2012) show that thin-capitalization rules can be used as an
instrument to differentiate between the effective taxation of domestic and multina-
tional firms. In a tax competition equilibrium, thin-capitalization rules will then be
set inefficiently lax, in order to attract investment by multinational firms.4 Mardan
(2013) compares the effects of alternative thin-capitalization rules. From an empirical
perspective, there is ample evidence that thin-capitalization rules are effective in re-
stricting internal borrowing and debt shifting, but still offer sufficient leeway to allow
for some (excessive) internal leverage. Examples of this literature are Weichenrieder
and Windischbauer (2008), Overesch and Wamser (2010), Bu¨ttner et al. (2012), and
Blouin et al. (2014).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we give some in-
stitutional background on CFC rules and describe the results in the recent empirical
literature on this subject in more detail. Section 1.3 presents our model and derives
the optimal financing and investment decisions of national and multinational firms.
Section 1.4 turns to the optimal tax policy choices made by the small country’s gov-
ernment. We also analyze in detail the relationship between the thin-capitalization
and CFC rules chosen in the government’s policy optimum. Section 1.5 discusses our
results and outlines some possible extensions. Section 1.6 concludes.
4An analogous argument holds for a lax enforcement of the arm’s-length-principle, which allows
the MNC to shift profits to a low-tax haven. See Peralta and van Ypersele (2006).
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1.2 Institutional background and empirical re-
sults
CFC rules were first introduced as ‘Subpart F’ legislation in the United States in 1964.
Germany followed in 1972 (‘Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung’ in §§7 to 14 in the Foreign
Tax Act) using the US rules as a blue print. In 2013, more than 30 countries worldwide
used CFC rules to limit profit shifting by multinational corporations.5 Table 1.1
collects the minimum tax rates that a host country must levy in order to avoid CFC
taxation in the parent country of the multinational and compares this tax rate to the
statutory corporate income tax rate in the parent country. The table also shows that
most countries with CFC rules also employ thin-capitalization rules to limit debt-
shifting by multinationals operating in their country.
The basic set-up of CFC rules is as follows. If a resident company (parent) has a
significant, controlling influence (no matter whether direct or indirect shareholding)
on an affiliate that is located abroad and faces a ‘low tax rate’, the host country of the
parent will override the tax-exemption principle if the income is classified as ‘passive
income’. Passive income (e.g., interest income, royalties) will then be taxed on accrual
under the tax-credit method at the higher tax rate of the parent company.
The German rules are exemplary. German CFC rules apply if a German company
directly or indirectly holds 50% or more of the voting rights in a foreign affiliate and
if this affiliates faces an effective tax rate of less than 25% (being calculated according
to German tax base measures). If the foreign company earns passive income, that
passive income is immediately included in the corporate tax base of the German parent
company and taxed at the German tax rate – no matter where the passive income
effectively accrued. Thereby, the German tax code negatively defines ‘passive income’
as not being listed as active incomes in §8(1) Foreign Tax Act. Essentially, passive
income comprises revenues from nonproductive activities such as royalties and interest
income in affiliates, earned on capital not raised from unrelated third parties.6
Due to the fact that the German central bank (i.e., Deutsche Bundesbank) provides
a detailed data base (the so-called MiDi database) for analyzing debt-shifting, FDI
flows and related issues, the German CFC rules are well-examined empirically. Ruf and
5See KPMG (2008) for a brief survey of institutional details. Lang et al. (2004) offer a detailed
discussion of CFC rules from a legal perspective.
6For detailed overviews of the German CFC legislation, see Fo¨rster and Schmidtmann (2004)
and Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012).
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Table 1.1: CFC Rules and thin-capitalization Rules in Selected Countries (2013)
corporate in- CFC rule: thin capital-
come tax rate minimum tax ization rule
(CIT, in%) in host country (%) typea ratio
Argentina 35 black-listed jurisdictions debt/equity 2:1
Australia 30 30b debt/equity 3:1
Azerbaijan 20 10 (50% of CIT) none -
Brazil 34 20 (as of 2015) debt/equity 2:1
Canada 26.5 26.5b debt/equity 2:1
China 25 12.5 (50% of CIT) debt/equity 2:1
Denmark 25 25b debt/equity 4:1
Egypt 25 18.75 (75% of CIT) debt/equity 4:1
Finland 24.5 18.38 (75% of CIT) interest/EBITDA 30%
France 33.33 16.66 (50% of CIT) debt/equity 1.5:1
Germany 29.55 25 interest/EBITDA 30%
Hungary 19 10 debt/equity 3:1
Iceland 20 13.33 (66% of CIT) none -
Indonesia 25 25b none -
Israel 25 20 none -
Italy 31.4 15.7 (50% of CIT) interest/EBITDA 30%
Japan 38 20 debt/equity 3:1
Korea (Rep.) 24.2 15 debt/equity 3:1
Lithuania 15 11.25 (75% of CIT) debt/equity 4:1
Mexico 30 22.5 (75% of CIT) debt/equity 3:1
New Zealand 28 28b debt/equity 1.5:1
Norway 28 18.66 none -
Peru 30 22.5 (75% of CIT) debt/equity 3:1
Portugal 25 15 (60% of CIT) interest/EBITDA 30%
South Africa 28 21 (75% of CIT) debt/equity 3:1
Spain 30 22.5 (75% of CIT) interest/EBITDA 30%
Sweden 22 12.1 (55% of CIT) none -
Turkey 20 10 debt/equity 3:1
Un. Kingdom 23 17.25 (75% of CIT) debt/equity 1:1
United States 40 40b debt/equity 1.5:1
Uruguay 25 12 none -
Venezuela 34 20 debt/equity 1:1
a ‘Safe haven’ debt-to-equity ratio or share of interest income over gross profits
(EBITDA)up to which interest payments are deductible from the corporate tax base.
b Country adopts transaction approach: (only) the passive income of a CFC is added to
the tax base in the residence country and taxed there, irrespective of the CFC’s location.
Sources: European Tax Handbook (2013) and Global Corporate Tax Handbook (2013).
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam.
14
An economic rationale for controlled-foreign-corporation rules
Weichenrieder (2012) find that German CFC rules are very effective in curbing passive
investments and have a strong impact on the location decision of internal banks and
profit centers. Analyzing data from 1996 to 2006, the authors use a set of German tax
reforms that occurred between 2001 and 2003.7 One of their findings is that a shelter
from CFC taxation has strong effects on the location of internal banks, i.e., conduit
entities with positive net lending. The existence of binding CFC rules reduces the
likelihood to locate the internal bank in such a low-tax country by 45%. Consequently,
binding CFC rules significantly reduce passive investment in tax havens, and even lead
multinationals to abandon their presence in some tax havens altogether.
In a sequel paper, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) test whether the Cadbury-Schweppes
ruling by the ECJ in 2006 and the resulting ban of CFC rules for low-taxed affiliates
within the European Economic Area induced German multinationals to relocate their
profit centers and internal banks to (implicit) tax havens within the European Eco-
nomic Area (e.g., Ireland or the Benelux countries). Analyzing the years 1999 to 2010
in the MiDi database, Ruf and Weichenrieder find (almost) no effect of the ECJ’s de-
cision. One explanation offered is that there is still sufficient uncertainty left whether
CFC rules indeed no longer apply in countries of the European Economic Area. An-
other reason could be that the German multinationals had located their internal banks
within the EU already before 2006.
Relying on the MiDi database as well, Egger and Wamser (2011) analyze the impact of
German CFC rules on real investment (i.e., fixed assets) in foreign affiliates of German
multinationals. These authors use the fact that the full set of German CFC rules
(including exemptions) gives rise to two different thresholds, thus allowing for a two-
dimensional regression discontinuity approach. Egger and Wamser find a substantially
negative local average treatment effect (around the two treatment thresholds) on real
investment, because a binding CFC rule significantly increases effective capital costs.
The only studies not using German data are Altshuler and Hubbard (2003) and Mutti
and Grubert (2006). Altshuler and Hubbard look at US multinationals’ income from
financial services and rely on changes in the ‘Subpart F’ legislation in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. Their findings suggest that tighter US CFC rules restrict tax deferral by
US multinationals. Mutti and Grubert, however, point out that there is an increased
7For example, there was a treaty override in 2003. Before 2003, passive income was sheltered
from any taxation in Germany (and thus also from CFC legislation) in some double tax agreements,
whereas other double tax agreements had explicit activity clauses providing tax shelter only for
active income. In 2003, however, Germany decided to apply such activity clauses to all existing
tax treaties.
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use of hybrid entities that could allow US multinationals to work around the tightening
of the US CFC rules.
1.3 The model
1.3.1 The basic framework
We set up a model of two small countries, a home country labeled h and a foreign
country labeled f . Additionally, there exists a continuum of tax haven countries
offering preferential tax rates tk, which are continuously distributed in the range [0, th).
Capital is perfectly mobile across countries so that the rate of return of capital is fixed
at r > 0.
There are two representative multinational companies (henceforth MNCs), one head-
quartered in each of countries h and f . Each MNC has one producing affiliate in each
country, h and f respectively, and a financial center in one of the tax haven countries.8
Furthermore, there is also one purely national firm in each country h and f . The cat-
egorization of firms into national vs. multinational firms is exogenous to our analysis,
arising for example from differential fixed costs of setting up an ’internationalized’
organizational structure.9
All firms use capital to produce a homogenous output good they sell in the world
market at a price normalized to one. The output good is produced with capital and
some fixed factor, leading to a production function with positive but decreasing returns
to investment. Production technologies are allowed to differ between national firms
and MNCs. For the national firms, the capital use is denoted by di, with i ∈ {h, f}, and
production is given by g(di). For the MNCs, capital use is k
j
i , where the superscript j
denotes the ownership country (i.e., the country where the headquarter resides) and
the subscript i indicates the country where capital is employed. Production by the
MNCs is given by f(φkji ). We assume a home bias where capital invested by a MNC
in its home (headquarter) country is more productive than in the foreign (affiliate)
country. One reasoning could be that agency problems in the home country are less
8We assume that all affiliates are fully owned by the parent company. For an analysis of debt
shifting in the presence of variable ownership structures, see Schindler and Schjelderup (2012).
9This follows most of the literature on discriminatory tax competition, which assumes exoge-
nous differences in the international mobility of capital tax bases. For an analysis that endogenizes
the degree of firm mobility, see Bucovetsky and Haufler (2008).
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severe so that less resources are lost or wasted. Hence, the productivity parameter is
φ > 1 if i = j, but φ = 1 if i 6= j.
For simplicity, our analysis ignores external capital markets and assumes that all
firms can raise sufficient equity to finance their optimal investment levels. Thus, all
investment by national firms will be financed by equity. MNCs can, however, place
their equity in the tax haven affiliate, which then makes internal loans to the affiliates
in countries h and f . This generates interest income in the tax haven but deductible
interest expenses in countries h and f , thus leading to aggregate tax savings by the
MNC.
The governments of countries h and f can deploy three different tax instruments.
These are (i) the corporate tax rates ti; (ii) a thin-capitalization rule λi; and (iii) a
CFC rule that is characterized by a minimum tax rate τ j that the tax haven must levy
to avoid taxation in the headquarter country j. These three policy instruments affect
the decisions of MNCs by changing their effective tax rates. Thin-capitalization rules
allow all MNCs investing in a host country i to deduct internal interest payments to
the affiliate in the tax haven up to a maximum share 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 of the corporate tax
base. The policy instrument λi may thus either capture a ‘safe haven’ ratio of debt
to equity, or a share of total corporate profits (see Table 1.1). As long as the legally
specified share λi is not exceeded, we assume that the internal loan transaction with
the tax haven affiliate is not associated with any transaction costs for the firm. Hence,
given the tax savings, affiliates will always find it optimal to engage in internal lending
until the tax-deductible share of internal interest payments λi is exhausted.
Moreover, MNCs typically have additional ways to ‘stretch’ existing thin-
capitalization rules, for example by utilizing holding structures that are allowed
to have higher leverages (see Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 2008, for details) or
by misdeclaring internal debt as external debt and disguising the ownership in the in-
ternal bank.10 Such restructuring will cause additional costs, however, which we call
‘concealment costs’ in the following. Hence, in excess of the tax-deductible share of
internal debt λi that is covered by the thin-capitalization rule, affiliates will be able
to deduct a further, endogenous share βji of their capital costs in the host country by
means of internal debt shifting to a tax haven. The share βji is chosen so as to max-
imize the difference between the tax gain obtained by these additional transactions
and the concealment costs incurred. Concealment costs are assumed to be a linear
10More generally, the results in empirical studies on thin-cap rules point to that there is always
some leeway left; see, e.g., Blouin et al., (2014).
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function of the capital stock and a quadratic function of the extra leverage βji and are
given by Cji = (δ/2)(β
j
i )
2kji .
The CFC rule, in contrast, allows governments to discriminate between domestic and
foreign MNCs, as only the domestic MNCs are affected by this rule. The tax rate τ j is
the minimum tax rate that a tax haven country must levy on the profits of the MNC
in order to avoid additional taxation in the MNC’s parent country (see Table 1). In
the MNC’s optimum, the affiliate holding the firm’s capital (the ‘internal bank’ of the
MNC) will therefore be located in a tax haven country k whose statutory tax rate tk is
just equal to this lowest possible tax rate that avoids the headquarter country j’s CFC
rules. Hence, by choosing τ j, a headquarter country is able to limit the tax advantage
that the domestic MNC obtains from internal leverage. This instrument thus applies
to both the internal debt within the limit of the legally stipulated thin-capitalization
rule, and to the firm’s optimal level of ‘excess’ leverage βji .
1.3.2 Firms’ decision problems
National firms. Unlike MNCs, the national firms do not have the opportunity to
use internal debt as a tax planning instrument. Costs of capital cannot be deducted
from the tax base and hence the tax combines a tax on profits with a ‘pure’ capital tax.
The decision problem of the national firms reduces to an investment decision problem.
Profits of the national firms are
pidi = (1− ti)g(di)− rdi. (1.1)
The optimal investment level is then implicitly defined by the first-order condition
(1− ti)g′(di) = r. (1.2)
The effects of an increase in the statutory tax rate ti on the investment levels of national
firms are given by
∂di
∂ti
=
g′(di)
(1− th)g′′(di) < 0 ∀ i ∈ {h, f}. (1.3)
Since the costs of financing the investment are not tax-deductible for national firms,
but the returns from the investment are taxed, a higher tax rate induces national firms
to reduce their investment levels. The governments’ remaining tax instruments do not
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affect national firms.
Multinational firms. Under the ruling international standard of separate account-
ing, profits are considered separately for each entity of a MNC. Moreover, for a firm
that is headquartered in country j and has an affiliate in country i, net profits are
piji = (1− ti)f(φkji )− ρjikji , (1.4)
where φ ≥ 1, as discussed above and the firm-specific capital costs are
ρji =
[
1− (ti − τ j)(λi + βji ) +
δ
2r
(βji )
2
]
r. (1.5)
Thus the capital costs of an affiliate of MNE j in country i are reduced by the tax
shield of internal debt, which depends on the host country’s tax rate ti. However, the
tax gain is limited by the fact that the headquarter country’s CFC rule leads to the
internal bank being located in a tax haven with the tax rate τ j (where the interest
income from the internal loan is taxed).11 The amount of internal debt that is shifted
to the tax haven depends on the share of internal debt λi that is tax-deductible under
the thin-capitalization rule, and on the excess leverage βji . The latter, however, causes
concealment costs that reduce the net gain from the extra leverage βji and increase the
capital cost.12
The MNC’s maximization problem can be seen as a two stage process where the affiliate
first chooses the profit maximizing financial structure and then, in a second step,
decides on how much to invest and produce in each country. The optimal leverage
ratio is obtained by minimizing the effective capital cost in (1.5) with respect to βji ,
giving
βji =
r
δ
(ti − τ j). (1.6)
Substituting (1.6) in (1.5) gives the effective capital cost under the optimized financial
11For a tax-efficient capital structure, the internal debt tax shield needs to be maximized. That
implies to place the internal bank in the affiliate with the lowest effective tax rate; see Mintz and
Smart (2004) and Schindler and Schjelderup (2012). In case of CFC rules, this affiliate will be the
one for which the CFC rule is just not binding.
12From (1.5) we see that the investment costs of an affiliate in country i would be fully tax-
deductible, leading to effective capital costs ρji = (1− ti)r, if the headquarter country allowed the
internal bank to be placed in a tax haven with a zero tax rate (τ j = 0) and there is no binding
thin-capitalization rule so that λi = 1. In this case the affiliates would not have an incentive to
use any extra leverage (βji = 0) and consequently would also not occur any concealment costs.
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structure
(ρji )
∗ =
[
1− (ti − τ j)λi − r
2δ
(ti − τ j)2
]
r. (1.7)
From equation (1.7) we can derive the effects of all tax instruments on the effective
capital costs of each affiliate. In country h, three different entities of MNCs need to
be considered: the home affiliate of the domestic MNC, the foreign affiliate of the
domestic MNC, and the home affiliate of the foreign MNC. The effect of the home
country’s tax parameters th, λh and τ
h on these three firm types are given by
∂ρhh
∂th
= −(λh + βhh)r,
∂ρhh
∂λh
= −(th − τh)r, ∂ρ
h
h
∂τh
= (λh + β
h
h)r; (1.8a)
∂ρhf
∂th
= 0,
∂ρhf
∂λh
= 0,
∂ρhf
∂τh
= (λf + β
h
f )r; (1.8b)
∂ρfh
∂th
= −(λh + βfh)r,
∂ρfh
∂λh
= −(th − τ f )r, ∂ρ
f
h
∂τh
= 0. (1.8c)
Turning first to the effects on the domestic MNC’s home affiliate in (1.8a), we see
that an increase in country h’s statutory tax rate lowers the effective capital costs,
because it increases the tax shield of (internal) debt. Similarly, a more lenient thin-
capitalization rule reduces the cost of capital by decreasing the corporate tax base.
Finally, an increase in τh, which implies a tightened CFC rule, decreases the gains
from debt shifting and therefore results in higher effective capital costs.
The tax effects on the home MNC’s affiliate in the foreign country f are given in (1.8b).
This shows that neither the statutory tax rate th nor the thin-capitalization rule λh
affects the effective capital costs of this affiliate. However, countryh’s CFC rule applies
to the domestic firm’s affiliate in the foreign country. Thus, an increase in τh increases
the effective capital costs of this affiliate.
Finally, equation (1.8c) shows the tax effects on the foreign MNC’s affiliate in the
home country h. An increase in the home country’s statutory tax rate th or the thin-
capitalization rule λh reduces the effective capital costs for the foreign MNC for the
same reasons as they are true for the domestic MNC [see eq. (1.8a)]. However, the
foreign MNC is unaffected by a change in the home country’s CFC rule τ j.
In the first stage, all MNCs choose their investment levels, given the optimized financial
structure. From (1.4), optimal investment levels are
(1− ti)φf ′(φkji )− ρji = 0 ∀ i, j = h, f. (1.9)
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An increase in the effective capital costs ρji decreases investment by
∂kji
∂ρji
=
1
(1− ti)φ2f ′′(φkji )
< 0 ∀ i, j = h, f. (1.10)
The effects of the home country’s statutory tax rate th on the investment decision of
each MNC result from the direct effects on net profits in (1.9) and the effect on the
effective capital costs in (1.8a)–(1.8c). Recalling that φ > 1 if i = j, but φ = 1 if i 6= j
gives
∂khh
∂th
=
φf ′(φkhh)− (λh + βhh)
(1− th)φ2f ′′(φkhh)
< 0,
∂khf
∂th
= 0,
∂kfh
∂th
=
f ′(kfh)− (λh + βfh)
(1− th)f ′′(kfh)
< 0.
(1.11)
Accordingly, the statutory tax rate th negatively affects investment levels for all affili-
ates located in country h, but not the investment of the foreign affiliate of the domestic
MNC. The investment effects of the other tax instruments λh and τ
h result only from
the changes in the effective cost of capital (1.8a)–(1.8c), in combination with the neg-
ative effect of capital costs on investment levels in (1.10).
1.4 Optimal tax policy
Welfare in country h is given as a weighted average of domestic tax revenues and the
sum of the profits of national firms and the domestic MNC,13
Wh = th · Th + γ · Πh, (1.12)
where Th is the total tax base in the home country, Π
h = pid + pi
h
h + pi
h
f are the total
profits of firms operating in h, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the relative welfare weight placed on
firms’ profits. The welfare discount on firms’ profits either reflects the fact that raising
corporate tax revenue is important for society (either for redistributive reasons, or
to reduce other distortive taxes), or that domestic firms are partly owned by foreign
investors that do not enter the domestic welfare function. For γ = 0 we would have a
Leviathan government that is solely interested in maximizing its tax revenue.
The domestic tax base Th consists of the sales of all entities located in country h. From
this is subtracted the tax cost for the government of granting a tax shield by permitting
13Note that consumers in the home country are not affected by tax policy in our model, because
the price of the single output good is determined in the large world market.
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the deduction of internal debt for the home affiliates of the domestic and the foreign
MNCs:
Th = g(dh)+f(φk
h
h)−
[
λh +
r
δ
(th − τh)
]
rkhh+f(k
f
h)−
[
λh +
r
δ
(th − τ f )
]
rkfh, (1.13)
The home government (and analogously the foreign government) maximizes national
welfare in (1.12) by choosing the statutory tax rate th, the thin-capitalization rule λh
and the CFC rule τh, subject to the optimal financing and investment decisions of the
different firm types as discussed in the last section.
1.4.1 Choosing individual tax parameters
Optimal statutory tax rate. The welfare function shows that all types of firms in
country h are affected by changes in the statutory tax rate. Differentiating the welfare
function with respect to th implicitly determines the optimal statutory tax rate:
∂Wh
∂th
= (1− γ) [g (dh) + f (φkhh)− (λh + βhh) rkhh]+ [f (kfh)− (λh + βfh) rkfh]
+ thg
′(dh)
∂dh
∂th
+ th
[
φf ′
(
φkhh
)− (λh + βhh) r] ∂khh∂th
+ th
[
f ′(kfh)− (λh + βfh)r
] ∂kfh
∂th
− th r
2
δ
(
khh + k
f
h
)
= 0. (1.14)
The first-order condition in (1.14) states that an increase in the statutory tax rate th
increases the welfare in country h due to higher net gains from taxing domestic profits
(the first term on the right-hand side) and from the taxation of foreign-owned profits
(the second term). However, a higher statutory tax rate also reduces the domestic
tax base, and hence tax revenues, as a result of lower investments by all local affiliates
(the third, fourth and fifth term). Finally, the tax base of country h is further reduced
because MNC affiliates in country h have an incentive to increase the variable internal
debt level βji (the sixth term).
Evaluating (1.14) at th = 0 shows that all negative terms are zero in this case and
hence ∂Wh/∂th is unambiguously positive at this point. Therefore, the statutory tax
rate must be positive in the government’s optimum.
Optimal thin-capitalization rule. Introducing a thin-capitalization rule allows
the government to discriminate between purely national and MNCs, by changing the
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tax base for MNCs. Differentiating (1.12) with respect to λh gives
∂Wh
∂λh
= th
[
φf ′
(
φkhh
)− (λh + βhh) r] ∂khh∂ρhh ∂ρ
h
h
∂λh
+ th
[
f ′
(
kfh
)
−
(
λh + β
f
h
)
r
] ∂kfh
∂ρfh
∂ρfh
∂λh
− thr
(
khh + k
f
h
)
− γkhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
≤ 0. (1.15a)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (1.15a) is positive, as an increase in λh
reduces the effective capital costs and thus induces the home affiliates of the domestic
and foreign MNCs to expand their investment, and thus their sales in the home country
[see (1.10)]. The third term isnegative, however, as amoregenerous thin-capitalization
rule allows MNCs to deduct a higher share of their financing costs from the corporate
tax base. Finally, the fourth term is again positive, as a reduction in its capital costs
increases the profits of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate.
From (1.15a) we can infer that the government will only set a positive level of λh in the
optimum, if the three positive effects overcompensate the negative third effect. This
will be the case when the affiliates’ investment in country h reacts strongly to changes
in the cost of capital (i.e., ∂khh/∂ρ
h
h and ∂k
f
h/∂ρ
f
h are large in absolute value), or when
the profits of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate are important (large γ). When these
conditions are met, we can rewrite (1.15a) as
λhthr
(
khh + k
f
h
)
=
th
(1− th)
[
khhµ
hεkhh ,ρhhερhh,λh + k
f
hµ
fεkfh,ρ
f
h
ερfh,λh
]
− γkhhρhh ερhh,λh (1.15b)
where µj = ρjh − (1− th)(λh + βjh) r > 0 and we have defined the elasticities
εkjh,ρ
j
h
=
∂kjh
∂ρjh
ρjh
kjh
, ερjh,λh
=
∂ρjh
∂λh
λh
ρjh
, j = {h, f}. (1.16)
The first expression in (1.16) is the elasticity of capital with respect to the effective
capital costs. The second expression gives the elasticity with which the effective cost
of capital of the domestic and the foreign MNC respond to the home country’s thin-
capitalization rule.
Using (1.15b), we can interpret how the optimal (positive) thin-capitalization rule is
affected. Clearly, the optimal level of λh is the larger the higher is the product of the
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elasticities εkjh,ρ
j
h
ερjh,λh
. The product of these elasticities rises, in turn, when f ′′(φkhh)
and f ′′(kfh) are small [see eq. (1.10)]. This implies that pure profits are low and the
tax is mostly a tax on the normal return to capital. If capital reacts very elastically to
changes in the thin-capitalization rule (εkjh,ρ
j
h
ερjh,λh
→ ∞), then λh must go towards
its maximum of one. In this case the investment expansion will always dominate the
tax base reduction caused by the larger tax shield.
Optimal CFC rule. Finally, the home government can set a minimum statutory
tax rate τ j for an affiliate of the domestic MNC located in a tax haven, where τ j is just
sufficient to avoid additional taxation in the home (headquarter) country. Thus, the
CFC rule reduces the tax gain from internal debt and consequently raises the cost of
capital for affiliates of the domestic MNC located in h and f . Differentiating (1.12)
with respect to τh gives
∂Wh
∂τh
= th
{
r2
δ
khh +
[
φf ′
(
φkhh
)− (λh + βhh) r] ∂khh∂ρhh ∂ρ
h
h
∂τh
}
− γ [khh (λh + βhh)+ khf (λf + βhf )] r ≤ 0. (1.17a)
The first term in the curly bracket on the right-hand side is positive, showing that a
tighter CFC rule increases tax revenues in the home country by reducing the extra
leverage βhh that the home affiliate of the domestic MNC chooses in its financial opti-
mum. In contrast, the second term in the curly bracket is negative, because a tighter
CFC rule increases the effective capital costs of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate,
thereby reducing investment and tax revenues. Finally, the third term is also negative
as all affiliates of the domestic MNC lose profits due to the higher costs of capital.
Again, the government will only implement a CFC rule if the welfare gains associated
with this instrument exceed the welfare losses. This is the case if the concealment
cost parameter δ is low and hence internal debt responds elastically to changes in the
CFC rule. Moreover, a positive CFC rule is more likely, other things being equal, if
the investment response of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate is inelastic and if tax
revenues have a high weight in the welfare function, relative to the profits of the home
MNC (γ is small). We summarize these conditions in:
Proposition 1.1 Each government sets a binding CFC rule in its optimum (τh >
0), if (i) the financing structure of the domestic MNC responds elastically to this
policy change, (ii) the investment decision responds inelastically to the rise in the
cost of capital; and (iii) if tax revenue is important, relative to the domestic MNC’s
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profits.
If the conditions in Proposition 1.1 are met, we can rewrite (1.17a) as
τh
{
γ
[
1 +
khf
(
λf + β
h
f
)
khh
(
λh + βhh
)]− th
1− th
µh
ρhh
εkhh ,ρhh
}
= −th εβhh ,τh , (1.17b)
where
εβhh ,τh =
∂βhh
∂τh
τh
(λh + βhh)
.
From (1.17b), we can infer how the optimal (positive) CFC rule is affected. Firstly,
the CFC rule is the larger the smaller is the foreign investment of the domestic MNC
(khf ), relative to its home investment (k
h
h). This is because the CFC rule increases the
cost of capital for all affiliates of the domestic MNC. This increases the tax base of
the home affiliate, resulting in lower profits of the domestic MNC but also in higher
tax revenues. In contrast, the tax base broadening of the foreign affiliate reduces
the domestic MNC’s profits but the additional tax payments accrue to the foreign
country f . Secondly, if profits of the domestic MNC are unimportant for welfare (γ is
small) the negative effect of a decrease in the domestic MNC’s profits is small. This
leads to a tighter CFC rule (a higher level of τh), other things being equal. Thirdly,
the CFC rule is the larger, the smaller is εkhh ,ρhh in absolute value. This implies that
domestic investment does not fall too much if capital costs are increased. From (1.10)
we see that the investment response is reduced if there are high profits in the home
market (f ′′ is large), or if there is a large home bias of the domestic affiliate (φ is large).
1.4.2 Comparative statics
So far, we have discussed each policy instruments in isolation. It is interesting to see,
however, whether the choice of the optimal thin-capitalization rule on the one hand
and the optimal CFC rule on the other are interrelated. Therefore, we analyze how
a change in the home bias parameter φ affects the optimal thin capitalization rule λh
and the optimal CFC rule τh. In appendix A, we can show that
Proposition 1.2 A higher home bias corresponds with a tighter CFC rule (a higher
level of τh) and with more generous thin-capitalization rule (a higher level of λh) if
the government maximizes tax revenues and δ is small.
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The intuition is as follows. The direct effect of an increase in the home bias is that
the domestic MNC’s home affiliate reacts less sensitive to changes in the effective
capital costs (cf. (A.16)). Other things being equal, the government has an incentive
to set a stricter thin capitalization rule and a tighter CFC rule. The reason is that
the government’s tax gains from relaxing the thin capitalization rule are reduced due
to the lower elasticity of investments of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate. For the
same reason, the government can implement a tighter CFC rule as the reduction in
investment due to an increase in the effective capital costs are smaller.
However, for each of the two policy instruments there exists a counteracting indirect
effect which would be absent if we looked at the policy instruments in isolation. A
stricter CFC rule reduces the domestic MNC’s incentive to shift profits as the tax
differential, i.e. the difference between the home country’s tax rate and the tax rate
in the pivotal tax haven country (whose tax rate is just high enough to avoid CFC
legislation) is reduced. This increases the taxbaseof thedomesticMNC’shomeaffiliate
and allows the home government to be more generous in the thin capitalization rule.
This effect is stronger the higher the initial amount of the excess leverage βhh . Thus,
if costs of concealing are low, that is if δ is small, this effect will overcompensate the
direct effect. Consequently, the government allows a higher amount of tax deductions
for internal interest payments if the home bias increases.
A more lenient thin capitalization rule counters the decrease in the elasticity of in-
vestment and thus increases the costs of the CFC rule (see second term in in curly
brackets of (1.17a)). However, as a less strict thin capitalization rule increases invest-
ments also the amount of profits shifted via excessive leveraging rises (see first term
in curly brackets of (1.17a)) which can be taxed by the CFC rule. These tax revenue
gains are higher, the higher the initial excess leverage and thus the smaller the costs
of concealing. Hence, if δ is small, the increase in tax revenues via a reduction in the
excess leverage will overcompensate the decline in investments induced by tightening
the CFC rule. As a result, the government will set a tighter CFC rule in the optimum
if the home bias increases.
1.5 Discussion and extensions
In the previous section, we have discussed the conditions under which countries choose
positive values of λh and τ
h. This requires that the MNC’s financing decision responds
very elastically to tax incentives, the investment elasticities of MNCs have an inter-
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mediate value, and the governments are mostly interested in tax revenues. For many
countries this seems to be a plausible combination of parameters, motivating the ex-
istence of CFC rules and a positive share of internal debt that is deductible from the
corporate tax base (see Table 1.1).
We can go one step further, however, and interpret the optimal policies quantita-
tively for different country characteristics. For example, the optimal level of the thin-
capitalization rule λh in (1.15b) will be higher, if a country faces a high elasticity with
which investment from domestic and foreign MNCs responds to changes in the cost of
capital. Such high investment elasticities are typical for small countries, for example.
Therefore, the first-order condition (1.15b) is compatible with the result that smaller
countries will have more lenient thin-capitalization rules, on average, than their larger
(and otherwise similar) neighbors.14 Alternatively, a high investment elasticity can
also be the result of small location rents to be earned in a given country. This cor-
responds to a low value of f ′′(kji ) in eq. (1.10). Thus, in another interpretation, our
results are compatible with the finding that countries offering few location rents will
have more generous thin-capitalization rules, on average (see Mardan, 2014).
Similarly, we see from (1.17b) that the optimal CFC tax rate τh is smaller when the
ratio of foreign over domestic investment is high (i.e., khf/k
h
h is large). This is because
the foreign affiliates of the domestic MNC suffer from income losses when the CFC rule
is tightened, but the tax revenues resulting from the higher effective tax rate accrue
to the foreign host countries. This suggests that CFC rules will be used primarily by
large countries, whose MNCs have a substantial presence in the home country. This
is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 1.1.
We can also outline some possible extensions of our analysis. Our specification of CFC
rules has focused on the minimal tax rate tk that a (tax haven) host country must levy
in order to circumvent additional taxation by the headquarter country of the MNC. A
second criterion of CFC rules is that the income earned earned in the tax haven country
must be ‘passive income’. Therefore MNCs could alternatively avoid the CFC rule, if
they adjusted their activities in the tax haven so that the income is classified as active
income. The CFC rule would then not bind, even if the tax rate in the host country
is below the critical threshold. With such an extension, MNCs could therefore engage
in costly strategies to turn passive into active income, in order to increase the tax gain
of internal debt. This additional avoidance decision would thus tend to make a given
CFC rule less effective as an instrument to increase tax revenue collections. However,
14See Haufler and Runkel (2012, Proposition 4) for a rigorous analysis of this case.
27
An economic rationale for controlled-foreign-corporation rules
as long as setting up a substantial physical presence in the tax haven is costly to the
firm, the qualitative effects of introducing CFC rules should remain unchanged.
Finally, our model currently assumes that MNCs have no costs of placing an affiliate
in a tax haven and face no transaction cost of shifting internal debt there (at least for
the share of internal debt is covered by the thin-capitalization rule). More generally,
MNCs will face a fixed cost of establishing a presence in a tax haven and will therefore
not do so, if the tax gain is sufficiently small.15 Hence, by setting a sufficiently tight
CFC rule, a headquarter country could then eliminate all debt shifting to the tax
haven for domestic MNCs, whereas foreign MNCs could still benefit from a permissive
thin-capitalization rule. This model extension could explain the finding in Table 1.1
that some countries set CFC tax rates that are very close to their domestic statutory
corporate tax rate.
1.6 Conclusion
Many governments have to cope with less tax revenue as multinational corporations
are exploiting legal arbitrage opportunities in order to shift profits from high-tax to
low-tax countries. Justified by this development the OECD calls for introducing and
strengthening CFC rules in its member countries in its ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting’. Many governments have introduced such rules and the recent
empirical literature shows that multinational firms are sensitive to changes in CFC
rules. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far neglected the analysis of CFC rules.
This paper contributes in filling the gap.
In the paper, we identify the conditions under which binding CFC rules are part of
the optimal tax mix chosen by governments. First, we show that CFC rules are part
of the optimal tax mix chosen by the government if the MNC’s internal debt choice
responds elastically to the introduction of the CFC rule, and if it outweighs the negative
effects on the domestic MNC’s investment decision and on the profits of its foreign
affiliates. Second, we show that a higher home bias of the domestic MNC’s home
affiliate induces the government to set its CFC rule tighter but its thin capitalization
rule more generous. For the CFC rule, the dominant effect is that the domestic MNC’s
home affiliate reacts less elastic to changes in the effective capital costs which leads
to a less drastic drop in the investment following a tighter CFC rule. For the thin
15See Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) for such a modeling approach in a setting with
heterogeneous firms.
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capitalization rule, the dominant effect is that a tighter CFC rule increases the tax
base of the domestic MNC’s home affiliate via a lower excess leverage and therefore
allows the government to be more generous in its tax deductions for internal interest
payments.
Our theoretical analysis offers several predictionwhichcanbe testedempirically. First,
the level of the CFC rule depends - among other things - on the home bias of the
domestic MNC. A higher home bias reduces the investment elasticity of the domestic
MNC which results in a tighter CFC rule. Hence, countries with more profitable
home markets, e.g. larger or resource-rich countries, are more likely to use a CFC rule.
Second, in countries in which it is easier for MNCs to circumvent the thin capitalization
rule, i.e. countries in which the MNCs’ costs of concealing are rather small, strict CFC
rules should go together with lenient thin capitalization rules. An analysis of these
predictions is left for future research.
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Chapter 2
Why do countries differ in thin
capitalization rules: the role of
financial development
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can use internal debt to shift
profits from low-tax to high-tax countries.1 In detail, affiliates in low-tax countries
give loans to affiliates in high-tax countries. The interest on this loan is taxable in the
low-tax country, but tax-deductible in the high tax country. This reduces overall tax
payments by the amount of interest payments multiplied by the tax rate differential
of the respective countries.
Many governments try to act against this behavior by implementing thin capitalization
rules. Thin capitalization rules deny tax deductibility of internal loans if the size of
these loans surpasses a permissible threshold. In this way, the use of internal debt
for tax planning issues is limited, preventing an erosion of the tax base and hence tax
revenue losses.
Over time thin capitalization rules have become an attractive policy instrument for
governments. By 2005 the share of OECD countries moving to a thin capitalization
rule increased from less than half to to two thirds.2 Traditionally, the common way of
1Empirical evidence for such tax planning behavior is given inter alia by Huizinga et al. (2008)
and Egger et al. (2010).
2See, e.g., table 1 in Bu¨ttner et al. (2012).
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introducing a thin capitalization rule was to implement a so-called safe haven debt-
to-equity ratio. The safe haven debt-to-equity ratio caps tax-deductibility of internal
interest payments if affiliates exceed a defined debt-to-equity ratio. Recently, how-
ever, a number of countries including Germany, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain
switched to a system of a pure earnings stripping rule. The earnings stripping rule re-
stricts tax-deductibility if internal interest payments exceed a certain fraction of an
affiliate’s EBITDA.3
However, there is evidence that internal capital markets are also used by MNEs to
allocate internal capital to affiliates that are limited in raising external funds due to
a weak financial development of the host country (Desai et al., 2004; Egger et al.,
2014). A strict thin capitalization rule in the sense of a low allowance to deduct
internal interest payments can have serious drawbacks on local affiliates’ investments.
Previous studies showed that the access to finance is a major determinant of growth
and development (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2000). Moreover, Manova
(2013) shows that exporting firms and thus international trade are severely affect by
financing restrictions. About 20%-25% of the impact of credit constraints on trade is
driven by reductions in total output.
The chapter brings together these two simultaneous developments by analyzing the
effects of thin capitalization rules in the presence of financial frictions. The key element
of the model is a financing constraint in accordance with Tirole (2006). MNEs set up
an internal capital market and allocate internal funds to those affiliates where the
marginal return to capital is the highest. That means the shorter affiliates are in
external funds, the higher is the marginal return to capital and hence the incentive to
allocate capital to that affiliate. A more permissive thin capitalization rule decreases
affiliates’ capital costs and indirectly increases their opportunity to raise additional
external funds.
In the model presented here, subsidiaries in a high-tax country are endowed with in-
sufficient own resources and thus need additional funds for investment. External funds
are limited by subsidiaries’ pledgeable income, i.e. the income that can credibly be paid
back to the external lender without distorting managerial incentives. This pledgeable
income depends on subsidiaries’ productivity. Highly productive subsidiaries have
bigger investment opportunities and thus have a higher pledgeable income. Hence,
they can raise more external funds compared to less productive affiliates. However, if
3For a description of thin capitalization rules for most OECD and EU countries see Gouthie`re
(2005) and Dourado and de la Feria (2008) respectively.
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the restriction on external fundraising is severe, i.e. the country’s financial develop-
ment is weak, highly productive affiliates are financially more constrained because the
possibility to raise funds increases less than their demand.
Our first result is that, in the presence of financial frictions, governments will indeed
allow some deductibility of internal interest payments to increase their tax revenues.
The reason is that a permissive thin capitalization rule reduces the costs of capital for
financially constrained subsidiaries and therefore fosters investment. This broadens
the tax base and can overcome the negative effect of enhanced profit shifting. More-
over, the optimal thin capitalization rule gets more generous the weaker the financial
development of the country. This prediction is consistent with the fact that countries
with a weak financial development have a more lenient thin capitalization rule on av-
erage. Therefore, the model gives a rationale previously neglected by the literature
why thin capitalization rules can differ between countries.
Ourfirst result is that the implementationofanearnings stripping rulegenerateshigher
tax revenues than a safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. Under an earnings stripping rule,
the amount of tax-deductible interest payments is based on the affiliate’s EBITDA and
thus on its productivity. As compared to a fixed debt-to-equity ratio, highly productive
affiliates can deduct a higher amount of interest payments from their tax base than
less productive affiliates. Thus, the earnings stripping rule allows the government
to discriminate between different types of MNEs. This gives the government the
opportunity to reduce theamountof shiftedprofitswithoutchanging investment levels.
Our analysis combines three strands of the literature. The first strand considers finance
constraints in a taxation environment. The impossibility of effort verification is, in
this context, responsible for a limited opportunity of external finance. Keuschnigg
and Ribi (2013) analyse the impact of profit taxes under different tax systems when
firms are financially constrained. They conclude that profit taxes have first order
welfare effects even when tax rates are small. Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013) set
up a model of financing frictions and offshoring of intermediate inputs. They find
that the underlying arm’s length price introduces a flawed benchmark and can reduce
world welfare. The reason is that high transfer prices and low royalty payments of
MNEs are misinterpreted as tax induced profit shifting, even though these choices are
efficient for overcoming financing constraints. Egger et al. (2014) analyze theoretically
several determinants of internal debt and test these empirically using data of German
multinationals. Due to the incorporation of financing restrictions they find a vastly
higher tax semi-elasticity of internal debt than typically found in other studies.
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The second strand analyses preferential tax treatment of mobile tax bases and its ef-
fects on profit shifting. Peralta et al. (2006) show that a lenient control of profit shifting
can reduce tax competition when governments cannot tax discriminate between multi-
national and domestic firms. In a general equilibrium model, Hong and Smart (2010)
find that citizens of high-tax countries benefit if MNEs are allowed to shift some profits
into a tax haven. Janeba and Smart (2003) establish consitions under which a restric-
tion on preferential tax regimes decreases tax revenues. Mintz and Smart (2004) find
support that the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates is significantly
higher for corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting.
The third strand empirically investigates the effects of thin capitalization rules on
the firms’ financial structure. Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), Overesch
and Wamser (2010), Bu¨ttner et al. (2012), Wamser (2013) and Blouin et al. (2014)
analyze the effectiveness of the safe haven rule. They all find that debt-to-equity
ratios significantly declined when the thin capitalization rule was tightened. Dreßler
and Scheuering (2012) and Buslei and Simmler (2012) investigate the effects of a
change from a fixed debt-to-equity ratio to an earnings stripping rule in Germany
in the year 2008. They find that the introduction of the new rule lowered firms’
debt-to-assets ratios and their net interest payments.4 In the theoretical literature,
Haufler and Runkel (2012) is the only paper that addresses thin capitalization rules
in detail.5 They find that thin capitalization rules can be used as a policy instrument
in tax competition. Smaller countries set less strict thin capitalization rules because
they face the more elastic tax base. However, a crucial assumption is that firms have
unlimited access to external funding. In contrast, our model allows us to study optimal
thin capitalization rules in the presence of credit market frictions.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the basic model for our
analysis. Section 2.3 analyzes the optimal thin capitalization rules in a framework with
credit market frictions. Section 2.4 compares the two most common thin capitalization
rules, i.e. the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio and the the earnings stripping rule.
Section 2.5 discusses the extension of transfer price manipulation and section 2.6
concludes.
4For an overview of thin capitalization rules and a summary of the economic effects, see Ruf
and Schindler (2012).
5Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) concentrate on the relationship between corporate and personal
income taxation but keeping the thin capitalization rule fixed. In an extension, Hong and Smart
(2010) endogenously derive the optimal thin capitalization rule of a small open economy with
profit shifting MNEs.
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2.2 The model
2.2.1 The basic framework
We consider a simple one-period model of two small countries, labeled 1 and 2. Let
t1 > t2 so that country 1 is the high-tax country. Capital is assumed to be perfectly
mobile internationally. There is a fixed number 1 + m of multinational enterprises
(henceforth MNE) in the economy. Each MNE has one subsidiary in the tax haven
country 2 and one subsidiary in the high-tax country 1. Affiliates in country 2 merely
act as a lending basis. Hence, there is no production and we refer to these affiliates
as the financial centers. Production takes place only in the high-tax country 1. We
assume that affiliates in country 2 and in country 1 are exogenously endowed with E2
respectivelyE1 units of equity. Many economies require a minimum amount of capital
that an entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary in order to start a
business.6 In our model, this minimum amount of capital comprises only equity and
has to be raised from national investors. We assume that investors have to make their
decision in which of the affiliates to invest before the productivity is drawn. As affiliates
do not differ at this stage investors are indifferent in which of them to invest. As a
result, each producing affiliate is initially endowed with the same amount of equityE.7
Let θj denote the productivity of affiliate j in country 1. Productivity across MNEs
differs in the sense that θj can take on two values. Affiliates with a low productivity
exhibit a value of θ while affiliates with a high productivity have a value of θ¯. We
normalize the number of less productive firms to unity whereas the number of firms
with productivity θ¯ in the economy is m.
Each affiliate investsKj units of capital to produce a homogeneous good for the world
market at a world price normalized to one. Affiliates’ investment is successful with
probabilitypandunsuccessfulwithprobability1−p. Successprobabilitiesare identical
for all subsidiaries, but they are uncorrelated and hence the risk of the investment is
idiosyncratic. In case of success, the investment yields an end-of-period value Kj +
θjf(Kj), where Kj is undepreciated capital and θjf(Kj) is the cash-flow function
which exhibits the usual properties of positive but decreasing returns, i.e. f ′(Kj) >
0 > f ′′(Kj). If the investment fails the end-of-period value of the subsidiary is zero.
We assume that investment opportunities exceed own funds (Kj > E). Hence, a
6See http://www.doingbusiness.org/
7For convenience, we drop the subscript of equity endowment in country 1.
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financing gap arises that has to be filled by internal debt Ij or external funds Dj.8
Investment is therefore financed byKj = E + Ij +Dj. In case of a failing investment
neither external nor internal debt is repaid.
External funds have to be raised from national credit markets. For simplicity, we
assume that external funds consist of passive bank credits meaning that banks do not
engage in any monitoring activities. External lenders can choose to give a credit to
an affiliate or to earn a safe return R on the deposit market. They are willing to give
a credit if the expected repayment of external funds is at least as high as the end-
of-period value of the safe investment. With r ≡ 1 + R as the end-of-period value
of the safe investment, the external lender is willing to give a credit if p(1 + i) ≥ r.
Competition among external lenders results in zero profits so that the constraint holds
with equality.
Additionally, MNEs can operate an internal capital market and shift capital to their
producing affiliate. Similar to the external lenders, lending operations of the MNEs
are only profitable if the expected repayment satisfies p(1 + i) ≥ r. We assume that
MNEs cannot charge a higher premium on loans than the external lenders. This implies
that MNEs cannot use interest pricing as a means of profit shifting.9 In contrast to
external funds, internal loans can be used to minimize the global tax bill of the MNE
by shifting profits from the high-tax country to the low tax country. In fact, a loan
from an affiliate in a low-tax country to an affiliate in a high-tax country increases tax
payments in the low-tax country amid to a higher interest income. However, the tax
base in the high-tax country decreases by more if interest payments are deductible.
In general, countries can reduce this incentive by implementing controlled-foreign-
corporation rules along with thin-capitalization rules. These rules limit the use of
preferential tax regimes by overriding the tax-exemption principle and taxing passive
income (e.g. interest payments) according to the tax credit method, if some conditions
are met.10 However, MNEs can circumvent these rules, e.g. by taking measures that
reclassify the income in the tax haven as active income. We model this argument in
a highly stylized way by specifying a convex cost function C(Ij). We assume that
affiliates in country 1 have to bear these administrative costs.
In our model, affiliates have to pay taxes in the source country. Each subsidiary has to
8New equity as a source of finance is ruled out. Empirically, new equity as a form of financing
investments is small, see Bond (2000).
9In section 2.5, we discuss the possibility of transfer price manipulation.
10See Haufler et al. (2014) for a theoretical analysis of controlled-foreign-corporation rules.
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pay taxes proportional to its cash-flow. In principle, both external and internal interest
payments are tax-deductible. However, deductibility of internal interest payments is
limited by a thin capitalization rule which we denote by z. This thin capitalization rule
permits the deductibility of internal interest payments up to a threshold φj(z) which
can be firm-specific. Any further interest payments of internal debt are not deductible
from the tax base. Expected tax payments of producing affiliates in country 1 are
therefore given by
E(T j) = pt1[θ
jf(Kj)− iDj − i min(Ij, φj(z))]. (2.1)
In the case of a successful investment, total plant value of the affiliate V j1 is split among
the affiliate’s stakeholders, V j1 = V
j
1,A +V
j
1,I +V
j
1,D, with V
j
1,A as end-of-period value of
affiliate 1’s dividends, V j1,I as end-of-period value of affiliate 1’s internal debt and V
j
1,D
as end-of-period value of affiliate 1’s external debt. Each MNE’s central management
maximizes its net present value V j composed of the value of the subsidiary in the high-
tax country V j1 and the value of the subsidiary in the tax haven V
j
2 .
11 The central
management’s maximization problem can be written as
max
Ij
V j = V j1 + V
j
2
s.t. Ij1 + I
j
2 = 0. (2.2)
Within the MNE, it must be the case that lending and borrowing add up to zero. We as-
sume that the tax-exemption principle is generally applicable in our model. Therefore,
repatriated profits are tax-exempt in the home country of the central management.12
The timing of the central management’s decisions is as follows: Firstly, internal loans
are allocated. Secondly, external debt is raised and investment takes place. Thirdly,
managerial effort is induced. And lastly, external debt is repaid and dividends are paid
to the central management. We solve the model by backward induction starting from
stage three.
11The financial center is not producing any goods, so the net present value of this affiliate is
solely determined by the value of internal debt.
12In the European Union, for example, this is ensured by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. For
a recent discussion and analysis see Becker and Fuest (2010).
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2.2.2 Managerial effort and external financing constraints
We assume that the central management chooses the effort level in the affiliate in
country 1. If the central management chooses to exert a high effort level, the affiliate’s
probability of success is also high. Instead, it can deploy a low level of effort thereby
reducing the probability of success to pL < p. Doing so, the central management
can consume a private benefit bKj proportional to the investment. Accordingly, the
higher the private benefit bKj the central management can consume, the lower is the
incentive to execute a high effort level.
Since the central management maximizes the total net value of the MNE, it obtains the
expected surplus of the producing affiliate consisting of repatriated dividends V jA and
the repayment of internal debt V jI . If the investment is successful, the investment’s
end-of-period pre-tax value is Kj + θjf(Kj). In that case, the external credit has to
be paid back and taxes T j have to be remitted. Moreover, the central management
takes into consideration that the opportunity cost for internal debt accrue even if the
subsidiary is unsuccessful. Likewise, opportunity costs for equity and administrative
costs of internal debt accrue in any case. The expected surplus of the subsidiary is
then given by
υj = p[Kj + θjf(Kj)− (1 + i)Dj − T j]− r(E + Ij)− C(Ij). (2.3)
The central management will exert high effort only if υj(p) ≥ υj(pL) + bKj. Substi-
tuting (2.3) yields
p[Kj + θjf(Kj)− (1 + i)Dj − T j] ≥ βKj, β ≡ p
p− pL b. (2.4)
Equation (2.4) determines the maximum amount of external debt Dj the subsidiary
can raise. The reason why the use of external credits is constrained is the following.
The total net surplus of the subsidiary has to be split among the central management
and the external lender. The higher the share of capital from the external lender, the
higher is also the share of the surplus the external lender gets. However, the central
management’s compensation must at least be βKj. If not, it reduces the effort level
and the external lender would not break even. The amount of external debt the affiliate
can raise therefore crucially depends on the income which can credibly be paid back
to the external lender, i.e. the pledgeable income.
Furthermore, the amount of external funds that can be raised depends onβ. The higher
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is β the lower is the amount of external funds subsidiaries can raise. In our model,
β can be interpreted as the financial development of the country. A high value of β
corresponds to a financially less developed country, where access to the national capital
market is severely constrained. One reason could be that the quality of intermediaries,
i.e. their monitoring effort, is low and hence the incentive to give a credit.
2.2.3 The investment decision and the allocation of internal
funds
To determine the subsidiaries’ investment levels, we insert subsidiaries’ tax payments
in equation (2.1) into (2.4) and substitute external debt Dj = Kj − Ij − E. This
determines affiliates’ constraint for optimal investment (COI)
V j1 ≡ p[(1− t1)(θjf(Kj)− iKj)− t1iE] ≥ βKj − r(Ij + E) + pt1iωj, (2.5)
where ωj = [Ij −min(Ij, φj(z))]. As explained in the previous section, subsidiaries
are limited in raising external funds as the incentive to exert effort is distorted if the
external credit is too high. More external debt raises the end-of-period value of the
affiliate, i.e. the left-hand side of the COI, in a concave manner. However, the private
benefit the central management can consume, and therefore the right-hand side of the
COI, increases linearly with the amount of external debt employed. At a certain level
of lending the affiliate has exhausted its external debt capacity and the COI becomes
binding. At this point, a further increase in external funds would raise the right-hand
side of the COI at a faster rate than the left-hand side. Furthermore, as we focus on
credit market frictions, we assume that for some subsidiaries the limitation of external
funds confines their level of investment. This means that these affiliates would like to
invest more because the marginal return on investment is higher than the marginal
cost, but are constrained by inability to raise further external funds. We define µj as
the net of tax excess return of investment
µj ≡ p(1− t1)[θjf ′(Kj)− i] ≥ 0. (2.6)
However, the government can alleviate the financing constraint by implementing a
thin capitalization rule that allows to deduct a higher amount of internal interest
payments from the tax base. With a more generous thin capitalization rule MNEs
have an incentive to allocate more internal loans to their producing subsidiary. This,
38
Why do thin capitalization rules differ between countries
in turn, increases the surplus of financially constrained affiliates as they can reach a
higher investment level and raise further external funds without distorting the central
management’s incentives. This means that the right-hand side of the COI increases
only by β− r which we assume to be smaller than µj.13 This ensures that the external
lender in indeed willing to give an additional credit if own resources of the affiliate
increase.
This leaves us with the question, whether the more or the less productive subsidiaries
are hit harder by the financial constraint. There are two countervailing effects of an
increase in productivity. First, a higher productivity increases the marginal excess re-
turn of capital µj and hence makes highly productive subsidiaries more constrained,
other things being equal, i.e. subsidiaries need more capital to reach the first-best in-
vestment level. Second, the higher is the productivity of the affiliate, the bigger is
the central management’s incentive to allocate internal loans to its subsidiary leading
to an increase in the subsidiarie’s pledgeable income. This enables high-productivity
subsidiaries to raise more external funds. Which of the two effects depends on the finan-
cial development β. If the financial development is sufficiently weak high-productivity
subsidiaries are the ones with the larger excess return µj. This is because the addi-
tional capital demand of high-productivity subsidiaries is not satisfied by the higher
internal loan and the additional external funds.14
In the following, we assume that β is sufficiently high. As less productive affiliates
have the lower excess return on investment, we normalize for simplicity their excess
return to zero (µ = 0).15 Thus, only highly productive affiliates have an excess return
on investment (µ¯ > 0). Less productive subsidiaries are financially unconstrained
meaning that they can raise enough external capital, so that their investment is first-
best.16 These affiliates use internal loans only for the reason to minimize their tax
payments. In contrast, highly productive subsidiaries use internal debt also to increase
their investment levels.
13As the marginal unit of internal interest payments is tax-deductible, the value of ωj becomes
zero for this unit.
14In Appendix B, we derive an explicit threshold for β which ensures that highly productive
subsidiaries are financially more constrained.
15We denote values for the less (more) productive subsidiaries with a lower (upper) bar.
16Relaxing this assumption does not change the qualitative results of our analysis. The differ-
ence would be that starting from the point where no tax deduction for internal interest payments
is permitted the government benefits also from less productive subsidiaries. However, at a certain
point less productive subsidiaries will no longer increase their investment whereas highly produc-
tive subsidiaries still do since these are financially more constrained.
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The central management chooses that amount of internal loans which maximizes the
end-of-period value of the MNE. The end-of-period value is the sum of the end-of-
period value of the producing subsidiary and the end-of-period value of the financial
center. Total end-of-period value of the MNE is given by
V j = p
[
(1− t1)θjf(Kj)− (1− t1)iDj − iE − iIj + t1i min(Ij, φj(z))
]
+ (1− t2)pi1 − pt2iIj − rE2 − C(Ij), (2.7)
with pi1 as the end-of-period book surplus of the financial center. The maximization
process of financially unconstrained affiliates can be seen as a two stage process. In a
first step, internal loans are allocated to optimize the financial structure. In a second
step, the affiliate chooses the optimal amount of external funds for the output decision.
The optimal amount of external debt is given by differentiating (2.7) with respect to
Dj
p(1− t1)[θf ′(K)− i] = 0. (2.8)
In order to minimize the overall tax payments, producing affiliates replace equity E
by internal loans I from the financial center as long as internal interest payments are
tax-deductible and agency cost are not too high. This ensures tax deductibility and
therefore increases after-tax profits of the MNE. Unused equity is placed at the deposit
market where the affiliate obtains a payment of r which is as high as the opportunity
cost.
Highly productive subsidiaries cannot raise sufficient external funds. Hence, in con-
trast to less productive affiliates, the marginal investment is determined by internal
loans. Differentiating (2.7) with respect to Ij implicitly defines the optimal amount
of internal loans
C ′(I¯) = p[(1− t1)θ¯f ′(K¯)− i+ (λt1 − t2)i], (2.9)
whereλ is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the marginal unit of internal
interest payment is tax-deductible and zero otherwise. Highly prductive affiliates differ
in the way that apart from tax planning, internal loans also serve these affiliates to
increase their investment.
Figure 2.1 depicts subsidiaries’ investment levels depending on the productivity level
θj, the thin capitalization rule z and the financial development β.17 In the figure, the
17For clarity, we concentrate in the graph on highly productive affiliates.
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Figure 2.1: Investment level and internal loan allocation
curved line patterns highly-productive subsidiaries’ end-of-period value V¯1, i.e. the
left-hand side of the COI. Likewise, the straight line pictures the right-hand side the
COI. Highly productive affiliates are financially constrained so that their maximal
investment level K¯c is lower than the first-best level K¯∗. At this point, these affiliates
do not get any further external funds as this would distort managerial incentives. A
more generous thin capitalization rule induces MNEs to give a higher credit to their
subsidiary. This raises high-productivity subsidiaries’ pledgeable income and allows
them to raise additional external funds. This is depicted by a downward shift of the
straight line. As a result investment increases. In contrast, a more generous thin
capitalization rule does not affect less productive affiliates’ investment as external
funds suffice for first-best investment.
2.3 Optimal thin capitalization rule
The incentives of the two types of affiliates highlight the trade-off for the government
with respect to the implementation of a thin capitalization rule. A more generous thin
capitalization rule allows higher interest deductions of internal debt. This induces
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all MNEs to shift more internal debt to their subsidiary in country 1. Financially
constrained subsidiaries use these additional funds to increase their investment levels.
In contrast, financially unconstrained subsidiaries do not increase their investment in
reaction to a more generous thin capitalization rule. These subsidiaries will only use
the tax shield to shift profits into the low-tax country.
We postulate that the government maximizes its corporate tax revenues.18 From a
theoretical perspective, the assumption that the profit income of MNEs does not enter
thegovernment’sobjective functioncorresponds toa settingwhere the residentsof each
country invest their capital in perfectly diversified global portfolios.19 Furthermore,
we assume for simplicity that national tax rates are exogenous.20 Thus, tax revenues
are maximal if the tax base is largest. Country 1’s expected tax revenues are given by
E(T1) = pt1{θf(K)− iD − iφ(z) +m[θ¯f(K¯)− iD¯ − iφ¯(z)]}. (2.10)
In the case of unsuccessful investments end-of-period values of the subsidiaries and
also tax-deductions are zero. Only if investments are successful is country 1’s tax
base positive. Then, country 1’s tax base consists of the cash-flow of all subsidiaries
resident in country 1. This tax base is reduced by the tax shield of external debt and
the cost of tax grants for internal debt. The latter can be different between highly
productive subsidiaries, φ¯(z), and less productive subsidiaries, φ(z).21 Both sources
of costs depend on the kind of thin capitalization rule z the government implements.
Taking the tax rate as given and maximizing tax revenues with respect to z implicitly
18Our results would not change qualitatively under a welfare maximizing government, where
welfare is composed of weighted corporate tax revenues and income of the local affiliates (consumer
surplus is unchanged as the output price is fixed). The lower is the weight on tax revenues the
less important are the costs of the thin capitalization rule and the more important is the income
of local affiliates. If tax revenues are not considered, welfare is maximized if affiliates’ investment
is first-best. In the optimum, the government would fully allow the deductibility of internal
interest payments. Hence, the lower is the weight on tax revenues, the more generous is the thin
capitalization rule.
19Empirically, globally diversified portfolios are a plausible scenario when most of the small
country’s capital is invested through financial intermediaries, such as pension funds or insurance
companies.
20The effects of a profit tax on financially constrained firms is analysed by Keuschnigg and
Ribi (2013). They show that profit taxes of even a small magnitude are investment and welfare
decreasing. For this reason, we abstract from statutory tax issues and squarely focus on the thin
capitalization rule. Despite that, endogenizing the choice of the tax rate increases the complexity
of the analysis without adding additional insights.
21In the model, we assume that administrative costs of internal loans are not too convex such
that affiliates will always make use of a higher allowance of interest deductibility. Thus, the costs
for the government are equivalent to the affiliates’ thresholds φ¯(z) and φ(z).
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determines the optimal thin capitalization rule22
m
(
∂[θ¯f(K¯)]
∂z
− i ∂φ¯(z)
∂z
)
= i
∂φ(z)
∂z
. (2.11)
Relaxing the thin capitalization rule has two effects on government 1’s expected tax
revenues. Firstly, every subsidiary will use more internal debt to reduce its costs
of capital. This induces costs for the government arising from tax planning of less
productive subsidiaries (right hand side of (2.11)) which reduces country 1’s tax base.
Secondly, internal loans used by the m financially constrained subsidiaries increases
their investments and hence the tax base. Thus, the government weighs the tax gain
from the additional investments of highly productive affiliates against the tax losses
from merely profit shifting low-productivity subsidiaries.23
In the case of a financially advanced country 1, highly productive subsidiaries could
raise sufficient external funds. This would mean that independent of the level of
productivity, each subsidiary’s investment would be first-best. A more generous thin
capitalization rule would just induce the MNEs to shift profits into the low-tax country
without enhancing investment in the high-tax country 1. In equation (2.11), ∂[θ¯f(K¯)]
∂z
=
0, i.e. the investment of high-productivity affiliates is not changing. In this case, the
government would fully disallow tax-deductibility of interest payments for internal
loans. Therefore, we can summarize our findings in
Proposition 2.1 In a setting where firms are financially constrained, the optimal
thin capitalization rule allows positive internal interest deductions.
Proposition 2.1 highlights a simple, yet previously neglected, motive why governments
set lenient thin capitalization rules. In the presence of financial frictions governments
are willing to set a more generous thin capitalization rule in order to reduce the costs
for loans thereby enhancing investments of some subsidiaries. The incentive to be
generous in the thin capitalization rule gets stronger, the higher the excess return
on investment of the highly productive affiliates (cf. (2.11)). Thus, the incentive is
stronger, the weaker the financial development of the country, i.e. the higher β.
22Changes in the amount of external finance for the highly productive affiliates due to a change
in the thin capitalization rule are incorporated in the marginal return on investment f ′(K¯). Less
productive affiliates do not change the level of external funds at all as their investment is already
first-best.
23It could be the case that the government has no incentive to allow any deduction for internal
interest payments although highly productive subsidiaries increases their investment. This is true
if the marginal return of investment is lower than the costs of a more generous rule −t1i. Thus,
the tax revenue from highly productive subsidiaries would also be negative.
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We provide some suggestive evidence for this predition by plotting countries’ financial
developmentagainst their thincapitalizationrule. Followingthe literature (Arezkiand
Bru¨ckner, 2012; Chinn, Eichengreen and Ito, 2014; von Hagen and Zhang, 2014), the
level of financial development is measured by domestic credit provided by the banking
sector as a percentage of GDP (henceforth credit-to-GDP ratio). For the credit-to-
GDP ratio, we use data provided by the World Bank for the year 2012 if available.
Otherwise, we use the latest data available. For countries’ thin capitalization rules,
we collect data on debt-to-equity ratios from the European Tax Handbook (2013)
and the Global Corporate Tax Handbook (2013) and convert them to debt-to-asset
ratios.24 Figure 2.2 shows a negative correlation implying that countries with a weak
financial development have a more generous thin capitalization rule, on average. This
observation is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Figure 2.2: Relation of thin capitalization rule and financial development
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24Using the debt-to-asset ratio introduces an upper limit of unity for those countries that have
no thin capitalization rule at all. Note also that for those countries which have recently switched
to an earnings stripping rule, Figure 2.2 uses the former debt-to-asset ratio.
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2.4 Safe haven rule vs. Earnings stripping rule
Our analysis in the previous section has shown that the implementation of a lenient thin
capitalization rule can result from limited access to external funding. In this section,
we compare two systems, the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio and the earnings strip-
ping rule and ask which one is preferable. The debt-to-equity ratio disallows the tax
deduction of interest payments to related parties if internal debt exceeds the country-
specific debt-to-equity ratio. The permissible amount of internal debt is calculated
from the amount of equity within the subsidiary, multiplied by the debt-to-equity ra-
tio. The earnings stripping rule disallows the tax deduction of interest payments to
related parties if internal debt exceeds a certain proportion of the affiliate’s earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). This rule, therefore,
is based on the affiliate’s economic activity.
We begin our analysis by first considering the effects of a safe haven rule on the allo-
cation of internal loans. The end-of-period value of MNEs is given by
V j =p[(1− t1)(θjf(Kj)− iKj)− t1i(Ij + E) + t1i min(Ij, δ)]
− C(Ij) + (1− t2)pi(θj)− pt2iIj − rE, (2.12)
where φj(z) = δ is the threshold for the tax-deductibility of internal interest payments
under the safe haven rule. Given the level of equity, the safe haven rule δ allows the
subsidiary to tax-deduct internal interest payments on a one-to-one basis.
For the earnings stripping rule, the end-of-period value of MNEs is instead given by
V j =p[(1− t1)(θjf(Kj)− iKj)− t1i(Ij + E) + t1i min(Ij, αθjf(Kj))]
− C(Ij) + (1− t2)pi(θj)− pt2iIj − rE, (2.13)
where φj(z) = αθjf(Kj) depicts the threshold of tax-deductibility of internal in-
terest payments under the earnings stripping rule. Under this rule the threshold of
tax-deductibility differs across subsidiaries. A more generous earnings stripping rule
increases subsidiaries’ allowance for tax-deduction by a factor θjf(Kj). Highly pro-
ductive subsidiaries can deduct a higher amount of internal interest payments as com-
pared to less productive ones because they have a higher EBITDA.
In the following we consider which of the two thin capitalization rules generates the
higher expected tax revenue for the government. Since we take the tax rates as exoge-
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nously given, higher expected tax revenues go along with a higher expected tax base.
Expected tax bases differ depending on the thin capitalization rule. Under the safe
haven rule country 1’s expected tax base is given by
pB(δ) = p[θf(K(θ, δ)) +mθ¯f(K¯(θ¯, δ))− (1 +m)rδ], (2.14)
consisting of the cash-flows of less productive and highly productive affiliates less total
tax deductions of internal interest payments under the safe haven rule. As the safe
haven rule is country-specific, the cost of the safe haven rule is proportional to the
number of affiliates in the country.
Under the earnings stripping rule country 1’s expected tax base is instead given by
pB(α) = p{θf(K(θ, α))+mθ¯f(K¯(θ¯, α))−αr[θf(K(θ, α))+mθ¯f(K¯(θ¯, α))]}, (2.15)
with the difference that the cost of the earnings stripping rule is firm-specific and
depending on the productivity. Highly productive subsidiaries have a higher threshold
and therefore generate higher costs for the government. The difference in tax bases
between the two rules is given by
∆
p
= B(α)−B(δ) = mθ¯[f(K¯(θ¯, α))− f(K¯(θ¯, δ))]−mr[αθ¯f(K¯(θ¯, α)− δ]
+ θ[f(K(θ, α))− f(K(θ, δ))] + r[δ − αθf(K(θ, α))]. (2.16)
To compare these two thin capitalization rules, we assume a government with a tax
revenue maximizing safe haven debt-to-equity ratio δ = δ∗. We then ask whether
there exists an earnings stripping rule that generates higher expected tax revenues
than the optimal safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. To answer this question, suppose an
earnings stripping rule αδ such that the highly productive subsidiaries get the same
tax deduction, i.e.
αδθ¯f(K¯(θ¯, αδ)) = δ∗. (2.17)
First, highly productive subsidiaries have the same tax deduction under both systems.
Accordingly, their investment level is also the same under both systems (first term
on the right-hand side of (2.16)). Second, the incurred costs for the government
by both thin capitalization rules are the same by definition (second term). Third,
the investment level of less productive subsidiaries does not change as the first-best
level can be reached with only external funds (third term). Hence, tax bases do
46
Why do thin capitalization rules differ between countries
not differ with respect to these three effects. However, due to the lower EBITDA,
less productive subsidiaries cannot claim the same amount of tax rebates under the
earnings stripping rule as compared to the safe haven rule (αδθf(K(θ, αδ)) < δ∗).
Therefore, the government incurs fewer costs from less productive subsidiaries leading
to a higher tax base under the earnings stripping rule than under the safe haven rule.
This is given by
∆
p
= αδr[θ¯f(K¯(θ¯, αδ))− θf(K(θ, αδ))] > 0. (2.18)
We can summarize our findings in
Proposition 2.2 In a setting where firms are financially constrained, tax revenues
are higher under an earnings stripping rule for given investment decisions of both
firm types, as compared to a safe haven rule.
Looking at countries’ thin capitalization rules, we see that the bulk of them has im-
plemented a safe haven debt-to-equity ratio.25 One reason why none of the financially
less developed countries has introduce an earnings stripping rule could be that the safe
haven rule is associated with relatively low administrative costs because the threshold
of internal interest payments is country-specific and internal debt-to-equity ratios are
relatively easy to check. Under an earnings stripping rule thresholds are firm-specific
so that the administrative costs tend to be higher. However, we show that exactly for
financially less developed countries it could be worth switching to an earnings strip-
ping rule.
2.5 Extension: Allowing for profit shifting
In our model, MNEs are able to shift profits into the low-tax country 2. They do so
by deciding upon the quantity of internal loans, while sticking to the arm’s length
price. However, it could also be true that MNEs manipulate transfer prices. MNEs
could then have an incentive to provide the subsidiary with more internal loans but
also with a more expensive credit by demanding a higher interest rate iP > i.26 In this
way, MNEs have a second channel to engage in profit-shifting by manipulating transfer
25Only five countries switched to a pure earnings stripping rule. These countries are Finland,
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These countries are also financially advanced.
26We drop firm superscripts in this section.
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prices. However, in contrast to debt shifting transfer prices are only used for tax-saving
purposes and not for allocative reasons. Administrative costs related to internal loans
now also depend on the transfer price iP , so that C = C(iP , I). Under this more
complex cost function the optimal thin capitalization rule can also be influenced by
the possibility of transfer price manipulation.
If the costs of debt-shifting and of transfer price manipulation are separable, the op-
timal thin capitalization rule is unaffected by the possibility of transfer prices. The
government has an incentive to be as strict as possible in the regulation of transfer
prices for two reasons. If the government is loose in the regulation of transfer prices,
a higher iP firstly increases the amount of profits shifted by the financially uncon-
strained subsidiaries. Secondly, it increases capital costs for financially constrained
subsidiaries, thereby reducing their investment. Both effects reduce tax revenues.
However, as Schindler and Schjelderup (2013) pointed out, matters are not that clear
if the costs of debt shifting and transfer price manipulation are interdependent. These
costs can either interact in a substitutive or in a complementary way. Substitutability
is defined by the authors as a marginal decrease in the cost of debt-shifting when trans-
fer prices decrease (and vice versa). Likewise, complementarity means that marginal
costs of debt shifting increase if transfer prices decrease. As in the case without inter-
dependency in the costs, a stricter regulation of transfer prices reduces the amount of
profits shifted. Under cost complementarity, the central managements now allocates
fewer loans to their subsidiary which worsens the financial situation of all highly pro-
ductive affiliates. As a result, stricter regulations of transfer prices reduce the amount
of debt-shifting but also the overall investment level. However, the government could
increase expected tax revenues by being more generous in its thin capitalization rule.
At this point, it must be that
m
(
∂[θ¯f(K¯)]
∂z
− i ∂φ¯(z)
∂z
)
> i
∂φ(z)
∂z
. (2.19)
This inequality is reversed under cost substitutability. Stricter transfer price regula-
tions reduce the marginal costs for debt shifting. Central managements allocate more
loans to their subsidiary, relaxing the financing constraint. The benefits of a lenient
thin capitalization rule are smaller so that under cost substitutability the thin capital-
ization rule is comparably less generous. Thus, the qualitative result of Proposition
2.1 still holds under the extended cost function.
As the difference in thin capitalization rules under the new cost function is just of
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quantitative manner, we can make use of the same argument as we did in section 2.4
when examining the comparison of the two types of thin capitalization rules. Irrespec-
tive of how costs interact, an earnings stripping rule can generate higher tax revenues
for the government because it allows the government to discriminate in favor of highly
productive subsidiaries by granting them the same amount of tax deduction as un-
der a safe haven rule. Thus, Proposition 2.2 also holds under the more complex cost
function.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced a model where a high-tax country chooses its optimal
thin capitalization rule in the presence of financial frictions. The key element of the
model is a financing constraint that restricts MNEs’ ability to raise external funds.
The restriction depends on subsidiaries’ pledgeable income. Since subsidiaries differ
in their productivity, the highly productive ones can raise more external funds in
absolute terms. However, if the restriction is severe, highly productive subsidiaries are
relatively more constrained because available funds increases less than their demand.
In the absence of such financial frictions, the government has no incentive to grant
any deductibility of internal interest payments because MNEs would only use this
allowance to shift profits out of the high-tax country. However, if the financial devel-
opment of the country is weak at least highly productive subsidiaries need internal
loans for real economic reasons. In this case, the government sets a thin capitalisation
rule that allows positive interest deductions. This assists highly productive affiliates
to at least partly overcome the financing friction which, in turn, increases the coun-
try’s tax base. A more generous thin capitalization rule in this setting turns out to be
a Pareto improvement. We show that this prediction is consistent with countries’ tax
policy. By comparing countries’ thin capitalization rules and their financial develop-
ment, we see indeed a negative correlation suggesting that financially less developed
countries have a more generous thin capitalization rule on average. Therefore, the
model offers an explanation for why countries differ in their thin capitalization rule
apart from beggar-thy-neighbor policies on which the previous literature has focused.
A second result is that the implementation of an earnings stripping rule, where the
amount of tax-deductible interest payments is based on the affiliate’s EBITDA, is
better suited to raise tax revenues as compared to a fixed debt-to-equity ratio. The
reason is that the earnings stripping rule allows the government to discriminate in favor
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of highly productive subsidiaries. Thus, a switch to an earnings stripping rule can
reduce the amount of profits shifted by the less productive affiliates without changing
the overall investment level of the country.
Our model can be extended in several ways. First, our model captures only the so-
called bright side of the internal capital market. This is because managers can only
influence the probability with which the cash-flow is positive and not the size of the
cash-flow itself. In a framework where managers can also influence the size of the cash-
flow, managers’ cash-flow depends not only on their own effort but also on the effort of
managers in other affiliates. Managers’ incentive to exert effort is therefore distorted
by the incentive of MNEs to shift resources to other affiliates (see Ko¨thenbu¨rger and
Stimmelmayr, 2013). Adding this realistic features reduces the incentive to give an
internal loan to the high-tax affiliate as this increases the cost for the MNE to shift cap-
ital by inducing managers of other affiliates to exert a lower level of effort. This makes
high-productivity affiliates in the high-tax country even more financially constrained.
Hence, the government has an incentive to increase the amount of tax deductions for
internal interest payments. Second, the model could be incorporated in a tax competi-
tion framework in which countries can also decide on their tax rate. Different types of
thin capitalization rules may have diverse effects in the competition for mobile firms.
As the earnings stripping rule discriminates between different types of firms also the
tax rate sensitivity of firms could be affected differently. It is therefore a priori not
clear how the degree of tax competition is affected if countries can choose the type of
the thin capitalization rule. We leave this issue for future research.
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Chapter 3
Tax avoidance strategies in
(probably) loss-making affiliates
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, tax avoidance and earnings management in affiliates of multinational
companies arehotlydebated issues. Popularnewspapers andgovernmentcommissions
(e.g., Bergin, 2012; Levin and McCain, 2013) picked up the cases of big global player
such as Apple, Google and Starbucks that hardly pay any taxes anymore. In its “Base
erosion and profit shifting” (BEPS) report, the OECD (2013) confirms that the losses
in tax revenue are substantial and identifies transfer pricing and debt shifting (i.e.,
thin-capitalization, particularly by using internal debt from related companies) as the
two main strategies for shifting profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. Both devices
to reduce multinationals’ overall tax payments are well-analyzed and well-understood
in the accounting, the finance, as well as the economics literature.1
It is also well-known and intuitively straightforward that the incentive to shift profits
out of high-tax countries is reversed if the affiliates in such countries are running
losses. In loss-making affiliates, the effective tax rate drops to zero, and because
intertemporal loss offsets are limited and cannot be carried forward with interest,
This chapter is based on joint work with Arnt O. Hopland and Dirk Schindler.
1Gresik (2001) and Go¨x and Schiller (2007) survey relevant transfer-pricing literature; Mintz
and Weichenrieder (2010) provide an overview on (internal) debt shifting, while Huizinga et al.
(2008) and Møen et al. (2011) introduce external debt shifting into the picture. The accounting
literature on empirical tax research is reviewed by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010).
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multinationals have a clear incentive to balance losses immediately by shifting in
income from other affiliates. Hence, there is some bunching around zero profits for
affiliates of multinationals (compared to domestic firms), see Grubert et al. (1993,
chapter 7.4). Maybe due to the fact that this intuition appears to be very simple
at first glance, the literature on profit shifting in loss-making affiliates has been very
small and limited to date. However, all available literature has totally neglected that
reverting the tax-avoidance mechanisms within a tax year, in order to shift in profits
instead of shifting profits to low-taxed profit centers, requires a lot of flexibility. In
principle, this flexibility can be limited, because reverting profit-shifting channels can
interfere with internal incentive systems for local management; arise suspicion at tax
authorities; and be bounded by other transaction costs.2
This chapter points out in its theory part that (in-)flexibility in reverting the profit-
shifting streams has crucial implications for firm’s behavior in achieving a tax-efficient
earnings management also under losses. Only under perfect flexibility, any profit
shifting can be adjusted ex post (“at year’s end”) to ensure zero taxable profits. If
there is hardly any flexibility, all firms are forced to take the likelihood of running losses
at year’s end into account and need to adjust their tax-management strategies ex ante
– no matter whether they will run operating profits or losses in the end. Our empirical
approach provides evidence for the assumption that transfer pricing gives substantial
flexibility to firms so that they can adjust their profit shifting ex post. On the contrary,
we do not find any evidence for flexibility in the capital structure. Accordingly, we can
suggest that most debt-shifting decisions must be taken at the beginning of the tax
year (or even earlier). One important implication from our finding on debt shifting is
then that it is the expected tax-rate differential that should be taken into account when
estimating the effect of tax shields on multinationals’ capital structures. By neglected
this issue, the debt-shifting literature underestimates both the impact taxes have on
firm’s (internal) debt-to-asset ratios and the magnitude of debt shifting.
In order to analyze these issues, we set up a simple model of a multinational company
that owns productive affiliates in n countries and hosts a profit and financial center
in a tax haven. The tax-haven affiliate uses its equity to lend internal debt to the
other related affiliates. Moreover, it charges them user fees for a fixed factor (e.g., roy-
alties on technology) and it serves as a vendor, buying an intermediate good at the
world market and reselling it with a mark-up to the productive affiliates (e.g., the Ap-
2When in addition taking into account that, for multinational affiliates, the average probability
of running a loss is quite substantial (e.g., Norwegian based multinationals experience losses in
38% of the observations), it is even more surprising that none of the three fields took this issue.
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ple Sales International case, see Levin and McCain, 2013). Thus, our model captures
profit shifting by transfer pricing both in intangibles and in intermediate goods as well
as internal debt shifting. Shocks on the sale price of the final good introduce the risk
to end up with net operating losses at the end of the tax year. To focus on the effects
of (in-)flexibility of reverting earnings-management strategies during the tax year, we
assume central decision making by the headquarters. This assumption neglects both
the incentive role of transfer prices on management in decentralized units and its inter-
action with the tax aspect of transfer pricing.3 But, it allows to isolate how flexibility
influences the cost structures of affiliates that are ex ante identical, but, ex post, report
net operating losses and profits, respectively. One justification is that firms can al-
ways rely on two books and multiple transfer prices in order to separate the tax-driven
earnings management from handling principal-agent problems in a decentralized trust
structure (cf. Smith, 2002; Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller, 2012). Furthermore, from
the economics literature, it is well-known that centralization becomes the dominant
strategy when tax differentials become large and tax savings important (Nielsen et al.,
2008). Go¨x and Schiller (2007, p. 692) survey mixed empirical evidence for the use of
two books, but anecdotic evidence fosters the view that big multinational companies
that are very tax efficient (aggressive) operate with multiple transfer prices.4
From our model, we derive three testable hypothesis: (H1) Multinationals’ affiliates
should consistently report lower profits and lower losses, respectively, than comparable
domestic firms, i.e., multinationals’ affiliates bunch around zero profitability. (H2)
Under full flexibility in reverting earnings-management decisions during the tax year
(‘ex-post profit shifting’), all multinational affiliates will report roughly zero profits.
However, otherwise comparable multinationals’ affiliates with the same output level,
will disclose high transfer payments and a high internal leverage when running net
operating profits, and will report low transfer payments and no internal debt when
they face net operating losses. (H3) If there is no flexibility in earnings management
and all final tax decisions need to be settled at the beginning of the tax year (‘ex-ante
profit shifting’), otherwise comparable affiliates of multinationals will report different
profitability levels (i.e., significant profits or losses), but will disclose the same transfer
3See Go¨x and Schiller (2007) for an overview on these aspects. This assumption is not made
because we believe that the incentive role is not important. But, for the comparison of ex-
post differences in ex-ante identical affiliates, allowing for decentralization would add complexity
without producing additional insights on the tax incentives.
4A point in case here is General Electrics. See Daniel Kocieniewski on ‘G.E.’s Strategies Let
It Avoid Taxes Altogether’ in The New York Times of March 24, 2011, and informal statements
by General Electric’s Treasury officials.
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price payments and internal leverage.
Using a firm-level panel data set including all Norwegian based firms, we are able to
test several implications of the theoretical model. First, by comparing multinationals
to domestic firms, we confirm that multinationals to a larger extent bunch around
zero. Second, we conduct a regression analysis to test whether or not firms have
flexibility to adjust ex post (consistent with H2) or must commit to an ex-ante strategy
(consistentwithH3). This isdonebyregressing internal transferpaymentsand internal
leverage on a dummy variable equal to one if the firm experiences a loss position in
that year. If being in a loss position significantly reduces internal leverage and transfer
payments from the Norwegian affiliate, this indicates flexibility to shift ex post. Ex
ante expectations are controlled for by including both the lagged loss position, which
is strongly correlated with the present status, and an interaction-term variable that
captures whether the firm was in a loss position both at time t and t− 1.
The results indicate that multinationals have the possibility to adjust their transfer
pricing ex post.5 Hence, with respect to transfer pricing, we find clear support for H2.
For internal leverage, we obtain the expected sign, but the effect from being in a loss
position is insignificant. Thus, H3 seems to be closer to reality in the case of internal
leverage. Note that, since less outgoing transfers and less leverage reduce the risk of
experiencing a loss, our estimates may suffer from an attenuation bias. Therefore,
it is still possible that firms have some flexibility to also adjust internal leverage ex
post. But, there should be a least quite some rigidity in internal capital structures,
and transfer pricing is the more flexible instrument of the two profit-shifting devices.
Governments in high-tax countries are concerned about an erosion of their tax base by
profit shifting of multinational firms into low-tax countries. De Simone and Seidman
(2013) conclude that tax authorities should not only focus on transactions of profitable
affiliates in high-tax countries with related parties in low-tax countries but should also
scrutinize transactions to unprofitable affiliates in other high-tax countries as these
affiliates’ effective tax rate is zero. In our model this behavior corresponds to firms that
are flexible in reverting their earnings management strategies. However, less flexible
firms also engage in tax planning and might be just as aggressive even though they
sometimes report profits and losses. Taking into consideration that debt shifting is
seen as a major channel to shift profits out of a high-tax country, it would be imprudent
5Consistent with findings in Dischinger et al. (2014), we find that there are important differ-
ences between multinationals’ affiliates, controlled from abroad, and (Norwegian) parent compa-
nies. We point out that flexibility is more important for daughter companies.
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just to focus the audit on those firms whose profits bunch around zero as tax revenue
losses could be quite substantial from tax planning of inflexible firms.
We contribute in at least four ways to the literature. First, there is, as said, a small
literature that analyzes profit shifting under losses. Klassen et al. (1993, section 4.1)
discuss distinctive features of affiliates with net operating losses and point out that
there is an incentive to shift in profits into such affiliates. But, the authors decide to
drop loss-making affiliates in their main sample, instead of testing for their character-
istics. 6 Using indirect evidence from IRS panel data on US companies from 1980 to
1987, Grubert et al. (1993) suggest that roughly 50% of the return-rate difference be-
tween foreign- and domestically controlled firms needs to be attributed to tax-induced
transfer pricing and earnings management. In chapter 7.4, the authors point out that
foreign-controlled firms not only disclose significantly less taxable income, but also
consistently achieve to have their profitability bunched around zero, with significantly
less deviations compared to domestic firms. This is taken as clear evidence for active
earnings management and profit shifting.7 Closest to the analysis of this chapter is
de Simone and Seidman (2013) who focus on profits shifted to unprofitable affiliates
of multinationals and who recognize that there are adjustment costs. Utilizing the
Amadeus data base, they analyze independent and affiliated European firms over the
period from 2002 to 2011. The authors not only find strong evidence for a bunching
around zero profitability, but also that, besides risk-sharing motives, tax factors ex-
plain the profitability difference between domestic firms and multinationals’ affiliates.
Particularly adjustment costs, instrumented by the statutory tax rate, have a strong
effect on the reduced loss reporting in multinationals relative to domestic firms.8
We confirm the finding of bunching around zero profits in multinationals’ affiliates and
extend this literature by pointing out that flexibility in reverting the tax-avoidance
mechanisms matters for the extend of this bunching. By comparing intra-company
6This became the dominant strategy in (almost) all papers on both transfer pricing and debt
shifting in order to, apparently, avoid any bias from reversed incentives under net operating losses.
7Maydew (1997) points out that, on the contrary, there can be an incentive to report high
losses also in multinational affiliates if these net operating losses can be settled immediately against
taxable income from previous tax years. He finds evidence of such loss-carryback behavior for US
firms in the years after the 1986-tax reform that reduced corporate taxes substantially. However,
the availability of loss carrybacks has been massively limited both in magnitude and in time
(mostly to one year only now) in the last 15 years, at least in European countries.
8Furthermore, both Gramlich et al. (2004) and Onji and Vera (2010) analyze profit-shifting
behavior within domestic Japanese trusts (‘keiretsus’) and find evidence that net operating losses
in some Japanese affiliates are balanced by shifting in profits from other Japanese affiliates. Onji
and Vera credit this behavior to tax motives that arise from the fact that the Japanese corporate
income tax did not provide group provision in order to consolidate keiretsus’ overall taxable income.
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transfer payments and internal interest expenses between otherwise identical loss-
making and profitable affiliates of multinationals, our approach allows to test directly
for flexibility in income shifting and sheds light onto the question to which extend
multinationals can actually adjust their earnings management ex-post. Based on our
empirical findings, affiliates that can do a lot of transfer pricing can balance losses
better than affiliates that must mainly rely on thin-capitalization because they neither
have large internal sales nor royalty/patent payments.
Second, the finance literature reports a significant rigidity in capital structures so that
they cannot be easily adjusted to changed environments. Fischer et al. (1989) argue
that firms will only adjust to their target capital structure when the losses from a sub-
optimal leverage are getting larger than the costs of adjusting. Particularly financially
distressed (e.g., loss making) firms face high costs of adjusting their overleveraged
external debt-to-asset ratios and linger around longer with their suboptimal capital
structure (e.g., Gilson, 1997; Strebulaev, 2007). Reasons are hold-out problems (no
enforcement in settlement) and regulatory disincentives for institutional lenders to
turn their debt into equity. Korteweg (2010, section 5C) summarizes this discussion
and, using a new strategy to identify net benefits of debt financing, provides evidence
for significant costs of suboptimal capital structures. Thereby, the costs of being
overleveraged are much higher. Moreover, Korteweg reports evidence that firms are
underleveraged on average.
Our empirical results on the inflexibility of (internal) debt-to-asset ratios support this
view. Even a strong tax incentive (i.e., a drop from a 28% tax rate to an effectively zero
tax rate) does not induce a change in the capital structure during the tax year. Hence,
the short-term rigidity seems to be substantial. Furthermore, the lagged adjustment
also applies to internal debt that should neither suffer from transaction costs related to
agency costs nor from costs of renegotiating with external lenders. Finally, a strategic
underleveraging could be driven by taking into account the loss probabilities under
ex-ante decision making.
Third, although the effects from tax debt shields on external and internal debt shifting
are always highly significant, the estimated magnitudes in studies such as Desai et al.
(2004), Huizinga et al. (2008), Egger et al. (2010), Møen et al. (2011) or Bu¨ttner and
Wamser (2013) are surprisingly low. The estimates for the semi-elasticity of internal
debt lie between 0.69 and 1.3; for external debt the range is between 0.34 and 0.69.
Still, debt shifting is seen as an important channel to shape earnings disclosures and
tax payments, and the limited effects are perceived as kind of a puzzle in this literature.
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Bu¨ttner and Wamser suggest that the adjustment costs of the capital structure should
be very high. They also find that minority ownership reduces the tax-rate sensitivity
of debt, but point out that this effect is not strong enough to solve the puzzle.
Our results indicate now an additional reason for the low tax-rate sensitivities. All
the studies base their estimations on tax differentials between statutory tax rates.
When firms are forced to anticipate potential losses ex ante, however, the correct tax
rate differential will be the expected tax rate differential which can be significantly
lower. Consequently, by overestimating the decision-relevant tax differential, the
debt-shifting studies to date underestimate the impact of debt tax shields on capital
structures. To put it differently, the standard procedure of excluding (or controlling
for) loss-making affiliates does not heal the problem, because even profitable affiliates
will have adjusted their capital structure to the (ex-ante) risk of running losses.
Fourth, we suggest an additional explanation for the empirical findings of strong tax
impacts in the transfer-pricing literature. For a long time, it was difficult to properly
identify the effect of transfer pricing on profit differentials.9 Coming up with first
direct evidence, Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) point out that foreign-owned affiliates
in the UK are characterized by lower profits but higher dividend distributions (than
UK-controlled firms). Their findings confirm significant profit shifting by foreign-
controlled affiliates and directly identify transfer pricing as major driving force for
this. Pak and Zdanowicz (2001) and Bernard et al. (2006) calculate that the absolute
losses in US tax revenues, stemming from transfer pricing by US multinationals, are
massive. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) study OECD data and point out that the
additionally earned tax revenue, stemming from a unilateral tax increase, would be by
a factor three to eight higher if profit shifting by transfer pricing could be shut down.
Studies such as Swenson (2001), Clausing (2003) and Langli and Saudagaran (2004)
confirm the strong impact of transfer pricing. Conventional wisdom in the literature
is that it is easier to shift large amounts of profits by mispricing intra-firm trade than
to rely on thin capitalization (and potentially low interest rates) for reducing the tax
burden. Furthermore, transfer pricing is seen to cause less concealment costs, because
it is more difficult to enforce the arm’s-length principle for transfer prices than to
9Most, and particularly the earlier, studies only provide indirect evidence by showing that
profitability substantially differs between domestic and multinational firms and that these differ-
ences should be explained by profit shifting (transfer pricing). See, e.g., Grubert and Mutti (1991),
Harris (1993), Klassen et al. (1993), Hines and Rice (1994), Collins and Shackelford (1995), and
Jacob (1996).
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enforce effective thin-capitalization rules.10
Based on our findings, some part of the (comparably) high tax-differential sensitivity
of transfer pricing could be explained by the fact that transfer pricing provides suffi-
cient flexibility to adjust the earnings management during the tax year. For transfer
pricing, multinationals do not need to take into account the loss probability too much
and the expected tax rate differential matters less. Hence, the empirical studies on
transfer pricing suffer less than the debt-shifting literature under using an ‘incorrect’
tax differential – and excluding loss-making firms indeed eliminates (at least to a larger
extend) incentives of reverting profit-shifting channels in case of losses.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section 3.2, we set up the theoretical
model and derive some predictions on firm behavior that can be empirically tested.
A description of the data set and descriptive statistics are provided in section 3.3. In
section 3.4, we outline the empirical strategy, report our empirical findings and provide
a discussion of the results. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in section 3.5.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 The setting
Consider a multinational firm (henceforth MNC) that has affiliates in n countries. Let
be country 1 the country with the lowest tax rate so that ti > t1, i = 2, ..., n. As a
simplification, we assume that the affiliate in the low-tax country (e.g., a tax haven)
acts exclusively as a financial center of the MNC and therefore does not produce any
goods. All other affiliates use capital Ki and an intermediate good Si to produce a
homogenous final good yi according to the production technology y = F (Ki, Si; X¯),
which is concave in both inputs. The price pi of the final good is stochastic and drawn
from a cumulative distribution function H(p) with support on [p, p¯]. X¯ represents a
fixed factor that we interpret as acquired technological know-how (e.g., resulting from
R&D investment within the MNC group).
The financial center purchases the intermediate good S =
∑
i Si at marginal costs of
qS on the world market and re-sells it at priceG
S
i +qS to the other affiliates, pretending
10Another indirect evidence for the strong impact of transfer prices on tax avoidance is provided
in Lohse and Riedel (2013). Analyzing European multinationals, they point out that tightening
the documentation rules for transfer prices substantially reduces profit shifting and pays-off for
tax authorities, even though the administrative burden of this regulation is high.
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that it has added value to the input good. The correct arm’s-length price ofS, however,
is qS. Furthermore, the patent rights for the technological know-how X¯ are also located
in the profit center which claims license feesGXi +qX , while the true arm’s-length price
is qX . Any deviation from the true arm’s-length price leads to convex concealment
costs CP (PXi , P
S
i ), where P
X
i = G
X
i · X and P Si = GSi · Si, with ∂C
P
∂Gai
> (<)0 if
Gai > (<)0 and
∂2CP
∂(Gai )
2 > 0, a = {X,S}. The concealment costs are defined over
shifted profits and correspond to the set up in Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where
a fine is calculated based on undeclared income. This concept of concealment costs in
transfer pricing mirrors the ‘comparable profit method’ proposed by the OECD.11
The headquarters (henceforth HQ) of the MNC endows the financial center with equity
E1 and provides the producing affiliates with the equity necessary to reach both a tax-
efficient financing structure and the optimal level of real capital. Thus, productive
capital Ki in affiliate 2 is financed by equity Ei provided by the HQ and by internal
debt DIi borrowed from the financial center so that Ki = Ei + D
I
i .
12 The financial
center uses its equityE1 to finance its internal lending
∑
iD
I
i to all the other affiliates
so that E1 =
∑
iD
I
i . For expositional purposes, we define the leverage ratio of the
producing affiliate as bi = D
I
i /Ki and assume that both types of finance are free of
risk and carry the world-market interest rate r.
In line with most tax systems, we assume that the costs of equity are not tax de-
ductible whilst interest expenses related to debt can be deducted from the corporate
tax base. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Mintz and Smart, 2004; Schindler
and Schjelderup, 2012), the MNC needs to incur concealment costs CI(bi) in order to
conceal thin capitalization. These costs are proportional to the amount of capital em-
ployed and convex for any positive internal leverage bi > 0, but zero otherwise (i.e.,
CI(bi) = 0 for bi ≤ 0).
Given these assumptions, the economic profit of affiliate i is given by revenue from the
sales of the output good minus the licences cost, the cost for the intermediate good
and the user cost of capital
piei = piyi − (GXi + qX)X¯ − (GSi + qS)Si − CP (PXi , P Si )− CI(bi)Ki − rKi. (3.1)
11The alternative approach would be to rely on the deviation of the true arm’s-length price only,
featuring the ‘comparable unrelated price method,’ see OECD (2013) and Gresik and Osmundsen
(2008) for institutional details. Qualitatively, our results do not depend on which approach is
chosen.
12For simplicity and without any consequences for our main results, we have assumed that there
are no external capital markets for debt available.
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Taxable profit differs from economic profit in that opportunity costs of equity and
concealment costs are not tax-deductible. Furthermore, we assume that no loss offset
is granted when the affiliate is running taxable losses. Hence, if the realization of the
output price pi is too low, the government does not participate in the resulting losses
and the tax payments are zero.13 Let p0i be the price for which the taxable profit of
affiliate i is just zero. The taxable profit of affiliate i can then be written as
piti =
piyi − (GXi + qX)X¯ − (GSi + qS)Si − rbiKi, if pi > p0i0, if p ≤ p0i .
The surplus of the financial center in country 1 amounts to
pi1 = (1− t1)p¯i + (1− t1)
∑
i
(GXi + qX)X¯ + (G
S
i + qS)Si + rbiKi − qXX¯ − qSSi]− rbiKi
= (1− t1)p¯i + (1− t1)
∑
i
GXi X¯ +G
S
i Si − t1r
∑
i
biKi. (3.2)
Hereby, p¯i > 0 represents positive exogenous profits in the financial center.14
The HQ of the MNC maximizes total after-tax profits Π by choosing the optimal tax-
avoidance activity, i.e., by optimizing over leverages bi, and the transfer prices G
X
i
and GSi . With respect to the timing of the tax planning strategies of the MNC, two
scenarios are applicable. Firstly, the MNC could choose its tax-planning strategies
after the realization of the output price, say, at the end of the year. We will refer to this
scenario as ‘ex-post profit shifting.’ Secondly, it could be that the MNC has to decide
on and to commit to its profit-shifting activities before the revelation of the output
prices. We will refer to this setting as ‘ex-ante profit shifting.’
13In reality, loss carry forwards imply that current losses can be deducted against future profits.
However, loss carry forwards are not inflated with interest so that the present discounted value
decreases. Therefore, our simplifying assumption of no loss offsets is harmless, because multi-
nationals always have the incentive to settle losses in one affiliate with taxable profits in other
affiliates.
14In a full-fledged model, there would be other (profitable) affiliates that shift profits to the
financial center. In order to account for that and to make sure that the multinational can shift
profits to the high-tax affiliates in case of taxable losses in these affiliates, we assume p¯i > 0 as a
shortcut.
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3.2.2 Ex-post profit shifting
Ex-post the MNC knows about the realization of the output prices pi. Taking this
into consideration, the MNC optimally shifts income into the affiliates that give the
higher effective reduction in tax payments. We can distinguish the two cases pi > p
0
i
and pi ≤ p0i .
Positive taxable profits. In the first case, the producing affiliates makes economic
profits and therefore face the local tax rate ti. The overall profit of the MNC can be
written as
max
bi,GXi ,G
S
i
Π = pi1 +
∑
i
piei − tipiti
s.t. piti > 0,∑
i rbiKi = 0,
∑
i
GXi X¯ = 0,
∑
i
GSi Si = 0. (3.3)
Differentiating the total after-tax profits for the three tax-avoidance variables and
considering λi as the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier yields
ti − t1 − 1
r
∂CI
∂bi
≤ λi, (3.4a)
ti − t1 − ∂C
P
∂PXi
≤ λi, (3.4b)
ti − t1 − ∂C
P
∂P Si
≤ λi, (3.4c)
where the first-order conditions hold with equality and λi = 0 if pi
t
i > 0.
The first-order conditions state that the effective marginal concealment costs for each
profit shifting device equalize in the optimum, i.e. 1
r
∂CI
∂bi
= ∂C
P
∂GXi
= ∂C
P
∂GSi
. Furthermore,
if the taxable profit in the producing affiliates is positive, the MNC is unconstrained
in the use of all profit shifting channels (λt = 0) and effective marginal concealment
costs are equal to the marginal tax savings ti− t1. The consequences are that the MNC
sets transfer prices above the correct arm’s-length prices, and that the financial center
lends internal debt to the high-tax affiliates in order to shift profits into the tax haven.
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Non-positive taxable profits. Whenever the output price is equal to or below the
break-even price (pi < p
0
i ), the producing affiliates have neither economic nor taxable
profits. Therefore, their tax payments drop to zero. The overall profits of the MNC
can be written as
max
bi,GXi ,G
S
i
Π = pi1 +
∑
i
piei
s.t. piti ≤ 0,∑
i rbiKi = 0,
∑
i
GXi X¯ = 0,
∑
i
GSi Si = 0. (3.5)
The optimization problem is similar to the case with positive taxable profits and yields
t1 +
1
r
∂CI
∂bi
≥ λi, (3.6a)
t1 +
∂CP
∂PXi
≥ λi, (3.6b)
t1 +
∂CP
∂P Si
≥ λi, (3.6c)
where for the Kuhn-Tucker parameter holds λi = 0 if pi
t
i ≤ 0.
Once more, the first-order conditions state that the effective marginal concealment
costs for each profit shifting device are equalized in the optimum. In the case of taxable
losses (piti < 0), the effective marginal concealment costs, in absolute terms, equal the
marginal loss−t1 from shifting out profits. Accordingly, the MNC has an incentive to
reduce the transfer price for the intermediate good as well as for the licence fee below
the correct arm’s-length price.15 Moreover, the internal debt tax shield in affiliate i
becomes negative and internal debt will drop to zero. Actually, the MNC has even an
incentive to use the high-tax affiliates as internal bank as long as these affiliates are in
a loss position and their effective tax rate is zero. We will, however, assume that the
MNC cannot reallocate its equity. For tax savings, the total interest deduction over
the entire tax year matter so that an inverted financial structure at year’s end will not
deliver any reward. In sum, the MNC shifts profits into the high-tax countries which
means that the incentives for profit shifting are completely reversed in a loss position.
15Implicity, we assume that there are no concealment costs related to shifting profits out of a
tax haven, because the tax haven does not monitor the financial flows.
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Tax-efficient capital structure. The mechanism at play under debt shifting is
that interest income is earned in the low-taxcountryanddeducted inhigh-taxcountries
so that the tax savings arising from the deductions in high-tax countries exceed the
corresponding tax payments in the low-tax country.
Following the empirical debt-shifting literature (e.g., Huizinga et al., 2008, Møen et
al., 2011), we assume concealment costs of (internal) debt to be quadratic in leverage,
i.e.,
CI(bi) =
ηb
2
· (bi)2 (3.7)
ηb represents a constant cost parameter of debt shifting. Applying equation (3.7) in
the first-order condition (3.4a), we find as optimal internal leverage in the case of a
profitable producing affiliate
b∗i = (ti − t1)
r
ηb
> 0. (3.8)
All affiliates i > 1 will borrow internal debt from the financial center and, due to
improved possibilities to save taxes, the internal leverage is increasing in the internal
tax debt shield, that is
∂bi
∂ti
=
r
ηb
> 0 and
∂bi
∂t1
= − r
ηb
< 0.
If taxable profits are negative instead, the affiliate experiences a negative debt tax
shield (−t1r) and the optimal internal leverage is zero in affiliates that are in a loss
position piti < 0.
Optimal transfer pricing. As for debt shifting, the literature on transfer pricing
suggests quadratic concealment costs (e.g., Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Grubert,
2003; Nielsen et al., 2010). Since the MNC in our model has two devices for shifting
profits by transfer pricing, GXi and G
S
i , it is reasonable to consider the two as cost
substitutes, i.e., the two devices are mutually increasing each others’ concealment
costs. We define the concealment cost function of profit shifting as
CP (PXi , P
S
i ) =
1
2
[ηX
2
(
PXi
)2
+
ηS
2
(
P Si
)2]2
. (3.9)
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Using (3.9) as the cost function leads to the following optimal (abusive) transfer prices
for the licence fee and the intermediate good16
(
GXi
)∗
= 3
√
ηS
ηS + ηX
· 2
(ηX)2
· (1 · ti − t1) 1
X¯
, 1 =
1, if piti > 00, if piti ≤ 0. (3.10a)
(
GSi
)∗
= 3
√
ηX
ηS + ηX
· 2
(ηS)2
· (1 · ti − t1) 1
Si
, 1 =
1, if piti > 00, if piti ≤ 0. (3.10b)
Not surprisingly, the surcharge on the correct arm’s-length prices is positive in case of
a profitable affiliate (GXi , G
S
i > 0). In this case, the mark-up increases with the tax
rate of the producing affiliates ti , but decreases with the tax rate t1 of the financial
center
∂Ga
∂ti
> 0 and
∂Ga
∂t1
< 0, a = X,S.
Ahigher taxdifferentialmakes transferpricingmoreattractive, because shiftingprofits
will result in higher tax savings.
In contrast, the MNC sets a transfer prices that lies below the correct arm’s-length
price if the affiliate is in a loss position (GXi , G
S
i < 0). This is because the effective
marginal tax rate is zero, regardless of ti. Consequently, profit-shifting incentives are
reversed as long as the producing affiliates have non-positive taxable profits (i.e., zero
tax payments). In this case, the tax rate ti does not affect the magnitude of the transfer
prices. Contrary to before, an increase of the tax rate t1 in the profit center leads to a
decrease in the transfer prices and to more profits shifted to the producing affiliates,
now. The reason is that the tax disadvantage of the tax haven relative to the effectively
zero tax burden in the high-tax countries increases.
Putting both aspects together, affiliates of MNCs are bunching around zero taxable
profits. For profitable affiliates, the HQ has an incentive to shift profits into the
low-tax country, whereas affiliates with taxable losses in the operating business will
receive profits from affiliates abroad (the financial center). For zero taxable profits,
the incentives to shift coincide and collapse. Because domestic companies cannot
shift profits internationally, these companies cannot buffer their operating profits and
losses. Hence, the profit distribution around zero is much less compressed for domestic
firms than for affiliates of MNCs. Empirical studies by Grubert et al. (1993, chapter
7.4) and by Møen and Tropina (2013) find empirical support for this result.
16We deliver a full derivation of the optimal transfer prices in Appendix C.1.
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3.2.3 Ex-ante profit shifting
If the MNC must decide ex ante on transfer prices as well as the level of internal
debt, it cannot revisit these decisions after the output prices revealed. The MNC’s HQ
maximizes the expected overall profits taking into consideration that the output prices
pi are stochastic and follow a cumulative distribution functionH(p) with support [p, p¯].
Then, expected profits of the high-tax affiliates are
E(pii) =
∫ p¯
p
pih(p) dp · yi − (GXi + qX)X¯ − (GSi + qS)Si − rKi
+ [1−H(p0i )] · ti[(GXi + qX)X¯ + (GSi + qS)Si + rbiKi]
− ti
∫ p¯
p0i
pih(p) dp · yi − CP (PXi , P Si )− CI(bi)Ki. (3.11)
The first line displays affiliates’ economic profits. The size of the economic profits
depends on the realization of pi which is ex-ante uncertain. Additionally, affiliates
have to pay taxes in the case of a sufficiently high output price. This happens only with
the likelihood [1−H(p0i )]. In any other case, tax payments in country i are zero. The
MNC incurs also concealment costs for debt shifting and transfer price manipulation.
Accordingly, overall expected profits of the MNC can be written as
E(Π) =
∑
i
E(pii) + (1− t1)
∑
i
GXi X¯ +G
S
i Si − t1r
∑
i
biKi. (3.12)
Differentiating the expected after-tax profits of the MNC for the three tax-avoidance
variables, taking into consideration that the price p0i is affected by changes in the
transfer prices and internal debt, gives17
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
1
r
∂CP
∂bi
, (3.13a)
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
∂CP
∂PXi
, (3.13b)
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
∂CP
∂P Si
. (3.13c)
With uncertainty in the realization of the output price, the risk neutral MNC is more
cautious in setting transfer prices and allocating internal loans. The MNC only wants
17We deliver a full derivation of the ex-ante optimality conditions in Appendix C.2.
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to shift profits to the financial center if the producing affiliate has taxable profits. The
probability for this case (piti > 0) to happen is 1−H(p0i ). Therefore, it is the expected
tax rate of the producing affiliate, [1−H(p0i )] ti, that matters for determining the tax
savings ex ante. Consequently, overinvoicing transfer prices and internal debt shifting
becomes less attractive if the probability of being unprofitable, H(p0i ), increases.
3.2.4 Theoretical predictions
To summarize, the theoretical model offers several predictions, some of which we are
able to test empirically. Firstly, in line with the existing literature (Grubert et al., 1993;
de Simone and Seidman, 2013), the model predicts that, compared to purely national
firms within the same industry, affiliates of MNCs should have lower tax payments if
the affiliate is profitable. Analogously, affiliates of MNCs should report lower taxable
losses than comparable purely national firms. In both cases, the reason is that MNCs
can adjust their transfer prices and the financial structure to shift profits tax efficient
between countries. We summarize this finding in:
Hypothesis 1 High-tax affiliates should have lower tax payments (lower losses)
when running profits (losses) as compared to national firms.
Secondly, we should expect that tax payments of high-tax affiliates are bunching
around zero if the MNC has the possibility to adjust profit shifting strategies ex post,
i.e., at the end of the year when the actual output price pi is known. As a result, com-
parable affiliates of MNCs (with the same output) will differ in their cost structures,
but will all bunch around zero profits. More precisely, our model predicts:
Hypothesis 2 Tax payments of high-tax affiliates are bunching around zero in the
case of ex-post profit shifting. Otherwise comparable affiliates with the same output
level, however, will under ex-post shifting feature high transfer payments and a high
internal leverage if they are profitable (i.e., piti > 0 before any tax avoidance oper-
ation), whereas they will carry low transfer payments and no internal debt if they
are in a loss position (piti < 0).
Thirdly, if the MNC must commit to its profit-shifting strategy ex ante, we should
observe differences in the profit levels of these affiliates which stem from differences in
the realization of the output price. However, incentives for profit shifting are the same
for all affiliates ex-ante, i.e. we should observe an identical cost and financial structure
across affiliates. We summarize this in:
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Hypothesis 3 If ex-ante profit shifting is the relevant scenario, comparable affili-
ates of MNCs will show different profit levels (i.e., different tax payments), but will
feature the same transfer price payments and internal leverage.
Fourthly, if the probability of being unprofitable increases, we should observe a re-
duction in the profit shifting incentives of ex-ante profit shifters only. Incentives for
ex-post profit shifters are not affected by the ex-ante probability of being unproduc-
tive since they decide on profit shifting strategies after the realization of the output
price. We summarize this in:
Hypothesis 4 An increase in the probability of being unprofitable only affects the
profit-shifting behavior of MNCs that are forced to do ex-ante profit shifting.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The sample is constructed by combining three unique data sources. First,
Dun&Bradstreet provides data on all financial statistics for all companies registered
in Norway. Second, SIFON gives information about foreign ownership of Norwe-
gian firms. Third, the Tax Authorities (Skattedirektoratet) has data on transactions
and debt relationships between Norwegian firms and foreign affiliates (Utenlandsopp-
gaven). These three sources are merged, using an identification key that identifies
each Norwegian firm uniquely. We classify a Norwegian firm as a MNC if it either con-
trols at least one daughter company abroad or is controlled by a foreign owner. That
is, the Norwegian firm is an MNC if it either owns, directly or indirectly, at least 50%
of a foreign affiliate, or a foreign owner directly controls at least 50% of the shares of
the Norwegian firm. Outgoing transfers include royalties, license fees, rental expendi-
tures, and purchases the Norwegian firm makes from a foreign affiliate.
Our panel data covers the eight-year period from 1998 to 2005, and it includes all firms
except financial firms and producers of oil and gas which are subject to special laws
and regulations. The variation in the data is limited; in particular, there is not much
variation in each firm’s loss/profit positions over time. Therefore, we try to preserve
as much as possible of the original data. We only exclude some very few observations
with extreme values, notably negative sales and negative total assets. Finally, the
measures for transfer prices are winsorized at the 1st percentile, while we restrict the
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of results over assets before taxes
total internal leverage to the interval [0; 1].18 Several of the control variables are also
winsorized, see Appendix C.4 for details.
We start out by looking at the distribution of results before taxes of both domestic
firms and MNCs in Figure 3.1. It is clear from the graphics that profits are lower for
MNCs than for domestic firms. The picture is somewhat less clear for firms in a loss
position, but the quantile marks indicate that MNCs to a larger extent than domestic
firms bunch around break-even also when in a loss position. These observations are
in line with Grubert et al. (1993) as well as De Simone and Seidman (2013), and they
provide support to our first theoretical prediction (cf. Hypothesis 1 in section 3.2.4).
The theoretical model suggests that the observed bunching is due to reversed incentives
for profit shifting. It is, however, uncertain how much flexibility the MNCs have
when it comes to adjusting their transfer prices and internal leverage. The theoretical
model offers two contrasting predictions. Hypothesis 2 states that, under ex-post
1839 and 6 observations, respectively, are deleted from the sample of MNCs due to negative
sales and negative total assets. 303 observations with an internal leverage outside the interval [0; 1]
are excluded from the analysis of internal debt, but these are included in the study of transfer
payments.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics.
Average (st.dev)
The loss position dummy (N = 7, 457) 0.38 (0.49)
Full sample In loss position Not in loss position Difference
Net outgoing transfer payments
All MNCs -1.33 -1.06 -1.51 0.45**
(St.dev.) (9.29) (8.19) (9.89)
Number of obs. 7,457 2,829 4,628
Norwegian daughters 0.48 -0.48 1.07 -1.55***
(St.dev) (7.48) (5.16) (8.56)
Number of obs. 821 315 506
Total internal debt
All MNCs 4.53 3.93 4.89 -0.96***
(St.dev.) (14.51) (13.50) (15.08)
Number of obs. 7,159 2,698 4,481
Norwegian daughters 4.68 3.17 5.61 -2.44**
(St.dev) (15.32) (12.45) (16.79)
Number of obs. 789 300 489
Transfer payments and internal leverage are standardized as % of the
firm’s average total assets over the time period.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
shifting, affiliates with the same output level will feature high transfer payments and
a high internal leverage if they are profitable (i.e., piti > 0 before any tax-avoidance
operation), whereas they will carry low transfer payments and no internal debt if they
are in a loss position (piti < 0). Hypothesis 3 considers the low-flexibility situation
where MNCs have to commit to profit-shifting strategies ex ante. If this is the correct
scenario, we should observe differences in the profit levels of these affiliates which stem
from differences in the realization of the output price. However, incentives for profit
shifting are the same for all affiliates ex-ante, i.e. we should observe an identical cost
and financial structure across affiliates.
Actually, we would like to test Hypothesis 4 on the effect of an increase of the loss
probability empirically, as well. But, our data set provides us with too little variation
and information to do so. Therefore, the remainder of the empirical analysis seeks to
identify which of the two hypothesis H2 vs. H3 is most correct, i.e., to which extent
profit-shifting strategies are functions of whether or not the affiliate experiences a loss.
In order to study this, we generate a dummy variable (Lit) equal to 1 if the Norwegian
firm i is in a loss position in year t.
Table 3.1 takes a first, descriptive look at the relationship between being in a loss
position and profit-shifting strategies. In order to adjust for firm size, we standardize
the transfer payments and leverage by the firm’s (i.e., Norwegian affiliate’s) mean total
assets over the period. Using the mean total asset in the denominator secures that any
changes in the dependent variable are caused by changes in profit shifting rather than
in the denominator.
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Table 3.2: Autocorrelation in loss positions
Loss position at time t Correlation
Loss position at time t− 1 (N = 6, 605) 0.41***
Loss position at time t− 2 (N = 5, 746) 0.28***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
First, we note that firms experience losses in a substantial number of cases, as much
as in 38% of our observations. In contrast to what theory predicted, we observe that
MNCs in a loss position have higher net outgoing transfers when studying the full
sample of MNCs.19 This is a puzzle, but recent findings by Dischinger et al. (2014)
offer a plausible explanation. They find that the profit distribution is skewed in favor of
the headquarter’s location. This indicates that the headquarter plays a special role in
the MNCs, or to quote the title of their paper “There is no place like home”. Moreover,
their results are well grounded in theory that points to agency costs and moral-hazard
problems between the headquarters and the profit center/internal bank.20 Hence, we
also look at the sub-sample of MNCs that are controlled by foreign owners, i.e., at
daughter companies only. For that sub-sample, we get the expected negative sign, and
the difference is also clearly statistically significant.
The difference between the full sample of MNCs and the Norwegian daughters is less
dramatic when looking at internal leverage. In both cases, it seems that firms in a
loss position hold less debt than those in a break-even or profit position. However,
the difference is larger for the sub-sample of daughters. These differences seem to
suggest that there is flexibility in both devices for tax avoidance. However, it would be
premature to draw any conclusion at this stage. In order to discuss causality, a more
rigorous econometric procedure, which deals with a number of empirical challenges, is
required.
A first concern is the potential for autocorrelation in performance. If losses in previous
years are a good indicator of the probability of running losses also at time t, firms can
adjust their strategies based not only on present, but also on past performance. Failing
to control for such dynamic adaptions will give rise to an omitted variables bias.
We report the autocorrelation in Table 3.2. It is evident that being in a loss position in
one year is a strong predictor of the performance also in the next year, and even in the
next few years to come. Therefore, this should be taken into account when establishing
19Net outgoing transfers is defined as outgoing transfer payments less incoming transfer pay-
ments. Consequently, positive values imply that the Norwegian affiliate pays out more transfers
than it receives.
20See, e.g., O’Donnel (2000), Chang and Taylor (1999), and Hamilton and Kashlak (1999).
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the empirical model.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Empirical strategy
According to the theoretical model, the profit-shifting strategy should be a function of
the tax differential between Norway and the tax haven, and the loss position (given ex-
post shifting) or the expectation of experiencing a loss (given ex-ante profit shifting).
The empirical investigation thus relies on OLS estimations of variations of the equation
yijt = β0 + β1Lijt + β2Lijt−1 + β3Lijt ∗ Lijt−1 + κtlijt + z
′
ijtθ + δt + αj + ijt (3.14)
where the dependent variable yijt is transfer payments or internal leverage in affiliate
i, being active in industry j at year t.21 In the main specifications, we use net outgoing
transfers and total internal leverage, but we will also report results from regressions
on gross incoming and outgoing transfers, as well as short-term and long-term internal
leverage.
Lijt is the loss-position dummy, giving that β1 is the coefficient of most interest in
our study. According to our Hypothesis 2, β1 should be significantly negative if firms
have the flexibility to adjust their profit shifting ex post. If the ex-ante scenario is
relevant, however, it follows from Hypothesis 3 thatβ1 should be zero and insignificant,
because firms must commit to their transfer payments and leverages, respectively, at
the beginning of the tax year. Being in a loss position should not have any influence
in the latter scenario.
As discussed above, the substantial autocorrelation in losses gives that earlier years’
performance is an important control for the expectations on performance in year t.
Moreover, this expectation can have a direct impact on how a firm reacts to losses in
year t. Hence, we include the lagged loss position and an interaction term between the
present and lagged loss position in the regressions. The interaction term gives a new
dummy that is equal to one if a firm experienced a loss position both at time t and
21Following our theoretical approach, we have tried to run the empirical analysis while splitting
the transfer payments into the categories royalties, license fees, rental expenditures on the one
hand and purchases (cost of materials) on the other hand. But, this reduces the variation in the
data too much and no meaningful results can be obtained.
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t−1. By doing so, we try to control for the expectations on the loss probabilityH(p0i ),
being relevant in the ex-ante shifting scenario, cf. equations (3.13a) to (3.13c). Next,
tlijt is the tax rate in the foreign affiliate with the lowest tax rate (i.e., the ‘tax haven’),
capturing the maximum tax rate differential.
zijt is a vector of control variables and includes several key characteristics of the firm.
The choice of control variables is motivated by earlier literature on profit shifting,
see, e.g., Møen et al. (2013), Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2009), Huizinga et al. (2008),
and Rajan and Zingales (1995). First, the result as share of total assets serves as a
performance measure. Second, the loss carry forward is also a potentially important
control. This variable captures loss carry forward and losses on sold assets. Thirdly,
total assets and number of employees act as size measures. Fourth and finally, we
include the age of the firm.22 In addition, all regressions include for time and industry
fixed effects, represented by δt and αj, respectively.
In the descriptive statistics, we saw that losses seem to affect profit shifting in different
manners for parent and daughter companies. This observation is consistent with
findings in the literature suggesting that MNCs partially shift profits into the parent
company rather than optimizing the tax structure (Dischinger et al., 2014). Hence,
we will estimate the model both for all MNCs and for Norwegian firms controlled by
foreign parents.
A word of warning is in place before proceeding to the results of the empirical investiga-
tion. Even when conditioning on the set of control variables, one should show caution
when interpreting the coefficient for the loss-position dummy. For two reasons, the
point estimates are most likely biased.
First, since the profit shifting decisions affect the probability of being in a loss position,
and, thus, Lijt, β1 can be plagued by a simultaneity bias. In Appendix C.3 the bias
is derived and studied formally. The conclusion is that the simultaneity gives an
attenuation bias in our main results, suggesting that these are conservative estimates.
Second, the interpretation of our results depend crucially on our ability to control for
relevant characteristics of the firms. Since the data does not contain enough variation
to use firm fixed effects, one may fear that the results are driven by unobservable
characteristics. Specifically, it is problematic that the baseline regressions compare
companies with very different performances. Companies with large profits or losses
can be very different from those that are close to break-even, despite being on the same
22Descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in Appendix C.4.
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side of zero. In order to investigate whether or not our results are sensitive to this, we
will also estimate the model using sub-samples consisting only of firms close to break-
even. Similar strategies for reducing problems related to unobservable characteristics
have been used, e.g., by Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Hopland (2014).
Given these two caveats, we do not interpret the point estimates as marginal effects
from being in a loss position. Rather, we restrict ourselves to a discussion about how
the direction of the effects corresponds to the predictions from the theoretical model
and to which extent the estimated effects appear robust.
3.4.2 Results
Table 3.3 presents the main results for transfer-pricing strategies. In Column (A) we
include all Norwegian based MNCs in an estimation of net outgoing transfers. We
remember from the descriptive statistics that the raw difference came out with an un-
expected positive sign. When adding the control variables in a regression framework,
we obtain the expected negative sign for the loss position, but the coefficient is not sig-
nificant at any conventional level of significance. Moreover, the overall explanatory
power is very weak, and only the number of employees comes out as significant. Consis-
tent with the findings in Dischinger et al. (2013), we assume that the low explanatory
power, at least to some extent, is owing to the behavior of Norwegian parent compa-
nies. Thus, we devote Columns (B)-(D) to a study of Norwegian daughter companies.
Column (B) is similar to Column (A), the sample being the only difference. In the
descriptive statistics, we found a statistically significant raw difference of -1.55. When
conditioning on the control variables, the effect from being in a loss position is even
stronger, with a coefficient of close to -2.5. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, none of the
control variables comes out as significant. This is probably due to the limited variation
in net outgoing transfers. Of the 604 observations in the regressions, close to 500 take
the value zero, while the remaining observations are almost evenly distributed between
positive and negative.
In Columns (C) and (D), we split the net outgoing transfers and study gross outgoing
and gross incoming transfers separately. A first observation is that our model explains
much more of the variation in outgoing transfers than for the incoming transfers.
Moreover, we observe that the effect on net outgoing transfers is entirely driven by a
reduction in gross outgoing transfers, while the incoming transfers remain unchanged.
Table 3.4 presents the results for internal leverage. As when studying transfer pay-
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Table 3.3: Estimation of transfer pricing strategies.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
All MNCs Norwegian daughters
VARIABLES Net outgoing Net outgoing Gross outgoing Gross incoming
transfers transfers transfers transfers
Loss position at time t -0.162 -2.491** -2.423** 0.446
(0.457) (1.165) (1.211) (0.711)
Loss position at time t− 1 0.0848 -1.021 -1.587 -0.163
(0.393) (0.788) (0.992) (0.407)
Loss position both 0.743 -0.1000 -0.0700 0.384
at t and t− 1 (0.658) (1.273) (1.793) (0.689)
Results as share of -0.221 -0.813 -0.707 0.0174
total assets (0.170) (1.169) (1.751) (0.459)
Tax rate for affiliate 3.642 -5.448 -14.20 -2.580
with lowest tax rate (3.141) (7.437) (12.63) (1.999)
Total assets -7.84e-07 -8.99e-06 -1.82e-05 4.36e-07
(2.35e-06) (9.84e-06) (1.68e-05) (1.63e-06)
Employees -0.0142** 0.0108 0.0405 0.0112*
(0.00625) (0.0211) (0.0366) (0.00611)
Company age 0.000137 -0.0136 -0.0740 -0.0207
(0.0131) (0.0531) (0.0802) (0.0145)
Loss carry forward 0.240 -0.260 -0.218 0.00138
as share of the resul (0.165) (0.435) (0.601) (0.264)
Observations 5,405 604 604 604
R-squared 0.089 0.210 0.215 0.082
A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included
in all regressions. The transfer prices are standardized as % of the firm’s average
total assets over the period.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ments, it is reasonable to expect that it is not trivial whether a firm is a parent or
daughter company. Hence, Table 3.4 has the same structure as Table 3.3, with esti-
mations using the full sample of MNCs in Column (A), and estimations using only
Norwegian daughters in Columns (B)-(D).
We remember a negative raw difference in total internal leverage from the descriptive
statistics, and this sign remains in Column (A). However, when controlling for a wide
set of covariates in a regression framework, the coefficient for loss position comes out
as insignificant. The control variables seem to be of some more importance when
estimating leverage, most likely because this variable contains more information than
the transfers. As expected, the tax rate for the affiliate with lowest tax rate comes out
as negative. In addition, large companies (in terms of total assets) have more internal
leverage than smaller firms.
When studying the total internal leverage in Norwegian daughter companies, we also
obtain an insignificantly negative coefficient for the loss-position dummy. Among
the control variables, only the results as share of assets is significant, with a negative
sign. Finally, in Columns (C) and (D), respectively, we report the results for splitting
internal leverage into short-term and long-term leverage. The coefficient for the loss-
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Table 3.4: Estimation of internal leverage.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
All MNCs Norwegian daughters
VARIABLES Total internal Total internal Short-term internal Long-term internal
leverage leverage leverage leverage
Loss position at time t -0.0271 -1.085 0.351 -1.436
(0.631) (2.331) (1.929) (0.880)
Loss position at time t− 1 -0.117 -0.0966 1.419 -1.515*
(0.624) (2.082) (1.736) (0.832)
Loss position both 0.440 -3.270 -4.250 0.980
at t and t− 1 (0.949) (3.684) (3.276) (1.035)
Results as share of 0.447 -3.625** -2.487* -1.138*
total assets (0.346) (1.624) (1.492) (0.643)
Tax rate for affiliate -16.64*** -0.466 -2.551 2.085
with lowest tax rate (3.624) (10.22) (8.955) (3.619)
Total assets 5.75e-06** 3.75e-06 2.06e-06 1.68e-06
(2.31e-06) (6.64e-06) (5.59e-06) (2.40e-06)
Employees -0.00245 -0.0250 -0.0146 -0.0104
(0.00710) (0.0195) (0.0137) (0.00875)
Company age -0.0110 -0.0727 -0.0265 -0.0462*
(0.0147) (0.0552) (0.0415) (0.0255)
Delayed tax advantage -0.289 -0.329 -0.350 0.0207
(0.289) (0.862) (0.574) (0.451)
Observations 5,187 580 580 580
R-squared 0.151 0.220 0.178 0.214
A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included
in all regressions. Internal leverage is standardized as % of the firm’s average
total assets over the period.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
position dummy is not significant at any conventional level of significance in any of the
two. However, the lagged loss position comes out as negative when estimating long-
term internal leverage, indicating that companies to some extent adjust leverage over
time as a response to performance.
Table 3.5 presents robustness tests, where we use sub-samples close to break-even.
Using these sub-samples help to reduce problems related to unobservable character-
istics, since we only compare firms with similar performance. In Columns (A) and
(B), we restrict the sample to companies with results over assets between the 25th
and 75th percentile, i.e., we throw out the 25 highest and lowest performers in year t.
In Columns (C) and (D), we go much further, and keep only companies with results
over assets between -1.5% and 1.5%. We observe that the number of observations is
reduced heavily in both cases.
The results for net outgoing transfers are displayed in Columns (A) and (C). Interest-
ingly, we see that the coefficient increases compared to the baseline. When using the
least restrictive cut-off in Column (A), the coefficient is about twice as large as in the
baseline, while it is more than three times the size of the baseline when using the most
restrictive cut-off in Column (C). As explained in the previous section, we hesitate to
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Table 3.5: Estimations on sub-samples close to break-even. Only daughter companies
included.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Net outgoing Total internal Net outgoing Total internal
transfers leverage transfers leverage
Loss position at time t -5.991*** -2.170 -8.910** -10.53
(2.268) (3.267) (4.215) (11.86)
Loss position at time t− 1 -1.486* -0.372 0.0365 -2.663
(0.826) (2.372) (0.929) (3.605)
Loss position both 1.052 -4.778 0.797 7.542
at t and t− 1 (1.639) (4.886) (2.598) (8.763)
Results as share of -23.98** -23.03 -382.3** -225.3
total assets (11.75) (19.64) (185.8) (585.5)
Tax rate for affiliate -5.778 8.990 -11.41 -5.099
with lowest tax rate (7.914) (11.89) (14.93) (26.13)
Total assets -9.27e-06 5.18e-06 -2.36e-05* 1.25e-05
(1.11e-05) (7.35e-06) (1.24e-05) (1.47e-05)
Employees 0.0157 -0.0358 0.0173 -0.0916**
(0.0211) (0.0225) (0.0292) (0.0391)
Company age -0.0137 -0.0666 -0.0592 -0.210
(0.0639) (0.0726) (0.0773) (0.156)
Loss carry forward -0.860 -1.055 -0.887 2.578*
as share of the result (0.581) (1.021) (0.779) (1.371)
Observations 407 393 103 101
R-squared 0.312 0.261 0.463 0.534
Sample Results over assets Results over assets Results over Results over
between -6% and 18% between -6% and 18% assets between assets between
(25th-75th percentile) (25th-75th percentile) -1.5% and 1.5% -1.5% and 1.5%
A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all regressions.
The transfer prices and internal leverage are standardized as % of the firm’s average
total assets over the period.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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interpret the coefficients as marginal effect in any case. However, the fact that the co-
efficients increase as we seek to reduce problems related to omitted variables, and the
fact that the simultaneity bias probably causes an attenuation bias, at least indicate
that our baseline results are not overestimated. Hence, we are confident that MNCs
(at least daughter companies) use transfer-pricing strategies in order to shift losses,
not only profits. In total, being rather a conservative estimate, the significantly neg-
ative coefficient on the loss-position dummy gives support for the ex-post scenario in
case of transfer pricing.
Results for total internal leverage are reported in Columns (B) and (D). We observe
that even though the coefficients increase substantially, they are still far from being
significant at any conventional level of significance. Accordingly , the conclusion is
that companies seem to use internal leverage to a lesser extent than transfer pricing
when shifting losses. This interpretation is in line with Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2013)
who suggest that the adjustment costs of the capital structure should be very high.
Since the simultaneity bias gives an attenuation bias, we can not conclude that internal
leverage is not changed as a response to losses. However, it does seem that transfer
pricing is the more flexible tool of the two. Moreover, it suggests that there is at
least some support for Hypothesis 3 and ex-ante profit shifting when it comes to debt
shifting.
3.4.3 Discussion
Our first empirical finding, based on descriptive statistics and summarized in Figure
3.1, was that affiliates of MNCs indeed bunch more around zero profitability than
domestic (stand-alone) firms. This holds also for loss-making affiliates, reporting
lower losses than domestic firms. Of course, this finding neither proves that MNCs use
profit-shifting strategies to reduce losses nor does it allow to conclude anything about
causality. However, the bunching confirms earlier findings in Grubert et al. (1993)
and in de Simone and Seidman (2013) who can infer from their approaches that the
bunching is related to profit shifting. Hence, it appears to be safe to argue that the
plausible arguments in our theory model carry over to reality. The interesting issue,
however, is how flexible MNCs are in adjusting their earnings management during the
tax year and which of the profit-shifting devices can be used to reduce losses. This is
where our regression analyses comes into play.
We find substantial flexibility in transfer pricing, indicated by a highly significant
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loss-position dummy that indicates an inflow of transfer payments of roughly 6 and 9
percentage points of total assets (for affiliates with returns over assets in [−6%; 18%]
and [−1.5%; 1.5%] respectively) if an affiliate reports a negative tax base at the end of
the tax year, cf. columns (A) and (C) in table 3.5. Having in mind also the attenuation
bias present, this is clear evidence in support of ex-post profit shifting (cf. Hypothesis
2), when it comes to transfer pricing. For internal leverage and debt shifting, the
picture is very different. In none of our regressions on internal debt, the loss-position
dummy reaches any conventional level of significance, even when we analyse short-
term and long-term debt in separation. But, there is again an attenuation bias at work
so that we cannot draw any definite conclusion.
Nevertheless, the data clearly indicates that transfer pricing is providing more flexi-
bility to adjust and to revert earnings management. Furthermore, our preferred in-
terpretation of our findings is that there is substantial inflexibility in internal leverage
indicating that Hypothesis 3 and some need for ex-ante profit shifting are closer to re-
ality, when talking about debt shifting. A 28 percentage point reduction of the debt
tax shield should trigger some significant effect on leverage.23 Another indicator for
this view could be the fact that the expected loss probability, measured via being in a
loss position in the previous year, has a negative impact on long-term internal debt on
the 10% significance level (cf. column (D) in table 3.4). Accordingly, loss expectations
seem to affect the debt-shifting decision at the beginning of the year.
Our preferred interpretation of rather inflexible internal leverage also relates to other
studies and to findings on external leverage. When conceding that the tax effects on
internal debt shifting are surprisingly low in magnitude, Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2013)
suggest that the adjustment costs for internal leverage are substantial. Inflexible
internal leverage also would have its counterpart in a rigid capital structure of external
debt. In the finance literature, it is well known that the target capital structure is only
adjusted when the deviations from the optimal leverage are becoming large enough,
because adjustments are costly, in particular due to hold-out problems and regulatory
issues (e.g., Fischer et al., 1989; Gilson, 1997; Srebulaev, 2007). Korteweg (2010)
finds evidence that firms are strategically underleveraged on average, particularly
because the costs of overly leverage are significantly higher. We must confess that we
cannot explain where the inflexibility in holding internal debt is coming from, because
neither enforcement problems to accept an earlier repayment of debt nor regulatory
23In our sample period, profitable affiliates in Norway faced a statutory corporate tax rate of
28%. When disclosing losses, the effective tax rate drops to zero.
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disincentives should matter for internal debt. One reason could be covenant issues,
i.e., contracts with external debt holders, that prevent affiliates from paying back
internal loans as such a settlement would reduce the liquidity and the ability to serve
external debt. A common incentive to underleverage both in external and in internal
debt, however, would be to avoid having leverage when ending up with a negative tax
base. Hence, ex-ante profit shifting and anticipating potential year’s end losses are
a consistent piece of explanation for underleveraging affiliates, even though they are
profitable.
Such anticipation also has a major impact on the tax sensitivity of debt shifting and
could contribute to finding an explanation for one of the biggest puzzles in the litera-
ture on debt shifting. All studies in this area find highly significant, but surprisingly
modest/low effects of tax incentives on the use of internal debt. The estimates for the
semi-elasticity of internal debt lie between 0.69 and 1.3; for external debt the range is
between 0.34 and 0.69.24 Still, debt shifting is considered to be an important channel
to shape earnings disclosures and tax payments (OECD, 2013). Common to all these
studies is that they estimate the tax effect by focusing on the statutory tax rate (differ-
ential) and that they try to eliminate reversed profit-shifting incentives under losses
by dropping all firm-year observations in which affiliates report losses in that year.
But, under ex-ante profit shifting and anticipating potential losses when deciding on
internal debt at the beginning of the year, this procedure is insufficient and gives rise
to an omitted-variable bias, underestimating the tax sensitivities.
Based on our theory model and on equation (3.13a), the explanatory equation for
internal leverage should be based on the expected tax rate differential. That is, one
should not only capture the maximum tax rate differential, but also correct for the
fact that the debt tax shield cannot be utilized with a given probability.25 Therefore,
rearranging equation (3.13a) and applying the specification of debt costs (3.7), internal
leverage needs to be explained by
bi = (ti − t1) r
ηb
−H(p0i )ti ·
r
ηb
= γ1 · (ti − t1)− γi ·H(p0i )ti (3.15)
As the two terms are correlated by definition, the coefficient on the tax rate differ-
24See, in particular, Desai et al. (2004), Huizinga et al. (2008), Egger et al. (2010), Møen et
al. (2011) and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2013). Møen et al. also provide a more extensive discussion
of this issue as well as some literature review.
25For internal debt shifting, not being able to utilize the debt tax shield in the leveraged affiliate
increases total tax payments, actually, because the internal bank still has to pay taxes on interest
income received.
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ential, γ1, will pick up the negative impact of anticipating potential losses at year’s
end if the estimation equation omits the second explanatory variable, i.e., arbitrarily
imposes γi = 0 in the regression, as the entire debt-shifting literature to date does.
Consequently, neglecting the adjustment for loss anticipation will lead to a potentially
severe underestimation of the correct tax-rate sensitivity of internal debt. Note that
the unconditioned likelihood of ending up with losses, i.e., the share of observations
with losses, within a tax year is 38% in our data set.
Based on these considerations and our finding of substantial flexibility in transfer
pricing, it should also be less of a surprise that empirical studies focusing directly on the
tax sensitivity of transfer pricing find a high reagibility (e.g., Swenson, 2001; Clausing,
2003; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; and Langli and Saudagaran, 2004). Under the
ex-post profit shifting scenario (cf. Hypothesis 2), the anticipation of losses in the tax
year to come does not matter for the behavior of affiliates that report positive profits
at year’s end. Accordingly, the standard procedure to exclude affiliates disclosing
negative profits works well for transfer pricing and eliminates the offsetting effects of
reverted profit-shifting strategies under losses, indeed. Conventional wisdom to date
is that transfer pricing is more attractive because it can shift more profits and costs of
concealing profit shifting are lower than for conducting debt shifting. This should be
an undisputed matter of fact. But still, our findings suggest that part of the difference
in the empirical literature should also be due to the fact that transfer pricing is very
flexible whereas the debt-shifting literature suffers from a so far unrecognized negative
omitted-variable bias.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter asked the question whether multinational firms have the opportunity
to revert their earnings-management strategies during the tax year. The theory part
points out that (in-)flexibility in reverting the profit shifting streams has crucial im-
plications for firm’s behavior in achieving a tax-efficient earnings management also
under losses. Under full flexibility, firms can adjust their payments ex-post, i.e. at the
end of the tax year, to ensure zero taxable profits. Without flexibility, firms have to
decide ex ante on their tax avoidance strategies and cannot revisit these decisions once
they are taken. According to our empirical estimation, tax avoidance through trans-
fer price manipulation gives firms some leeway to adjust their profit shifting channels
ex post. We do not find that firms adjust their financial structure to revert payments.
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Importantly, the chapter delivers an explanation for the puzzle, why tax elasticities of
internal debt are so low. If firms are inflexible in adjusting their capital structure, i.e.
they are forced to decide on their earnings management strategies ex-ante (at the be-
ginning of the tax-year), it is the expected tax rate differential that is decisive and not
the statutory tax differential.
While most of the existing empirical work investigates profit shifting of profitable
affiliates to low-tax countries, profit shifting to unprofitable high-tax affiliates seems
to have escaped the attention of both researchers and policymakers. Alarmingly,
the presence of thin capitalization rules and controlled-foreign-corporation (CFC)
rules are ineffective policy instruments to correct firm’s incentives to revert profit
shifting streams as most profits are shifted via transfer price manipulation also to
high-tax affiliates. Especially within Europe, where the European Court of Justice
has tried to ban CFC rules for affiliates that operate within the European Economic
Area and belong to multinationals that are headquartered in a European Economic
Area country, the magnitude of profit shifting could me more severe. It is therefore
unavoidable for revenue authorities, firstly, to increase the intensity of auditing firms
whose profits bunch around zero and, secondly, also to scrutinize transaction to other
high-tax affiliates that are in a loss position.
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Chapter 4
Cross-border loss offset can fuel
tax competition
4.1 Introduction
Since the 2005 Marks and Spencer ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
cross-border loss compensation formultinationalfirmshasbecomean importantpolicy
issue in Europe. In this case the ECJ decided that the U.K. based parent company
should not be prevented from deducting the losses of its subsidiary in another EU
member state, if all loss offset possibilities in the host country of the subsidiary have
been exhausted and the losses in the host country are therefore ‘final losses’.1 As a
result of this decision, it is likely that EU member states will be legally obliged to offer
some form of cross-border tax relief to multinational businesses. This will constitute
a major change in current international tax systems, as most EU countries currently
permit loss offset only between entities that reside in the same jurisdiction.2
In the wake of the Marks and Spencer ruling, the European Commission has presented
alternative measures for providing a coordinated cross-border loss relief, which differ
This chapter is based on joint work with Andreas Haufler.
1Nevertheless the ECJ permitted the U.K. government to deny the parent company of Marks
and Spencer to deduct the losses incurred by its subsidiaries in Belgium, France and Germany from
its positive taxable profits in the United Kingdom, because it did not consider the subsidiaries’
losses to be ‘final’. See Lang (2006) for a critical discussion of the ECJ’s argument and Boulogne
and Slavnic (2012) for a review of further court decisions that have clarified the interpretation of
‘final losses’.
2At present, only four out of 27 EU member states (Austria, Denmark, France and Italy) apply
tax schemes that permit a cross-border loss offset. See European Commission (2006).
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primarily in whether the loss transfer from the subsidiary to the parent country would
be temporary or definitive (see European Commission, 2006). Moreover, a full cross-
border loss offset would be a direct implication of introducing a common consolidated
corporate tax base (CCCTB) in the EU, which has recently been proposed by the
European Commission (2011). The European Commission has also made it very clear
that the introduction of cross-border loss compensation will not be accompanied by a
harmonization of corporate tax rates. Therefore, an important question is whether,
and how, the introduction of cross-border loss offset affects the degree of corporate tax
competition in Europe.3
Despite its immediate policy relevance, the issue of cross-border loss compensation has
so far received only very little attention in formal theoretical analyses. In this chapter
we contribute to filling this gap. We set up a symmetric two-country framework with
two representative multinational enterprises (MNEs), which have their parent com-
pany in one of the countries and a subsidiary in the other. Both MNEs endogenously
choose the size of a risky investment project. Hence our model captures the positive
effects on MNEs’ investment incentives, which are regarded as the major economic
advantage of cross-border loss compensation (European Commission, 2006). The two
governments non-cooperatively choose their tax rates to maximize domestic tax rev-
enues when, following current international practice, the parent and the subsidiary of
a MNE are taxed as independent entities. A particular focus of our analysis lies on the
question of how the introduction of a coordinated form of cross-border loss offset will
affect the governments’ non-cooperative tax choices.
In our benchmark scenario, we assume that the parent country of the MNE bases the
tax rebate on its own, home country tax rate. This corresponds to the current practice
in those countries that offer a unilateral cross-border loss offset to resident MNEs
(see footnote 2). Moreover, this scheme also underlies the European Commission’s
proposals for a coordinated cross-border tax relief. We show that when this scheme
is applied, an increase in loss offset opportunities is likely to lead to falling tax rates
in equilibrium, and hence to intensified tax competition, at least when loss offset is
almost complete in equilibrium. The fall in equilibrium tax rates will in turn cause tax
3Corporate tax rates have fallen around the world, but the reduction has been particularly
strong in Europe. Between 1995 and 2011, statutory corporate tax rates fell from 35% to 23%
in the average of the EU-27 countries, and thus substantially more than in the non-EU member
states of the OECD (see Eurostat 2011, Tables II-4.1 and II-4.2). Moreover, recent empirical work
confirms the existence of strategic interaction in corporate tax setting among OECD countries in
general, but in particular among the member states of the European Union (Devereux et al. 2008;
Davies and Voget, 2008).
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revenue losses for each country to be even larger than is implied by the direct effect of
the reform. The reason underlying this result is simple: maintaining a high corporate
tax rate becomes more costly under cross-border loss compensation, because it induces
a higher tax rebate to the resident MNEs. We conclude that if this scheme is realized,
introducing cross-border tax relief may further fuel the ongoing tax competition in
Europe.
We then show that these negative side effects of cross-border loss compensation can
be avoided under an alternative loss offset scheme where tax rebates are instead based
on the tax rate in the subsidiary’s host country. In contrast to the benchmark scheme,
equilibrium tax rates will rise in this case following the reform. This is because an
increase in each country’s own tax rate is not accompanied by higher tax rebates to
loss-making subsidiaries, but more generous loss offset provisions increase the invest-
ment of both MNEs, and thus the corporate tax bases of both governments. As a
result, tax revenues even increase under this alternative scheme when cross-border
loss compensation is enhanced.
We analyze the robustness of our results by considering investments that are partly
financed by intra-company loans, alternative government objective functions, an en-
dogenous choice of the investment’s success probability by the MNEs, and asymme-
tries between the competing countries. A particularly relevant setting arises when tax
rates differ between countries. In this case the low-tax country would use a higher tax
rate for loss rebates than for taxing positive profits in its territory, if the alternative
system is applied universally. These redistributive effects can be avoided if each coun-
try applies the minimum of the tax rates in the parent and the subsidiary country to
the losses incurred by the subsidiaries of its resident MNE. At the same time, this min-
imum rule is likely to increase tax revenues in both countries, relative to the universal
application of loss offset at the parent country’s tax rate.
In the related literature, most theoretical and empirical studies have analyzed the
effects of incomplete loss compensation in a closed economy setting. Theoretical
analyses have focused mostly on the effects on investment and risk-taking decisions
over time (e.g. Eeckhoudt et al., 1997; Panteghini, 2001). The empirical literature has
estimated the response of investment decisions to tax law asymmetries in a national
setting, where positive profits are immediately taxed, whereas the tax value of a loss
can only be offset against positive incomes. This asymmetry has long been known to
cause important, negative effects on the investment and risk-taking decisions of firms
(Altshuler and Auerbach, 1990; Devereux et al., 1994).
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In recent years, a few papers have analyzed loss offset in an international setting, but
this literature is still very small. Among the empirical studies, Niemann and Treisch
(2005) perform a Monte Carlo simulation analysis of the unilateral introduction of
cross-border loss compensation in Austria (see footnote 2). Fuest et al. (2007) estimate
the tax revenue effects of a switch to a complete cross-border loss offset under the
CCCTB and find that, in the EU average, the corporate tax base falls by 20% as a
result of this change. Dressler and Overesch (2013) analyze the impact of national loss
offset regimes on MNEs’ investment decisions and find mixed empirical support for
the claim that generous loss offset provisions increase foreign direct investment.
Little is known, however, about how the introduction of cross-border loss offset shapes
national corporate tax policies in a setting of international tax competition. Ge´rard
and Weiner (2003, 2006) study this issue in a framework where MNEs are taxed under
formulary apportionment, but they do not derive the full equilibrium changes in tax
rates that follow from the reform. Closest to this chapter is Kalamov and Runkel
(2012), who derive the non-cooperative equilibrium when countries compete over both
tax rates and the rate of cross-border loss offset. Their analysis uses a framework
where countries base cross-border tax relief on their own tax rates. The authors find
that the loss offset parameter is set to zero in the decentralized equilibrium when
countries compete for real investment, but at a positive level when they compete to
attract profits. The focus of our analysis is different, as we analyze the coordinated
introduction of cross-border loss relief in a setting without profit shifting, and compare
its effects under alternative loss offset regimes.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the framework for our
analysis. Section 4.3 analyzes the effects of cross-border loss offset under the bench-
mark scheme, where the tax rebate is based on the tax rate in the parent’s home coun-
try. Section 4.4 carries out the same analysis under the alternative loss offset scheme,
where the tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country is used for the tax rebate. Section
4.5 numerically compares the effects of loss offset under these two schemes. Section
4.6 analyzes several extensions of our baseline model. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The framework
We consider a simple one-period model of two small countries, labeled 1 and 2. There
are two representative MNEs, each with a parent company in one country and with a
subsidiary in the other country. We label firm i ∈ {1, 2} by the country in which the
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parent is located. Capital isperfectlymobile internationallyand is supplied to thefirms
by the international capital market at an exogenous interest rate normalized to one.
Finally, we assume in our baseline model that both firms and countries are perfectly
symmetric. This excludes redistributive tax revenue effects that arise from tax rate
differentials in a setting with cross-border loss compensation. Hence our benchmark
model focuses squarely on the efficiency of firms’ investment choices and governments’
tax policies. Asymmetries between countries will be introduced in Section 4.6.4.
The two MNEs produce a homogeneous good for the world market, at a world price
normalized to one. Production occurs with capital and a fixed factor, leading to the
production function f(ki), with fk > 0 and fkk < 0. Hence pure profits arise from
decreasing returns to scale in production.
Each MNE chooses the level ki of a risky investment. We assume, for simplicity, that
this investment choice is made only by the subsidiary of firm i (which is located in
country j). In our baseline model, the investment is successful with an exogenous
probability p, and unsuccessful with probability (1 − p).4 The success probabilities
are identical for the two MNEs, but they are uncorrelated and hence the risk of the
investment is idiosyncratic. The parent company of each firm has an exogenous profit
income equal to Gi, which is sufficient to cover all possible losses of the subsidiary.
5
The MNEs behave in a risk-neutral way and maximize their net expected payoff.
Corporate income taxes are modeled as proportional taxes on profits. We assume that
taxes are imposed by the source country of the investment.6 This implies that country j
taxes the profits of the subsidiary of firm i, whereas the parent country of this firm,
i, exempts this income from tax. Moreover, our analysis focuses on the effects that
cross-border loss offset introduces under the current principle of separate accounting,
4In Section 4.6.3 we allow firms to endogenously choose the success probability of the invest-
ment.
5Alternatively, we could assume that the parent company of each MNE takes the same deci-
sions as the subsidiary. This, however, would reduplicate the decisions taken within each MNE,
increasing the complexity of the analysis without adding additional insights.
6The source principle of taxation, where the profits of a subsidiary are tax-exempt in the
country of the parent firm, is followed by the overwhelming majority of OECD countries. One of
the few exceptions is the United States. See Becker and Fuest (2010) for a recent discussion and
analysis.
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where the parent and the subsidiary of a MNE are taxed as separate entities.7
The essential element of our model is the cross-border loss offset within the MNE. In
our static model, losses incurred in one country cannot be offset against positive future
profits in the same country. Hence the one-period model highlights the role of cross-
border loss offset by effectively turning all losses incurred in one country into ‘final
losses’ (see the introduction). Specifically, we postulate that if the investment project
of firm i’s subsidiary is unsuccessful, then a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the losses can be
deducted from the exogenous taxable profit income of the parent firm in country i.
Our analysis thus focuses on a setting where the losses of a subsidiary can be deducted
from positive profits made by the parent company. In practice this is the setting in
which cross-border loss offset is most likely to be introduced, because it minimizes the
possibility that the MNE can abuse loss offset provisions.8
Finally, we focus on the coordinated introduction of cross-border loss offset in both
countries. From a policy perspective, this is motivated by the developing legal stan-
dards in Europe, which are likely to introduce common rules for cross-border loss relief
in the EU member states. From an analytical perspective, no country has an incen-
tive to unilaterally set a positive level of cross-border loss offset in our framework.9
This corresponds to the empirical observation that only very few countries grant cross-
border tax relief unilaterally (see footnote 2).
7In contrast, Ge´rard and Weiner (2003, 2006) base their analysis of cross-border loss offset on
a system of formulary apportionment, where the total profits of a MNE are aggregated and then
allocated to the various host countries according to a predetermined formula. It is well-known
that the tax incentives for national governments can be very different under separate accounting
and under formulary apportionment (see e.g. Riedel and Runkel, 2007).
8If a parent company’s losses can be deducted from the profits of a subsidiary, then the MNE
will often have a choice in which country to offset the losses. If the tax rebate is based on the tax
rate in the country granting the tax relief, the MNE has an incentive to offset the parent’s losses
in the host country with the highest tax rate. For this reason, there is considerable skepticism
against a ‘downward’ cross-border tax relief, in contrast to the ‘upward’ tax relief that we consider
here. See European Commission (2006).
9This is different in the analysis of Kalamov and Runkel (2012). In their model, two gov-
ernments unilaterally set their corporate tax rates and their degree of cross-border loss-offset to
attract investment and profits from two MNEs. If the two countries only compete via foreign in-
vestment, the optimal degree of loss offset is zero (see their Proposition 1). The reason is that
the total capital stock is fixed in their model and unilateral cross-border loss offset granted in one
country makes it more attractive to invest in the other country, in order to benefit from the tax
rebate. If investment levels in each country are fixed, however, and governments compete only
over profit shifting, the optimal unilateral degree of loss offset is positive (Proposition 2). The in-
tuition is here that if country i unilaterally introduces cross-border loss offset, this will make it
less attractive for the MNE to shift profits to the other country j, because transferring positive
profits to j will reduce the expected losses that can be offset against the tax liability in i.
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4.3 Benchmark: Loss offset at the home coun-
try’s tax
In this section, we analyze the implications of cross-border loss-offset under the bench-
mark scheme where the MNE’s home country applies its own tax rate to grant cross-
border tax relief to the domestic firm for the losses incurred by its foreign subsidiary.
This scheme is currently applied by the countries that offer a unilateral cross-border
loss offset and it also underlies the European Commission’s proposals for the coordi-
nated introduction of cross-border tax relief.
4.3.1 Firms and governments
Given the corporate tax rates ti and tj, the expected after-tax profits of the MNE based
in country i are
E(pii) = (1− ti)Gi + (1− tj)p[f(ki)− ki]− (1− αti)(1− p)ki ∀ i 6= j. (4.1)
The first term in (4.1) describes the exogenous profits of the parent company, net of
the tax rate applied in the parent firm’s home country i. The second term captures
the net profits of firm i’s subsidiary in country j in the case where the investment is
successful, whereas the third term captures the losses incurred by the subsidiary when
the investment fails. Both of these terms depend on the assumptions made about the
financing of the subsidiary’s investment. We focus here on the simplest possible case
where all investment is financed by external debt.10 In this case, the cost of capital
(with the interest rate normalized to one) can be fully deducted from the value of
output so that the corporate tax base in the second term corresponds to a pure profit
tax, conditional on the investment being successful. If the investment fails, the value
of output is zero and the before-tax loss in the third term equals the total capital cost
ki. This loss is reduced by the tax relief granted in the parent’s home country i, where
the tax credit depends on country i’s tax rate and on the internationally coordinated
loss offset factor α.
Maximizing (4.1) with respect to ki implicitly defines the subsidiary’s optimal invest-
10In Section 6.1 we discuss the implications of allowing for a partial financing of the subsidiary’s
investment through a loan from its parent company.
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ment level by
fki − 1−
(1− p)
p(1− tj) (1− αti) = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (4.2)
In the absence of uncertainty (p = 1), the third term on the left-hand side of (4.2) is zero
andtheoptimal investment level isdeterminedbytheusual condition that themarginal
product of capital, fk, equals the exogenous world interest rate of unity. In the presence
of uncertainty, but in the absence of taxes, the marginal productivity of capital in case
of success must rise by (1− p)/p, in order to compensate the risk-neutral investor for
the possibility of failure. This decision is distorted by a tax system that taxes positive
profits but grants no tax relief for losses incurred. If no cross-border loss offset occurs
at all (α = 0), the marginal product of capital must rise by (1 − p)/[p(1 − tj)]. This
implies an underinvestment by the subsidiary that is the more severe, the higher is
country j’s tax rate. Introducing cross-border loss offset counteracts this distortion,
but it will only fully eliminate it when the loss offset parameter α equals one and tax
rates in both countries are identical.
From (4.2), the effects of taxes on the firm’s optimal investment choice ki are:
∂ki
∂ti
= − α(1− p)
p(1− tj)fkiki
≥ 0, ∂ki
∂tj
=
(1− αti)(1− p)
p(1− tj)2fkiki
< 0, (4.3)
∂ki
∂ti
+
∂ki
∂tj
=
[1− α + α(tj − ti)](1− p)
p(1− tj)2fkiki
≤ 0. (4.4)
Equation (4.3) shows that an increase in country j’s tax rate leads to less capital
investment by the subsidiary of firm i.11 In contrast, by increasing the expected tax
rebate, an increase in the tax rate of country i increases capital investment by firm i’s
subsidiary when the loss offset parameter α is strictly positive. From equation (4.4)
we see that when both tax rates are simultaneously increased, the negative effect of tj
on ki dominates, unless cross-border loss offset is complete and tax rates are identical
in the initial equilibrium.
Turning to the two governments, we postulate in our baseline model that they set tax
rates to maximize corporate tax revenues. This objective captures the concern about
tax revenues that features prominently in both policy debates and court decisions on
cross-border loss offset. From a theoretical perspective, the assumption that the profit
income of MNEs does not enter the governments’ objective function corresponds to a
11Recall that the subscript i refers to the headquarter country of MNE i, but the subsidiary’s
investment occurs in country j. Therefore the well-known negative effect of source-based taxes on
investment is given by ∂ki/∂tj in our notation.
89
Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition
setting where the residents of each country invest their capital in perfectly diversified
global portfolios.12 The implications of an extended government objective that also
incorporates the profits of home-based MNEs are considered in Section 6.2.
Country i’s tax base consists of the exogenous profit incomeGi, less the share α of the
losses made by the subsidiary of firm i if its investment fails. To these are added the
profits made by the subsidiary of firm j when this firm’s investment is successful. Tax
revenues in each country are thus given by
Ti = ti{Gi − α(1− p)ki + p[f(kj)− kj]} ≡ tiBi ∀ i 6= j. (4.5)
Maximizing with respect to ti gives country i’s optimal tax rate in implicit form:
Bi[α, ti(α), tj(α)] + ti(α)
∂Bi
∂ti
[α, ti(α), tj(α)] = 0 ∀ i, (4.6)
where the profit tax base Bi is given in (4.5) and
∂Bi
∂ti
≡ Ωi =
[
p(fkj − 1)
∂kj
∂ti
− α(1− p) ∂ki
∂ti
]
< 0 (4.7)
collects the sum of effects that an increase in ti has on country i’s tax base via the
investment decisions of both representative MNEs. From the firms’ investment re-
sponses (4.3), these effects are all negative. The optimal tax policy thus follows a
straightforward inverse elasticity rule: it rises with the total value of country i’s tax
baseBi, but falls in the aggregate response of the tax base to a tax increase in country i.
4.3.2 The effects of cross-border loss offset
The core question of our analysis is how a coordinated increase in the loss offset pa-
rameter α affects optimal tax rates and equilibrium tax revenues. As is shown in
Appendix 1, totally differentiating (4.6) and using the symmetry of countries13 yields
dt
dα
=
1
φ
(
∂B
∂α
+ t
∂Ω
∂α
)
, (4.8)
12Empirically, globally diversified portfolios are a plausible scenario when most of the small
country’s capital is invested through financial intermediaries, such as pension funds or insurance
companies.
13Since the symmetry assumption is used at this point, we drop country indices in the following
when no confusion is possible.
90
Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition
where we show in Appendix D.2 that the multiplier φ must be positive.
The first bracketed term in (4.8) gives the change in each country’s tax base followingan
increase in the loss offset parameterα. To sign this effect we derive the impact effects of
a change inα on equilibrium investment levels.14 Implicitly differentiating (4.2) shows
that increased cross-border loss compensation raises investment by both subsidiaries:
∂k
∂α
= − t(1− p)
(1− t)pfkk > 0. (4.9)
Incorporating the investment responses of both firms, the net change in each country’s
tax base following an increase in α is then given by
∂B
∂α
= −(1− p)k + (1− α)(1− p)
(1− t)
∂k
∂α
. (4.10)
The first term in (4.10) gives the negative, direct effect on each country’s tax base
that results from the increased tax rebate to the loss-making subsidiary of its resident
MNE.Thesecondtermcaptures the indirect effects throughthe inducedchange inboth
MNEs’ investment behavior. The expansion of risky activities in firm i’s subsidiary
reduces country i’s expected tax base, because the government of country iparticipates
only in the losses, but not in the profits of this subsidiary. Matters are reversed for the
subsidiary of firm j, where country i taxes the increased profits in case of success, but
does not share in the losses if the investment fails. As long as loss offset is incomplete
(α < 1), the latter effect dominates and the second effect in (4.10) is strictly positive.
In general, it is therefore not possible to sign the change in each country’s tax base that
results from an increase inα. The net effect can be signed, however, when cross-border
loss compensation is almost complete and α → 1. In this case, the indirect effects in
the second term of (4.10) sum to zero. Intuitively, the symmetry of the model implies
that a rise in α leads to equal increases in the investment levels of both firms. From
the firms’ optimal investment condition, we then get that the expected increase in the
tax base from a successful investment of subsidiary j is exactly offset by the higher
expected losses incurred by subsidiary i. Finally, country i’s tax rate on the positive
profits of firm j equals the effective subsidy rate for the losses of firm i, αti, when loss
14By impact effect we mean the direct effect of the exogenous parameter change, without taking
into account the induced changes in governments’ tax policies.
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offset is complete (α = 1). Hence only the negative direct effect in (4.10) remains and
∂B
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α→1
= −(1− p)k < 0. (4.11)
In the following we will refer to this direct effect as the mechanical effect of the reform.
Next, we analyze the effect of improved loss offset opportunities on the elasticity of
each country’s tax base, as given by Ω. To differentiate (4.7) with respect to α, we
use (4.2) and (4.9). Further differentiating the tax sensitivities of capital investments
in (4.3) with respect to α gives15
∂Ω
∂α
=
−2(1− p)2
(1− t)pfkk
[
t(1− αt)
(1− t)2 − α
]
. (4.12)
The sign of (4.12) is ambiguous, in general. On the one hand, a higher loss-offset
parameter implies that the sensitivity with which firm j responds to a tax increase in
country i is reduced, as this firm will now receive a higher loss offset in its home country.
This corresponds to the positive first effect in the squared bracket. On the other hand,
a rise in α increases the tax base loss that country i faces from a domestic tax increase
due to the higher loss compensation it has to offer the subsidiary of its home-based
firm. This is the negative second effect. The latter effect dominates when loss offset is
almost complete (α→ 1) and the tax rate is not too high initially (t < 0.5).16 The sign
of (4.12) is then negative, implying that a rise in t leads to a larger tax base loss when
cross-border loss offset is improved. Using this result along with (4.11) in (4.8) gives
conditions that are sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure that improved cross-border
loss offset will reduce equilibrium tax rates in both countries. This is stated in:
Proposition 4.1 Consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium in tax rates where gov-
ernments maximize tax revenues and the losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax
rate of the parent’s home country. Then a small increase in cross-border loss off-
set dα > 0 reduces equilibrium tax rates in both countries, if loss offset is almost
complete initially (α→ 1), and if initial tax rates are not too high (t ≤ 1/2).
15For analytical simplicity, we treat fkk as a constant from here on, thus ignoring third deriva-
tives of the production function. Our results remain intact, and are even strengthened, when the
third derivative is positive. This is true, for example, for a Cobb-Douglas production function.
In this case, a further negative term would be added to eq. (4.12), making it more likely that an
increase in α reduces the equilibrium tax rate.
16The restriction on tax rates is needed because the sensitivity of firm j’s investment response
rises more steeply in t than the loss compensation for firm i. Therefore, a high level of t tends to
increase the positive first effect in (4.12), relative to the second effect.
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Proposition 4.1 is confined to a small change in α in the neighborhood of complete loss
offset. We can, however, also derive conditions under which a discrete switch from no to
full cross-border loss offset (i.e., from α = 0 toα = 1) lowers the equilibrium tax rates.
Using the (implicit) optimal tax rate expression in (4.6), this requires that B1 < B0
and −Ω1 > −Ω0 > 0, where the superscripts 1 and 0 refer to the equilibrium values
with full loss offset and no loss offset, respectively. Comparing first the numerators in
the two discrete equilibria, we get from rearranging the definition of B in (4.5):
B1 < B0 ⇐⇒ p
[
f(k1)− f(k0)
k1 − k0 − 1
]
<
(1− p)k1
k1 − k0 . (4.13)
On the left-hand side of (4.13) is the expected average return (net of investment costs)
of the incremental investment k1 − k0 that is induced by a switch from zero to full
loss offset. On the right-hand side are the expected losses that the government has to
compensate under full loss offset, again relative to the induced change in investment.
Overall the condition thus states that corporate tax bases will fall when the expected
returns to the additional investment are moderate, relative to the additional risks
taken by the firms (and shared by the governments).
Turning to the comparison of denominators, substituting (4.2), (4.3) and (4.9) in (4.7)
and rearranging gives
−Ω1 > −Ω0 ⇐⇒ t0 < 1−
√
0.5. (4.14)
Hence, similar to Proposition 4.1, an additional constraint is that tax rates must not
be too high in the initial equilibrium without loss offset.
If the conditions (4.13) and (4.14) are simultaneously fulfilled, it follows from (4.6)
that t1 < t0. This is summarized in:
Proposition 4.2 When losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate of the par-
ent’s home country, a discrete switch from zero to full cross-border loss offset re-
duces equilibrium tax rates in both countries, if the expected returns to the additional
investment are moderate, relative to the risks involved, and if tax rates are not too
high initially.
These results isolate an important and, as yet, little studied effect of coordinated
arrangements to increase cross-border tax relief. Given that governments remain free
to set profit tax rates non-cooperatively, improving the international tax deductibility
of losses may render international tax competition more aggressive, at least when loss
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offset is nearly complete. The reason is that cross-border loss offset increases the costs
of maintaining a high tax rate when each country grants the loss offset based on its
own tax rate. This effect is the stronger the higher is the degree of loss offset α.
We now derive the equilibrium change in tax revenues following an increase in α.
Writing Ti = Ti[α, ti(α), tj(α)] and differentiating with respect to α gives
17
dTi
dα
=
∂Ti
∂α
+
∂Ti
∂tj
dtj
dα
∀ i 6= j. (4.15)
The first term in (4.15) captures the direct effect of α on the tax base, and hence tax
revenues, for constant tax rates ti. From (4.10) and (4.2) this effect can be expressed as
∂Ti
∂α
= t
[
−(1− p)k + (1− p)(1− α)
(1− t)
∂k
∂α
]
∀ i. (4.16)
The first effect in the squared bracket is again the direct or mechanical effect of the
reform, which is now valued with country i’s tax rate. The second term gives the
net change in country i’s tax revenues through the behavioral responses of both sub-
sidiaries. In case of success, tax revenues in country i increase with an investment
expansion of firm j, but decrease with a higher investment of firm i. The net effect will
be positive as long as cross-border loss offset is incomplete. We have already shown,
however, that the second effect goes to zero, and the tax base change is unambiguously
negative, when α→ 1 [see eq. (4.11)].
To obtain the general equilibrium change in tax revenues, it remains to sign the exter-
nality that the induced tax change in the other country j has on country i’s tax base.
From (4.5) we can show that this externality is unambiguously positive and country i’s
tax base will rise following a tax increase in country j:
∂Ti
∂tj
= ti
[
p(fk − 1)∂kj
∂tj
− α(1− p)∂ki
∂tj
]
≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (4.17)
The first effect in (4.17) shows that a rise in tj increases investment by firm j’s sub-
sidiary, as this firm will now receive a higher tax rebate in the event of a loss. This
effect increases the tax base of country i. Second, a higher tax rate in country j re-
duces firm i’s investment and thus reduces the volume of tax rebates that country i has
to grant its resident MNE. Hence both effects work in the same direction and the tax
17Note that the effect of country i’s own tax rate on its tax revenues Ti is zero from the envelope
theorem.
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externality is always positive. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, this implies that
both countries set their tax rates at inefficiently low levels under the benchmark loss
offset scheme, relative to a situation of joint revenue maximization.
We can now combine eqs. (4.16) and (4.17). Using (4.2) and (4.3) and employing the
symmetry condition, we get in a first step
dT
dα
= t
[
−(1− p)k − t (1− α)(1− p)
2
p(1− t)2fkk
]
− t 2α(1− p)
2(1− αt)
p(1− t)2fkk
dt
dα
.
In a second step we substitute t in the squared bracket of the first term and in the
second term by −B/Ω [cf. eq. (4.6)] and use (4.2) and (4.3) again. This yields:
dT
dα
= t
[
−(1− p)k + (1− α)(1− t)B
(1− αt)2 + α2(1− t)2
]
+
2α(1− t)(1− αt)B
(1− αt)2 + α2(1− t)2
dt
dα
, (4.18)
whereB is each country’s tax base, as defined in (4.5). Evaluating (4.18) at α = 0 and
α = 1, respectively, gives:
dT
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= tE(pi0) > 0,
dT
dα
∣∣∣∣
α→1
= −t(1− p)k +B1 dt
dα
∣∣∣∣
α→1
< 0, (4.19)
where E(pi0) is the MNE’s after-tax profit [as defined in eq. (4.1)] for α = 0 and B1 is
the corporate tax base for α = 1. Finally, we have used Proposition 1a to sign dt/dα
for α→ 1.
Equation (4.19) shows that, starting from an initial value of α = 0, an increase in
cross-border loss offset raises equilibrium tax revenues. When cross-border loss offset
is almost complete, however, tax revenues fall by both the mechanical effect and by the
decrease in equilibrium tax rates that occurs when the conditions in Proposition 4.1
are fulfilled. Hence a marginal increase in the degree of cross-country tax relief to the
point of full loss offset is definitely undesirable for revenue-maximizing governments,
as it reduces both the equilibrium tax base and the optimal rate of corporation tax.
We summarize our findings in:
Proposition 4.3 When the losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate of the
parent’s home country, then a small increase in cross-border loss offset dα > 0
lowers equilibrium tax revenues in each country by more than the mechanical effect,
if loss offset is almost complete initially (α→ 1), and if the initial tax rates are not
too high (t ≤ 1/2).
For a discrete switch from zero to full cross-border loss offset, tax revenues must un-
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ambiguously fall under the conditions summarized in Proposition 1b, as both the tax
base and the tax rate are then lower in the equilibrium with α = 1, as compared to the
case where α = 0. Fuest et al. (2007) have isolated the direct tax base effect (mechan-
ical effect) of such a discrete switch and have estimated that this reduces corporate
tax revenues in the EU average by roughly 20%. In addition to this direct effect, our
analysis incorporates the behavioral responses of both firms and governments. While
the investment responses of firms tend to reduce the tax revenue losses borne by gov-
ernments, their strategic setting of corporate tax rates tends to increase revenue losses
when the conditions in Proposition 4.2 are met.
Finally, since countries are symmetric, equation (4.19) also determines the degree of
cross-border loss offset that revenue-maximizing governments would jointly set in the
first stage of an extended game when they anticipate the non-cooperative setting of
tax rates in the second stage. This is given in:
Corollary 1 Under the benchmark scheme of cross-border loss offset, the optimally
coordinated level of α is strictly greater than zero and less than one, when the effects
of loss offset on the tax competition between countries are incorporated.
Corollary 1 can be easily understood from our previous discussion. When α is zero
initially, the effect on tax competition is eliminated and an increase inαunambiguously
raises investment and tax revenue in both countries. In contrast, when α is close to
unity, investment is already at a maximum and the only effect of increasing α further
is to make tax competition between countries more aggressive. Hence, if the two
symmetric countries coordinate on the level of α while competing over tax rates in a
subsequent stage, they will choose an interior level of loss offset 0 < α < 1.
4.4 An alternative loss offset scheme
4.4.1 Firms and governments
Our analysis in the previous section has shown that introducing cross-border loss offset
may intensify tax competition when the MNE’s home country bases the tax rebate
for the losses of foreign subsidiaries on its own tax rate. This suggests an alternative
loss offset scheme, where the home country still grants a tax rebate for the losses of
its foreign-based subsidiaries, but applies the tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country
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to the loss offset.18 In the following we analyze this scheme in more detail, focussing
again on the issue of how international tax competition is affected by cross-border loss
compensation.
With the changed specification of loss compensation, the expected after-tax profits of
firm i are given by
E(p˜ii) = (1− t˜i)Gi + (1− t˜j)p[f(k˜i)− k˜i]− (1− αt˜j)(1− p)k˜i ∀i 6= j, (4.20)
where the tilde indicates terms under the alternative loss offset scheme. The only
difference between (4.20) and equation (4.1) in the last section lies in the third term,
where losses are now rebated at the tax rate t˜j of the subsidiary’s host country. The
firms’ optimal investment decisions are now implicitly determined by
fki − 1−
(1− p)
p(1− t˜j)
(1− αt˜j) = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (4.21)
Differentiating (4.21) with respect to the tax rates t˜i and t˜j yields
∂k˜i
∂t˜i
= 0,
∂k˜i
∂t˜j
=
(1− α)(1− p)
p(1− t˜j)2fkk
≤ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (4.22)
Equation (4.22) shows that the tax rate of the parent country no longer has any effects
on firm i’s choices. This is, of course, partly a result of our simplifying assumption that
the investment level of the parent company is fixed. At the same time, the tax rate of
the host country j now applies to both positive and negative profits. The net effect
of t˜j on the investment level of firm i’s subsidiary is negative when loss compensation
is incomplete. If α = 1, the distortion arising from source-based capital taxation
disappears and t˜j becomes a lump-sum tax.
As before, the objective of both governments is to maximize tax revenues. When
country i applies the foreign tax rate t˜j to calculate the tax rebate granted to the
subsidiary of its home-based MNE, its tax revenues are
T˜i = t˜i{Gi + p[f(k˜j)− k˜j]} − αt˜j(1− p)k˜i ≡ t˜iB˜i − αt˜j(1− p)k˜i. (4.23)
18We thank Clemens Fuest for the suggestion to study this alternative scheme.
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Maximizing with respect to t˜i gives
B˜i(α, t˜i, t˜j) + t˜i(α) Ω˜i(α, t˜i, t˜j) = 0, Ω˜i = p(fkj − 1)
∂k˜j
∂t˜i
< 0. (4.24)
Note from the definition of B˜i in (4.23) that the tax rebate to the loss-making subsidiary
does not enter the numerator of the optimal tax rate t˜i under this loss offset scheme.
This has important effects for the countries’ incentives to engage in tax competition.
4.4.2 The effects of cross-border loss offset
To analyze the effects of cross-border loss offset, we proceed as in the last section. The
effects of α on optimal tax rates correspond to those in eq. (4.8).19 The impact effect
of a change in α on investment is again unambiguously positive under the alternative
loss offset scheme. An important difference to the analysis in the previous section is,
however, that the loss offset parameter α now affects B˜i only through the investment
level of firm j. Hence we get:
∂k˜
∂α
= − t˜(1− p)
(1− t˜)pfkk
> 0,
∂B˜
∂α
=
(1− p)(1− αt)
1− t
∂k˜
∂α
> 0. (4.25)
The higher loss offset granted by country j increases investment by firm j’s subsidiary
incountry i, thus increasingcountry i’s taxbase. At the sametime, thehigher lossoffset
increases the loss compensation that country i has to pay its own subsidiary. While
this reduces country i’s net tax revenues, it does not reduce the tax base, with which
country i’s tax rate is multiplied [see eq. (4.23)]. Hence, there is no negative mechanical
effect on the tax rate in this case. In stark contrast to our previous specification
[see eq. (4.11)], we thus get the global result that the tax base of each country is
unambiguously rising in α under the alternative loss offset scheme.
Turning to the tax base elasticity in (4.24), differentiating with respect to α, us-
ing (4.21), (4.22) and (4.25) and simplifying yields:
∂Ω˜
∂α
=
−(1− p)2
p(1− t˜)3fkk
[1 + t˜(1− 2α)] > 0. (4.26)
The dominant effect in (4.26) is that firm j’s investment will respond less sensitively to
a tax increase in country iwhen the loss offset opportunities in the parent country j are
19The level of the multiplier φ˜ is changed, however. Appendix D.2 shows that φ˜ > 0.
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improved. In contrast, the higher loss compensation paid by country i is not relevant
for Ω˜. Noting that Ω˜i < 0 from (4.24), the elasticity with which country i’s tax base
responds to tax changes is thus unambiguously reduced in absolute value when loss
offset is improved. Using (4.25) and (4.26) in (4.8), we thus get:
Proposition 4.4 Consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium in tax rates where gov-
ernments maximize tax revenues and losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax
rate of the subsidiary’s host country. Then a small increase in cross-border loss off-
set dα > 0 increases equilibrium tax rates in both countries for any initial level of
α.
In contrast to Proposition 4.1 in the previous section, Proposition 4.4 states that
country i’s optimal tax rate is unambiguously and monotonically rising in α when
countries grant cross-border tax relief at the rate of the subsidiary’s host country. As
a result, it must also be true that a discrete switch from zero to full cross-border loss
offset unambiguously raises equilibrium tax rates. The core reason for this result is
that an increase in the loss offset parameter has no negative direct effect on optimal
tax rates in both countries. In other words, while each country still bears the costs of
subsidizing the losses of foreign affiliates of domestic MNEs, these costs are no longer
affected by the choice of the domestic tax rate. At the same time, the investment
expansion of MNEs induced by the rise in α increases tax bases in both countries and
thus offers an incentive to increase tax rates.
To compute the equilibrium changes in tax revenues, we follow (4.15) and first consider
the direct effect, ignoring for now the tax rate changes induced by enhanced cross-
border loss offset. The direct effect on tax revenues is:
∂T˜i
∂α
= t˜
[
−(1− p)k˜ + (1− p)(1− α)
(1− t˜)
∂k˜
∂α
]
. (4.27)
The structure of (4.27) is analogous to the direct effect in the previous section
[eq. (4.16)]. For given tax rates, the mechanical effect in the first term has the same
negative impact on tax revenues as under the benchmark scheme. The second term is
instead positive, as investment in each country rises as a result of improved loss offset.
The tax externality ∂T˜i/∂t˜j can be calculated from government i’s tax revenues by
differentiating (4.23) with respect to t˜j. This gives:
∂T˜i
∂t˜j
= α(1− p)
[
−t˜ ∂k˜i
∂t˜j
− k˜
]
. (4.28)
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The first effect in this expression is analogous to our analysis in the previous section
[see eq. (4.17)]. It is positive as an increase in t˜j reduces the investment of firm i’s
subsidiary, and therefore reduces the expected tax rebate of country i. There is a
counteracting second effect, however, which is specific to the tax rebate being based
on the tax rate in the subsidiary’s host country. By raising its tax rate, the host
country j can raise the rate at which country i has to grant tax relief to the subsidiary
of its home-based MNE. Taken in isolation, this effect thus provides an incentive for
strategic overtaxation under the alternative loss offset scheme.
We can show, however, that the ambiguities in (4.27) and (4.28) both disappear in
equilibrium. The total effect of cross-border loss offset on equilibrium tax revenues
is given by substituting (4.27) and (4.28) into (4.15). In a first step we employ the
symmetry condition and use ∂k˜i/∂tj from (4.22) and ∂k˜/∂α from (4.25). This gives
∂T˜
∂α
= (1− p)
[
−k˜ − t˜(1− p)(1− α)
(1− t˜)2pfkk
](
t˜+ α
dt˜
dα
)
. (4.29)
In a second step, we substitute t˜ in the squared bracket by−B˜/Ω˜ using (4.24) to get20
dT˜
dα
=
E(p˜i)
1− αt˜
(
t˜+ α
dt˜
dα
)
> 0, (4.30)
where E(p˜i) is the profit of MNEs under the alternative scheme, as defined in (4.20)
and dt˜/dα follows from Proposition 4.4.
Hence, under the alternative scheme, the negative mechanical effect is overcompen-
sated by the increased investment generated by improved loss offset conditions. By
the same argument, the negative externality in (4.28) is outweighed by the positive in-
vestment effect. Together with the result that tax rates are monotonously rising in α
under the alternative loss offset regime from Proposition 4.4, we thus get:
Proposition 4.5 When the losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate of the
subsidiary’s host country, then a small increase in cross-border loss offset dα > 0
increases equilibrium tax revenues in each country for any initial level of α.
Since Proposition 4.5 holds for any initial level of α, we can also conclude that tax
revenues will definitely increase for a discrete switch from zero to full cross-border loss
20Note that eq. (4.30) also holds when α → 1, even though the positive second effect in the
squared bracket in (4.29) includes a factor (1 − α) in the numerator. The reason is that the tax
rate will approach unity when α → 1 so that the factor (1 − t˜) in the denominator of this term
also approaches zero.
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offset. This is in contrast to the benchmark scheme, where the tax revenues effects of
cross-border loss offset are negative, at least in the neighborhood of α = 1, and the
revenue losses exceed the mechanical effect (Proposition 4.3). These differences are
primarily driven by the contrasting incentives to adjust optimal tax rates under the
two loss offset regimes.
Finally, as tax revenues are monotonously rising in α from (4.30), it is obvious that
two symmetric and revenue-maximizing countries would coordinate on the maximum
degree of cross-border loss offset under the alternative scheme. This is stated in:
Corollary 2 Under the alternative scheme, the optimally coordinated level of cross-
border loss offset is α = 1, when the effects of loss offset on the tax competition
between countries are incorporated.
4.5 Comparing the two loss offset regimes
Our theoretical analysis in the previous sections was limited by the fact that results
for the benchmark loss offset scheme could only be derived for specific cases. In
the following we therefore complement the theoretical analysis with some numerical
simulations that compare tax rates and tax revenues under the two loss offset schemes
for all possible levels of α. For this purpose we specify the production function of
both representative firms as f(ki) = Ak
ε
i , where ε < 1.
21 We present simulation
results for two cases, depending on whether the exogenous probability of success is
high (p = 0.8) or low (p = 0.5). The success probability is important because it
determines the expected size of the mechanical effect under both loss offset systems
[see the first terms in (4.16) and (4.27)]. This effect is the larger the lower is the success
probability of the investment and hence the larger are the cross-border losses that have
to be compensated. The results of our simulations are summarized in Figure 4.1.22 In
the upper half of the figure, Case 1 presents the results for the high success probability
p = 0.8. In the left panel we compare tax rates for the two loss offset schemes. Under
the benchmark scheme, tax rates first rise slightly, as the positive effect of increased
investment levels dominates the negative mechanical effect. As α continues to rise,
21This production function exhibits a positive third derivative with respect to k, thus ensuring
that all propositions for the benchmark scheme in Section 4.3 hold. See footnote 15.
22Our simulations confirm that a symmetric equilibrium exists that satisfies the conditions
specified in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. This is true for both regimes, and for all levels of the loss
offset parameter α.
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Figure 4.1: Tax rate and tax revenue effects of loss offset schemes
Case 1: High success probability (p = 0.8)
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Case 2: Low success probability (p = 0.5)
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however, the mechanical effect becomes stronger and tax rates definitely fall, at the
margin, as α approaches unity (see Proposition 4.1). Moreover, the figure also shows
that the conditions underlying Proposition 4.2 are fulfilled, and a discrete switch from
zero to full loss offset lowers equilibrium tax rates. Under the alternative scheme, in
contrast, tax rates are monotonously rising in α (see Proposition 4.4) and are above
the equilibrium tax rates under the benchmark scheme for any positive level of α.23
These differences are mirrored in the tax revenue levels shown in the right upper panel
of Figure 4.1. Under the benchmark scheme, tax revenues initially rise, but then fall as
α is further increased (Proposition 4.3). Under the alternative scheme, tax revenues
are instead monotonously rising in α as higher investment levels overcompensate the
mechanical effect (Proposition 4.5). Lastly, and importantly, equilibrium tax revenues
under the alternative scheme are always higher than under the benchmark loss offset
scheme.
In the lower half of the figure, Case 2 shows the simulation results when the success
probability of the investment is relatively low (p = 0.5). In this case the mechanical
effect is thus stronger than in Case 1. From their common starting point at α = 0, tax
rates are now monotonously falling under the benchmark loss offset scheme, whereas
they monotonously rise under the alternative loss offset scheme. For tax revenues
the pattern is qualitatively the same as in the case of a high success probability, but
the shortfall of revenues under the benchmark scheme as compared to the alternative
scheme is quantitatively more pronounced. Hence the case where relatively high loss
offset compensation is paid by governments accentuates the differences between the
two loss offset schemes. Overall, our simulations thus indicate that the equilibria
attainable under the alternative loss offset scheme are very likely to dominate the
equilibriaunder thebenchmarkschemewhentaxrevenuemaximization is theobjective
of governments.
4.6 Discussion and extensions
In this section we extend our analysis in several directions. Section 4.6.1 considers the
case where subsidiaries finance (part of) their investment by a loan from their parent
company. In Section 4.6.2 we modify the governments’ objective function to account
for the profits of home-based MNEs. In Section 4.6.3 we allow firms to endogenously
23Note that, at α = 0, the difference between the two loss offset schemes is inconsequential and
the equilibria must therefore coincide at this point.
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choose the success probability of their risky investments. Finally, in Section 4.6.4 we
introduce asymmetries between countries and compare the two alternative loss offset
schemes in a setting where redistributive effects between the two countries are present.
4.6.1 Financing the subsidiary’s investment via intra-
company loans
In this first extension, we briefly explore the implications of allowing the subsidiary to
finance (part of) the investment by a loan from its parent company.24 If this source of
finance is incorporated, and if the subsidiary’s investment fails, then the loan to the
parent firm will not be repaid and the corresponding share of the losses will effectively
be transferred to the parent country. In many cases this will lead to the losses being
fully deductible from the profits of the parent firm, thus corresponding to a loss offset
parameter of α = 1 for the investment share financed by intra-company loans.
It is unlikely, however, that the entire investment can be financed by intra-company
debt. We thus consider two different cases for the residual financing. In the first case,
a share βD of the firm’s investment will still be financed by external debt and this
share therefore remains deductible from the corporate tax base. In the second case,
the share βE of the investment will be financed by equity, which is not tax deductible.
In both cases, we assume that the parent company refinances the intra-company loan
by external debt. Therefore, the share of internal debt (1− βn), where n = {D,E}, is
always tax deductible for the MNE as a whole.
Partial external debt finance. With partial external debt finance, the expected
after-tax profits of the MNE in country i [cf. eq. (4.1)] become
E(pii) = (1−ti)Gi+(1−tj)p[f(ki)−ki]−(1−p)ki[(1−αti)βD+(1−ti)(1−βD)]. (4.31)
In this case, both means of financing the investment in country j are tax-deductible in
case of success [second term in (4.31)]. In case of failure, the aggregate effective rate of
loss offset is a weighted average of the internationally coordinated rate of cross-border
loss offset α (which applies to the share βD of external debt) and unity (applying to
the share 1 − βD of internal debt). This is given in the third term of (4.31). Since
24We thank the editor, Tom Gresik, for pointing this issue out to us and suggesting its impli-
cations.
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international loss offset rules remain relevant for the investment share βD financed by
external debt, our results in the previous sections carry over qualitatively to this case,
even though their quantitative importance is reduced.
Partial equity finance. With partial equity finance, the expected after-tax profits
of the MNE in country i are
E(pii) = (1− ti)Gi + (1− tj)p[f(ki)− (1− βE)ki]− (1− p)(1− ti)(1− βE)ki− βEki.
(4.32)
An implication of partial equity financing is that only the share of internal debt financ-
ing is deductible from the value of output in case of success [second term in (4.32)].
Moreover, since the costs of equity finance are not deductible from the corporate tax
base, they will not give rise to taxable losses in country j in case of failure, and there-
fore cannot be offset against positive profits made in country i. Hence, in case of failure
a loss offset occurs only for the costs of internal debt, but this share can be fully offset
from the parent’s profits [the third term in (4.32)]. In contrast, the costs of equity fi-
nance are never tax deductible and therefore have to be borne in full by the MNE (the
fourth term). It is then obvious from (4.32) that the internationally coordinated loss
offset parameter α is without any effect in this setting. In sum, therefore, we can con-
clude that our analysis of alternative cross-border loss offset rules applies only when
there is at least some degree of external debt financing.
4.6.2 Home ownership of MNEs
We now analyze how the comparison between the benchmark and the alternative loss
offset schemes is changed when each government’s objective function includes the
profits of the resident MNE.25 We capture this in our model by incorporating the
profits of firm i into country i’s government objective function with a weight of λ ≤ 1.
National welfare in country i then equals the weighted sum of the net-of-tax profits of
firm i and country i’s tax revenues. We confine our comparison to the determination
of optimal tax rates and their responses to the degree of loss offset α.
25Recall that the output price of the good produced by the two representative MNEs is fixed
in the world market. Consumer surplus is therefore unchanged throughout our analysis.
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Benchmark loss offset scheme. For this scheme, we get from the firm’s net profit
equation (4.1) and tax revenues (4.5):
Wi = λE(pii) + Ti = [λ+ (1− λ)ti]Gi − [λ+ (1− λ)αti](1− p)ki + tip[f(kj)− kj]
+ λ(1− tj)p[f(ki)− ki] ∀ i 6= j. (4.33)
Maximizing with respect to ti and using (4.2) and (4.3) implicitly defines country i’s
optimal tax rate. Using the superscriptW to indicate variables under a welfare objec-
tive, country i’s optimal tax rate is given by
BWi + t
W
i Ωi = 0, B
W
i = (1− λ)[Gi − α(1− p)kWi ] + p[f(kWj )− kWj ], (4.34)
where Ωi is the same as under tax revenue maximization [eq. (4.7)].
The change in tax rates following an increase in the loss offset parameter α, is again
given by (4.8).26 The change in tWi is positively related to the change in the numerator
BWi of country i’s tax rate expression in (4.34). Using (4.9), this is given by
∂BWi
∂α
= −(1− λ)
[
(1− p)kW − α(1− p)
2tW
(1− tW )pfkk
]
− (1− p)
2(1− αtW )tW
(1− tW )2pfkk . (4.35)
In (4.35) the negative first effect carries a welfare weight (1− λ), because the negative
effect on government i’s tax revenues is partly compensated by additional profits of
its home-based MNE. In the extreme case where the home MNE’s profits and tax
revenues are taxed equally (λ = 1), the negative first effect disappears altogether. The
second effect gives the increase in tax revenues collected by country i from additional
investment carried out by the foreign-based MNE j. As in the baseline scenario, this
effect is unambiguously positive.
The effects of a rise in α on Ωi have already been calculated in (4.12), and have been
shown there to be ambiguous. In particular, this effect is positive when α is very low
initially. Hence, for low initial levels of α, tax rates will unambiguously rise following
an increase in loss offset under the benchmark scheme, when governments weigh tax
revenues and the profit income of its resident MNE equally. For higher levels of α,
there is again a tendency towards falling tax rates, however, as in the case of revenue-
maximizing governments.
26The multiplier, denoted by φW , differs again, however. In Appendix D.2 we show that φW > 0.
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Alternative loss offset scheme. For the alternative scheme, we get from the
firm’s profit equation (4.20) and tax revenues (4.23):
W˜i = λE(p˜ii) + T˜i = [λ+ (1− λ)t˜i]Gi − [λ+ (1− λ)αt˜j](1− p)k˜i + t˜ip[f(k˜j)− k˜j]
+ λ(1− t˜j)p[f(k˜i)− k˜i] ∀ i 6= j.
From (4.21) and (4.22), country i’s optimal tax rate under the alternative loss offset
scheme is implicitly defined by
B˜Wi + t˜
W
i Ω˜i = 0, B˜
W
i = (1− λ)Gi + p[f(k˜Wj )− k˜Wj ], (4.36)
and Ω˜i is identical to its value in Section 4.4 [eq. (4.24)].
Comparing B˜Wi in (4.36) to the corresponding expression under tax revenue maximiza-
tion [eq. (4.23)] shows that the only difference lies in the constant first term. Together
with the unchanged Ω˜i, this implies that the effects of changes in α on the optimal tax
rate are the same as under tax revenue maximization [see (4.25) and (4.26)] and lead
to unambiguously rising tax rates for all initial levels of α. Hence Proposition 4.4 car-
ries over to the case where governments maximize a weighted sum of tax revenues and
the resident MNE’s net profits.
4.6.3 Endogenous success probability of firms
A further extension of our baseline model is to let the MNEs choose the success prob-
ability pi of their investments. We postulate that, along the technological frontier,
there is an infinite number of investment projects that differ in their success probabil-
ity, where an investment with a lower probability of success delivers a higher return,
in case it succeeds.27 Given our assumption that firms are risk-neutral, each firm
thus chooses pi to maximize its expected after-tax return. The production function is
then given by f(p, k) with first-order derivatives fk > 0 and fp < 0 and second-order
derivatives fkk < 0 and fpp ≤ 0. Furthermore the failure rate (1− pi) and the capital
investment ki are assumed to be complements, fkp < 0, implying that the higher the
probability of success of an investment, the lower is the marginal return on capital.
27See Haufler et al. (2014) for an analysis using this model element in a different policy setting.
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Figure 4.2: The firm’s optimal choice of the project success probability
-
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p
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Benchmark scheme. Under the benchmark loss offset scheme, the first-order con-
dition for the investment level is unchanged from (4.2). The additional first-order
condition for the optimal choice of the success probability is
f(pi, ki) + pifp(pi, ki) +
(tj − αti)
1− tj ki = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (4.37)
In the absence of taxes, the third term on the left-hand side is zero and the efficient
project choice is determined by the condition f(pi, ki) + pifp(pi, ki) = 0. For a risk-
neutral investor this first-order condition maximizes the expected return, pf(p), of the
project. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where p∗ is the first-best level of the success
probability.
Introducing taxes without a full cross-border loss offset leads to a positive third term
on the left-hand side of (4.37) when tax rates are identical. Hence the negative second
term must increase, implying a larger value of pi and hence an inefficiently high success
probability. In Figure 4.2 this corresponds to a project choice to the right of the first-
best projectp∗. Introducing cross-border loss compensation will reduce this distortion,
and it will fully eliminate it when α = 1 and ti = tj.
The full analysis of the extended model is complex, and is relegated to Appendix D.3.
It is straightforward, however, to summarize the results of this analysis, because the
effects of cross-border loss offset on the endogenous success probability are in many
ways parallel to those on the investment levels ki. A higher degree of loss compensation
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reduces the inefficiently high success probability pi and thus increases the expected
return from the investment. This effect increases the (expected) tax base for both
countries. At the same time, the expected tax rebates paid to the home-based MNE rise
for both countries, due to the higher probability of failure. In a symmetric equilibrium
where loss offset is almost complete (α → 1), these effects will just offset each other
and only the negative mechanical effect of the reform remains [see eq. (4.11)]. Hence,
as in our analysis in Section 4.3, each country will have an incentive to reduce its tax
rate following a rise in α, if the level of cross-border loss compensation is already high
in the initial equilibrium.
Moreover, each country is again adversely affected by the tax reduction in the other
country. In the extended model, the negative effect that a decrease in country j’s tax
rate has on the tax base of country i is even reinforced through the endogenous choice
of a lower success probability. A reduction of tj makes it more attractive for firm i to
choose a lower success probability, and the costs of failure are partly borne by firm i’s
home country via cross-border loss compensation. Hence the parameter range under
which an increase in α reduces tax revenues in both countries is enlarged, relative to
the benchmark case.28 Apart from that, the results from Section 4.3 carry over to this
model extension.
Alternative scheme. Under the alternative loss offset scheme, the first-order con-
dition for k˜i is given in (4.21). The first-order condition for the optimal p˜ is
f(p˜i, k˜i) + p˜ifp(p˜i, k˜i) +
t˜j(1− α)
1− t˜j
k˜i = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (4.38)
The effects of an increase in cross-border loss offset on firms’ decisions are analogous
to those derived under the benchmark scheme. Hence an increase in α will tend to
increase investment and reduce the success probability, both towards their efficient
levels. The induced changes in optimal tax rates are analyzed in detail in Appendix
D.3. It is shown there that the endogenous choice of p˜ makes it more difficult to
unambiguously sign the effects on tax rates and tax revenues for arbitrary levels of α.
When the initial level of α is sufficiently large, however, Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 from
Section 4.4 can be shown to carry over to this extension and both tax rates and tax
revenues rise when α is (further) increased. Moreover, as in the baseline model, each
28This is seen from the fact that the restriction on the level of tax rates in Proposition 4.3 is
relaxed in this extended setting. See eq. (D.17) in appendix D.3.
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country benefits from the tax increase in the other country. In sum, therefore, allowing
for an endogenous success probability leads to some changes in the parameter range
for which unambiguous results can be derived, but it does not qualitatively affect the
results from the baseline model.
4.6.4 Asymmetric countries and a minimum loss offset rule
Our analysis has so far focused on the case of symmetric countries. This is a suitable
benchmark case if one wants to find analytical solutions, but the practical implemen-
tation of a coordinated cross-border loss offset rule will almost always involve asymme-
tries between countries. In this more realistic setting analytical solutions for the tax
competition game become overly complex. However, the basic effects arising under
each of the two alternative loss offset schemes are easily deduced from the incentives
for firms and governments derived in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, respectively.
A simple way to generate differences in equilibrium tax rates in the model is to vary only
the exogenous profit levelsGi earned by the parent companies in the two countries. Let
country 1’s parent firm have the lower level of exogenous profit income so thatG1 < G2
while keeping the production function for the subsidiaries equal across countries. In
this setting country 2 will have the higher equilibrium tax rate. Under the benchmark
loss offset scheme, this implies that country 1 imposes a lower tax on the subsidiary
of firm 2, but simultaneously grants a lower rate of loss offset to the subsidiary of its
resident firm 1. Under the alternative loss offset scheme, in contrast, country 1 has to
offer a higher rate of tax relief to the subsidiary of its resident company 1 than it applies
to the positive profits of the subsidiary of the foreign-based firm 2. In this sense, the
alternative loss offset scheme implies redistributive losses for the low-tax country.
To reduce or even eliminate such redistributive effects, it is suggestive to employ a
minimum rule under which each country grants a tax rebate that is based on the
minimum of the tax rates in the parent and the subsidiary country.29 A minimum rule
thus leads to a mixed system of cross-border tax relief where low-tax countries apply
the benchmark scheme, whereas high-tax countries use the alternative scheme.
The basic incentive for the low-tax country 1 to limit the rate of loss offset under
the alternative loss offset scheme is easily shown by introducing a separate loss offset
29This is similar to the worldwide regime for dividend taxation under the tax credit method
where the parent country grants a credit for taxes paid in the subsidiary country, but it does not
make positive payments to the firm if the tax rate in the subsidiary country exceeds the tax rate
in the parent country. See e.g. Gresik (2001, Sec. 5).
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rate tLO1 , which applies only to the compensation of losses for the resident firm. The
expected profits for firm 1 are then
E(pi1) = (1− t1)G1 + (1− t2)p[f(k1)− k1]− (1− αtLO1 )(1− p)k1.
From firm 1’s first-order condition, its optimal investment (in country 2) is unambigu-
ously rising in the isolated loss offset rate tLO1 :
∂k1
∂tLO1
=
α(1− p)
−(1− t2)pfk1k1
≥ 0. (4.39)
The tax revenue expression for the low-tax country is
T1 = t1
{
G1 + p[f(k2)− k2]
}− αtLO1 (1− p)k1.
Differentiating with respect to tLO1 gives
∂T1
∂tLO1
= −(1− p)
[
k1 + αt
LO
1
∂k1
∂tLO1
]
< 0, (4.40)
which can be unambiguously signed from (4.39). Hence, reducing the tax rate for loss
offset tLO1 raises country 1’s tax revenues from both the direct (mechanical) effect, and
from the reduced investment of its resident firm in country 2. Note, however, that
eq. (4.40) captures only the first-round effect of a reduction in tLO1 on country 1’s tax
revenue. It does not incorporate the general equilibrium effects that arise from the
changed nature of tax competition with country 2. These effects must therefore be
simulated when countries are asymmetric. Figure 4.3 presents the results from some
representative simulations of the tax competition game under the two ‘pure’ systems
of cross-border loss offset and under the mixed scheme just discussed. The exogenous
profit levels ofparent companiesare setatG1 = 0.5andG2 = 5.0. All otherparameters
are kept unchanged from the symmetric case shown in Figure 4.1. To emphasize
the redistributive effects arising under the alternative loss offset scheme, we assume
that the success probability of investments is low (p = 0.5) and loss compensation is
accordingly likely. Our presentation of the results focuses on the low-tax country 1.
The full set of simulation results is reported in Appendix D.4.
The left panel of Figure 4.3 shows how country 1’s optimal tax rate develops for
changing levels of α. Under the benchmark loss offset scheme, country 1’s tax rate
again falls monotonically, as in the symmetric case (Case 2 of Figure 1). Under the
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Figure 4.3: Tax rates and tax revenue effects for a low-tax country (country 1)
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Notes: G1 = 0.5, G2 = 5.0, A = 5, ε = 0.8, p = 0.5.
alternative loss offset system, country 1’s optimal tax rate is fundamentally unchanged
from the symmetric case and is monotonously rising in α. Under the mixed system,
where the low-tax country 1 applies the benchmark scheme but the high-tax country 2
applies the alternative scheme, country 1’s tax rate lies in between the tax rates of
the two ’pure’ schemes. In comparison to the case where both countries operate the
alternative loss offset scheme, country 1’s tax rate is reduced by the switch to the
benchmark system, due to the incentive to strategically lower the domestic tax rate.
In comparison to the case where both countries use the benchmark scheme, country
1’s tax rate is instead increased, because country 2 operates the alternative loss offset
schemeand its tax rate is rising inα. Thehigher taxrateof country2 lowers investments
by the subsidiary of firm 1, which reduces loss compensation for the government of
country 1 and allows it to raise its optimal tax rate in equilibrium.
The right panel of Figure 4.3 shows the tax revenue implications for country 1. For low
levels of α, tax revenue in country 1 is higher under the benchmark loss offset scheme
than under the alternative scheme. In this range, the dominant effect is that country 1
does not have to base its tax rebates on the higher tax rate in country 2 when it uses
the benchmark scheme. Asα is further increased, however, the higher tax rates chosen
under the alternative loss offset scheme overcompensate this effect and tax revenues
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for country 1 are thus higher under the alternative loss offset scheme.
The mixed scheme yields higher revenues for the low-tax country 1, in comparison
to the pure benchmark scheme, once α rises above a certain (low) threshold. This is
because country 2 operates the alternative scheme in this case, and will set higher tax
rates than if it followed the benchmark scheme as well. As mentioned above, this higher
tax rate of country 2 allows the government of country 1 to also increase its tax rate.
In comparison to the pure alternative scheme, the mixed scheme has an advantage for
country 1 for low levels of α, because country 1 does not have to base its tax rebates
on the higher tax rate of country 2. This is the reason why country 1’s tax revenues
under the mixed system surpass the revenues under the benchmark system at a lower
level of α than is true under the pure alternative system.
For the high-tax country 2, the ranking of the three loss offset schemes is instead
unambiguous. This country’s tax revenues are highest under the pure alternative
scheme and lowest under the pure benchmark scheme for all levels of α (see Appendix
D.4). In sum, then, there is a trade-off between the mixed loss offset scheme and the
pure alternative scheme for the low-tax country, as the mixed scheme reduces negative
redistributive effects but also maintains some incentive for downward tax competition.
The pure benchmark scheme, in contrast, will be dominated by the mixed scheme
unless the level of cross-border loss offset remains sufficiently low.
4.7 Conclusions
In its 2005 Marks and Spencer ruling, the European Court of Justice has established
the principle that the parent country of a MNE must allow cross-border tax relief for
the losses incurred by a subsidiary in a different EU member state, if the losses incurred
by the subsidiary are ‘final’. Given this ruling, it is very likely that EU member states
will be legally obliged to offer some form of cross-border loss offset in the coming years,
even though the exact conditions under which this occurs are not yet clear. The critical
question is then how to introduce cross-border loss offset in a way that minimizes the
negative side effects of this change for member states’ tax revenues.
In this chapter we have analyzed two alternative schemes of introducing a coordinated
form of cross-border loss offset. Under the first, ‘benchmark’ scheme, each country
bases the tax rebate to loss-making subsidiaries of its domestic MNEs on its own
corporate tax rate. When this scheme is applied, a coordinated increase in cross-border
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loss compensation is likely to reduce optimal tax rates, at least when the level of cross-
border tax relief is high. In an environment where tax competition is an important
concern, as is the case in Europe, our analysis therefore warns that introducing cross-
border loss compensation may well aggravate tax competition, by increasing the ‘costs’
to governments of applying a high corporate tax rate. These behavioral effects imply
that the overall tax revenue losses accompanying the introduction of cross-border tax
relief are likely to be even larger than the direct (mechanical) effects of the reform.
We also show that a simple change in the scheme of cross-border tax relief will suffice
to eliminate these undesirable side effects of the reform. All that is needed is to apply
the tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country, rather than the parent country’s home
tax rate, when calculating the tax rebate. This scheme will also exhibit the efficiency-
enhancing effects on firms’ investment decisions that represent the core advantages of
cross-border loss compensation. In contrast to the benchmark scheme, equilibrium
taxes and tax revenues are likely to rise under the alternative loss offset scheme when
cross-border loss compensation is increased. Finally, the redistributive effects that
arise under this scheme when tax rates differ between countries can be reduced or even
avoided, if each country is given the option to apply the minimum of the tax rates in
the parent and the subsidiary country to the cross-border loss relief.
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. A first extension would be to introduce
an intertemporal model of investment and cross-border loss compensation. This would
allow, for example, to distinguish between a temporary and a permanent transfer of
losses from the subsidiary to the parent country, or to capture loss carryforward pro-
visions in the host country that are limited in time. We doubt, however, that adding
these realistic features would overturn the qualitative conclusions of our analysis with
respect to the ranking of the different loss offset regimes. A second, and more funda-
mental, extension would be to endogenize the location decisions of MNEs, which have
been taken as given in the present analysis. In such a setting, countries may have an
incentive to grant positive levels of cross-border loss offset in a fully decentralized tax
equilibrium, in order to attract headquarter location. An analysis of this case is left
for future research.
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The process of economic integration has led to increased competition among countries
for multinational enterprises. These firms have developed sophisticated strategies in
order to shift profits to low tax-countries by eroding their tax bases in high-tax coun-
tries. As a consequence, governments’ budget, and therefore their provision of public
goods and services to their citizens, is adversely affected by firms’ tax avoidance strate-
gies. Two decades ago, this threat induced the OECD in its report in the year 1998
to call for more tax cooperation to tackle the arising issue of harmful tax competition
practices among its member states and of tax havens. However, the heterogeneity of
the member states made it virtually impossible to align all the countries with common
source based tax policies. In recent years therefore the focus shifted from coordina-
tion to unilateral measures which directly address profit shifting. Among other things,
the OECD (2013) report mentions two approaches to combat tax avoidance and profit
shifting. First, the extension of residence based taxation, e.g. CFC rules, and second
the extension of source based taxation, e.g. thin capitalization rules.
In this doctoral thesis I have analyzed in each of the four chapters a certain aspect
of the taxation of multinational corporations. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are optimal
tax models. Chapters 1 analyzes the above mentioned extension of residence based
and source based taxation to counter profit shifting incentives and how they interact.
It contributes to explain why some countries have implemented a CFC rule on top
of thin capitalization rules while others do not. Chapter 2 focuses on source based
taxation, however, in a setting of imperfect capital markets. This chapter reveals that
differences in financial development is one reason why a cooperation in source based
taxation might fail. Typically, credit market distortions are rather difficult to tackle
directly. But they might be addressed by leniency in the thin capitalization rule at
least in the short run. Importantly, this incentive is irrespective of any argument
of competition for a mobile tax base. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 differ in the sense
that corporate losses are the center point of the analysis. Chapter 3 theoretically and
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empirically investigates behavioral responses of multinational firms once affiliates are
likely to run losses and finds that the manipulation of transfer prices gives firms the
highest degree of flexibility to revert their profit shifting streams. For tax authorities,
there are three important pieces of information. Firstly, they should intensify audits
of firms whose profits bunch around zero. Secondly, profit shifting via internal loans
is likely to be more intense than recent empirical studies suggest. Thirdly, it would be
unwise to neglect transactions to other high-tax affiliates once these are running a loss.
Chapter 4 departs from profit shifting and focuses solely on capital mobility. Therein,
I consider a tax competition model where governments participate in firms losses via
cross-border loss offset provisions. This chapter delivers some very useful insights for
policymakers. Depending on the loss offset scheme tax competition is either likely to
be intensified or mitigated. It shows that what policymakers intend to do is not what
should be done.
Apart from the extension of residence based and source based taxation, there are two
further approaches to combat tax avoidance and profit shifting which I do not address
in this thesis.1 First, a reform of reporting and transparency rules regarding taxes
paid by multinational corporations which requires multinationals to publicly disclose
data on their financial performance. However, this concept opens another channel for
competition if reporting standards are not universally defined. A second approach is a
reform of the current system of corporate income taxation by introducing a system of
formula apportionment. This concept would make transfer prices obsolete and avoids
the problem of measuring transfer prices. Clearly, a world wide concept is utopian.
However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, it is likely that the EU will implement some sort
of cross-border loss compensation which would be a direct implication of introducing
a common consolidated corporate tax base as proposed by the European Commission
(2001) at least in the EU. Obviously, this reform option can only tackle profit shifting
in the long run. But it might still be beneficial even though multinational corporations
could still engage in profit shifting out of the EU (see Riedel and Runkel, 2007). These
benefits might even get stronger if corporate losses are taken into account. Under
the current system of separate accounting, the possibility of corporate losses reduces
the expected tax base of countries, so that they see themselves confronted with a
higher tax elasticity. This gives countries rise to cut their taxes. Under a system of
formula apportionment, this incentive could be reverted since the corporate income
of a multinational company is consolidated and allocated also to governments whose
1See Fuest et al. (2013) for a summary of options for reform.
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tax base would be zero under a system of separate accounting.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
We first totally differentiate the first-order conditions (1.15a) and (1.17a). This leads
to the following equation set[
χ1 χ2
χ3 χ4
]
×
[
dλh
dτh
]
= −
[
χ5
χ6
]
dφ (A.1)
where
χ1 =
∂2W h
∂(λh)2
, χ2 =
∂2W h
∂λh∂τh
, χ3 =
∂2W h
∂τh∂λh
,
χ4 =
∂2W h
∂(τh)2
, χ5 =
∂2W h
∂λh∂φ
, χ6 =
∂2W h
∂τh∂φ
. (A.2)
Applying Cramer’s rule to the equation system (A.1), shows the effects of a change in
the homebias parameter φ on the thin capitalization rule λh and the CFC rule τ
h in
equilibrium:
dλh
dφ
=
χ2χ6 − χ4χ5
χ1χ4 − χ2χ3 ,
dτh
dφ
=
χ3χ5 − χ1χ6
χ1χ4 − χ2χ3 , (A.3)
where χ1χ4 − χ2χ3 > 0 to obtain a local maximum and
χ1 = th
[
φ2f ′′(φkhh)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
− r
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
+ th
[
f ′′(kfh)
∂kfh
∂ρfh
∂ρfh
∂λh
− r
]
∂kfh
∂ρfh
∂ρfh
∂λh
− thr
[
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
+
∂kfh
∂ρfh
∂ρfh
∂λh
]
− γ ∂k
h
h
∂ρhh
(
∂ρhh
∂λh
)2
(A.4)
χ2 = thr
[
φf ′(φkhh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
+ th
[
φ2f ′′(φkhh)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
+
r2
δ
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
− thr∂k
h
h
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
− γ ∂k
h
h
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
∂ρhh
∂λh
− γkhhr (A.5)
χ3 = th
r2
δ
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
+ thr
[
φf ′(φkhh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
+ th
[
φ2f ′′(φkhh)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
− r
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
− γr
[
khh + (λh + β
h
h)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
]
(A.6)
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χ4 = th
r2
δ
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
− th r
2
δ
[
φf ′(φkhh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
+ th
[
φ2f ′′(φkhh)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
+
r2
δ
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
− γr
[
(λh + β
h
h)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
+ (λf + β
h
f )
∂khf
∂ρhf
∂ρhf
∂τh
− khh
r
δ
− khf
r
δ
]
(A.7)
Using (1.5), (1.6), (1.8a), (1.8b), (1.9) and (1.10) we get
χ1 = thr
2(th − τh)
[
1 +
1− τh
1− th
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
+ thr
2(th − τ f )
[
1 +
1− τ f
1− th
]
∂kfh
∂ρfh
− γr2(th − τh)2∂k
h
h
∂ρhh
< 0, (A.8)
χ2 =
th
1− th r
2
[
1− 2(1− τh)λh − r
2δ
(th − τh)[1 + 3(1− th) + 3(1− τh)]
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
− γr
[
khh − (th − τh)(λh + βhh)r
∂khh
∂ρhh
]
, (A.9)
χ3 =
th
1− th r
2
[
1− 2(1− τh)λh − r
2δ
(th − τh)[1 + 3(1− th) + 3(1− τh)]
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
− γr
[
khh − (th − τh)(λh + βhh)r
∂khh
∂ρhh
]
, (A.10)
χ4 = − th
1− th
r3
δ
[
1− 2(1− τh)(λh + βhh)− (1− th)βhh +
δ
2
(
βhh
)2] ∂khh
∂ρhh
+
th
1− th r
2λh(λh + β
h
h)
∂khh
∂ρhh
− th r
3
δ
λh
∂khh
∂ρhh
− γr
[
(λh + β
h
h)
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
+ (λf + β
h
f )
∂khf
∂ρhf
∂ρhf
∂τh
− khh
r
δ
− khf
r
δ
]
< 0. (A.11)
In general, the sign of χ2 and χ3 is ambiguous. However, if δ is small, the third term of
the first squared brackets in (A.9) and (A.10) gets large and the overall effect is likely
to become positive.
The effects of a change in the home bias on the first-order conditions for the optimal
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thin capitalization rule and the optimal CFC rule are respectively given by
χ5 = th
[
f ′(φkhh) + φk
h
hf
′′(φkhh) + φ
2f ′′(φkhh)
dkhh
dφ
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
+ th
[
φf ′(φkhh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂ρhh
∂λh
∂khh
∂ρhh∂φ
− thrdk
h
h
dφ
− γ ∂ρ
h
h
∂λh
dkhh
dφ
. (A.12)
χ6 = th
r2
δ
dkhh
dφ
+ th
[
f ′(φkhh) + φk
h
hf
′′(φkhh) + φ
2f ′′(φkhh)
dkhh
dφ
]
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
+
+ th
[
φf ′(φkhh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂ρhh
∂τh
∂khh
∂ρhh∂φ
− γ(λh + βhh)r
dkhh
dφ
. (A.13)
dkhh
dφ
= −f
′(φkhh) + φk
h
hf
′′(φkhh)
φ2f ′′(φkhh)
. (A.14)
Generally, the sign of
dkhh
dφ
is ambiguous. However, it is reasonable to assume that
capital investment increases if the affiliate gets more efficient.1 The change in the
sensitivity of capital with respect to the effective capital cost is given by
∂khh
∂ρhh∂φ
= −(1− th)[2φf
′′(φkhh) + φ
2khhf
′′′(φkhh)]
[(1− th)φ2f ′′(φkhh)]2
. (A.15)
Assuming that f ′′′ = 0 and using (1.10), we get
∂khh
∂ρhh∂φ
= − 2
(1− th)φ3f ′′(φkhh)
= −2
φ
∂khh
∂ρhh
> 0. (A.16)
Finally, using (1.8a), (1.9), (A.14) and (A.16), we get
χ5 =
th
1− th r
2(th − τh) 2
φ
[
1− (1− τh)(λh + βhh) +
δ
2
(
βhh
)2] ∂khh
∂ρhh
− [(1− γ)th + γτh]rdk
h
h
dφ
< 0. (A.17)
1This is true if the production function is not too concave, i.e. f” is small.
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χ6 = − th
1− th r
2(λh + β
h
h)
2
φ
[
1− (1− τh)(λh + βhh) +
δ
2
(
βhh
)2] ∂khh
∂ρhh
+
[
th
r2
δ
− γ(λh + βhh)r
]
dkhh
dφ
> 0. (A.18)
The signs of (A.3) are determined by the signs of the numerators. Us-
ing (A.8), (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), (A.17) and (A.18), we get for γ = 0
χ2χ6 − χ4χ5 = −
(
th
1− th
)2
r4λh
2
φ
ΣΨ
(
∂khh
∂ρhh
)2
− th
1− th r
2λhχ5
[
λh − r
δ
(1− 2th + τh)
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
, (A.19)
χ3χ5 − χ1χ6 =
(
th
1− th
)2
r4
2
φ
(th − τh)Ψ2
(
∂khh
∂ρhh
)2
+
(
th
1− th
)2
r4
2
φ
(th − τ f )[(1− th) + (1− τ f )](λh + βfh)Ψ
∂khh
∂ρhh
∂kfh
∂ρfh
+
t2h
1− th r
3
[
(1− τh)λh∂k
h
h
∂ρhh
− r
δ
(th − τ f )[(1− th) + (1− τ f )]∂k
f
h
∂ρfh
]
dkhh
dφ
+
t2h
1− th r
4 2
φ
(th − τh)λhΨ
(
∂khh
∂ρhh
)2
− t
2
h
1− th r
3Ψ
∂khh
∂ρhh
dkhh
dφ
, (A.20)
where Σ = 1 − 2(1 − τh)(λh + βhh) − (1 − th)βhh + δ2
(
βhh
)2
< 0 if δ is small and
Ψ = 1− (1− τh)(λh + βhh) + δ2
(
βhh
)2
> 0.
In equation (A.19) the first term on the right-hand side is positive. The sign of the
second term is ambiguous. For th < 0.5, (1−2th+τh) is positive. If δ is small, the term
in squared brackets becomes negative, and thus the second term of the right-hand side
becomes positive, so that χ2χ6 − χ4χ5 > 0.
In (A.20) the first, the second and the fourth term on the right-hand side are positive.
The sign of the third term is ambiguous. Again, if δ is small this term becomes positive,
so that χ3χ5 − χ1χ6 > 0.
Hence, a greater home bias results in a more generous thin capitalization rule and a
stricter CFC rule, i.e.
dλh
dφ
> 0,
dτh
dφ
> 0. (A.21)
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
First-best optimal investment for the subsidiaries is implicitly given by the condition
θjf ′(Kj(θj))− i = 0. (B.1)
The explicit optimal amount of capital invested then is
Kj = f ′−1
(
i
θj
)
. (B.2)
The difference in the first-best optimal amount of capital invested by the highly pro-
ductive and the less productive subsidiaries is
K¯∗ −K∗ = f ′−1
(
i
θ¯
)
− f ′−1
(
i
θ
)
. (B.3)
Following (2.5) constrained investment for the low-productivity subsidiaries K is de-
termined by
V 1 = βK − r(I + E) + pt1iω (B.4)
and analogously for the high-productivity subsidiaries by
V¯1 = βK¯ − r(I¯ + E) + pt1iω¯. (B.5)
Subtracting (B.4) from (B.5) gives the difference in the amount of capital in the con-
strained equilibrium that is invested by the two types of subsidiaries
K¯ −K = 1
β
(
V¯1 − V 1 + r(I¯ − I)− pt1i(ω¯ − ω)
)
. (B.6)
Hence, the difference between optimal investment and constrained investment is rela-
tively higher for the highly productive subsidiaries if
K¯∗ −K∗ > K¯ −K ⇔ β > V¯1 − V 1 + r(I¯ − I)− pt1i(ω¯ − ω)
f ′−1(i/θ¯)− f ′−1(i/θ) > 0. (B.7)
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Derivation of the ex-post optimal abusive transfer
prices
Differentiating the concealment cost function given in equation (3.9), we get as
marginal concealment costs for manipulating the transfer prices of the licence fee and
the intermediate input good, respectively,
∂CP
∂PXi
=
[ηX
2
(
PXi
)2
+
ηS
2
(
P Si
)2]
ηXP
X
i , (C.1)
∂CP
∂P Si
=
[ηX
2
(
PXi
)2
+
ηS
2
(
P Si
)2]
ηSP
S
i . (C.2)
By equating the two expressions (C.1) and (C.2), we find an ‘inverse-cost rule’ for
transfer-pricing devices,1
P Si
PXi
=
ηX
ηS
, (C.3)
Relying on equation (C.3) in order to substitute for P Si in equations (C.1) and us-
ing (3.4b) leads to the optimal (abusive) transfer prices in the case of a profitable
affiliate (
GXi
)∗
= 3
√
ηS
ηS + ηX
· 2
(ηX)2
· (1 · ti − t1) 1
X¯
. (C.4)
Analogous, we can determine the optimal transfer price for the intermediate good and
get (
GSi
)∗
= 3
√
ηX
ηS + ηX
· 2
(ηS)2
· (1 · ti − t1) 1
Si
. (C.5)
C.2 Derivation of the first-order conditions for ex-ante tax-
planning
In the following, we exemplarily deliver the first-order condition for the licence-fee
transfer price in the case that all tax-planning decisions need to be taken ex-ante (i.e.,
1Note that, in the optimum, marginal concealment costs will be equalized for both transfer-
pricing strategies.
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before the true sales price is revealed). This first-order condition is given by
∂E(Π)
∂GXi
= −X¯ + (1−H(p0i ))tiX¯ −
∂CP
∂PXi
X¯ + (1− t1)X¯ + h(p0i )tip0i yi
∂p0i
∂GXi
− h(p0i )ti[(GXi + qX)X¯ + (GSi + qS)Si + rbiKi]
∂p0i
∂GXi
= 0. (C.6)
Rearranging the terms gives[
(1−H(p0i ))ti − t1 −
∂CP
∂PXi
]
X¯
− h(p0i )ti[p0i yi − (GXi + qX)X¯ − (GSi + qS)Si − rbiKi]
∂p0i
∂GXi
= 0. (C.7)
Recall that the price p0i is defined as the price for which taxable profits are zero.
Hence, the term in the second line vanishes as the value of the squared brackets is zero.
Therefore, we get
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
∂CP
∂PXi
. (C.8)
C.3 Simultaneity bias
Our aim is to estimate the effect from being in a loss position (dummy Lit = 1 if firm i
experiences a loss in year t, zero otherwise) on transfer payments and internal leverage
on internal debt in year t, yit. zit is an exogenous control variable (or a vector of such)
that is potentially correlated with both yit and the probability of experiencing a loss.
yit = α1Lit + β10 + β11zit + u1it, α1 < 0 (C.9)
The problem is that reducing outgoing transfer prices and/or lowering internal leverage
also lowers the probability of experiencing losses. We thus also have the following
relationship
Lit = α2yit + β20 + β22zit + u2, 0 > α2 (C.10)
This is an example of two-way causality, both variables have an effect on the other.
(C.9) and (C.10) present the model on structural form. The reduced form presen-
tation is found by solving the system for the two endogenous variables and finding
quantity and price as functions of the exogenous variable(s). The solution for transfer
125
Appendix to Chapter 3
payments/internal debt/interest payments is then given by
yit =
β10 − α1β20
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi10
+
β11 − β22
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi11
zit +
u1it − α1u2it
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
e1it
By introducing some auxiliary notation, this reduces to
yit = pi10 + pi11zit + e1it (C.11)
Similarly, we find the solution for the loss position dummy as
Lit =
β20 + α2β10
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi20
− β11 + β22
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi21
zit +
u2it + α2u1it
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
e2it
Again, auxiliary notation helps to make the notation more compact
Lit = pi20 + pi21zit + e2it (C.12)
(C.11) and (C.12) give the reduced form presentation of the model, since transfer prices
and loss position are given as functions only of exogenous variables.
In this paper, we estimate the structural equation (C.9). The problem by estimating
this directly is that Lit is endogenously decided within the model and thus correlated
with the error term u1it. The covariance between Lit and u1it is
cov (Lit, u1it) = E [(pi20 + pi21zit + e2it)u1it] = E (e2itu1it)
since the z-variable(s) is/are exogenous. If we insert for e2it, and assume that u1it and
u2it are uncorrelated, we get
cov (Lit, u1it) = E
(
u2 + α2u1
1− α1α2 u1
)
=
α2σ
2
1
1− α1α2 > 0 (C.13)
since α2 > 0, and 1 − α1α2 > 0. σ21 = E (u21it), the variance of u1, assuming ho-
moscedasticity. Importantly, OLS is likely to give a positive bias in the estimator for
α1. Keep in mind that this is negative, meaning that OLS will underestimate the effect
from losses on transfer payments/internal leverage.
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C.4 Descriptive statistics II: Control variables
Mean (st.dev)
Tax rate for affiliate with lowest tax rate (N = 8, 091) 0.27 (0.09)
Results as share of total assets (N = 39, 141) -0.09 (0.68)
Total assets (in 1,000 NOK) (N = 39, 362) 63,140 (108,168)
Employees (N = 38, 108) 19.98 (35.48)
Company age (N = 40, 079) 13.30 (15.86)
Loss carry forward as share of result (38, 552) 0.01 (0.59)
The sample is the Norwegian based MNCs. Results as share of total assets,
total assets, and employees are winsorized at the 1st percentile.
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D Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Deriving the multiplier φ
Totally differentiating (4.6) with respect to α gives
∂Bi
∂α
+
∂Bi
∂ti
dti
dα
+
∂Bi
∂tj
dtj
dα
+ ti
(
∂Ωi
∂α
+
∂Ωi
∂ti
dti
dα
+
∂Ωi
∂tj
dtj
dα
)
+ Ωi
dti
dα
= 0.
Rearranging the terms and using the symmetry condition
(
dti
dα
=
dtj
dα
= dt
dα
)
leads to
∂Bi
∂α
+ ti
∂Ωi
∂α
+
(
Ωi +
∂Bi
∂ti
+
∂Bi
∂tj
+ ti
∂Ωi
∂ti
+ ti
∂Ωi
∂tj
)
dt
dα
= 0. (D.1)
Introducing
φ ≡ −
(
Ωi +
∂Bi
∂ti
+
∂Bi
∂tj
+ ti
∂Ωi
∂ti
+ ti
∂Ωi
∂tj
)
(D.2)
gives equation (4.8) in the main text.
D.2 Signing the multiplier φ
Benchmark scheme. To sign φ in (D.2) under the benchmark scheme, we first
differentiate eq. (4.3), treating fkk as a constant for analytical simplicity:
1
∂2ki
∂t2i
= 0,
∂2kj
∂t2i
=
2(1− αtj)(1− p)
p(1− ti)3fkk ,
∂2kj
∂tj∂ti
=
−α(1− p)
p(1− ti)2fkk . (D.3)
Using the symmetry condition along with eqs. (4.2), (4.3), and (4.7) gives:
φ = −(1− p)
2(1− αt)2
p(1− t)3fkk −
(1− p)2α2
p(1− t)fkk +
2α(1− p)2(1− αt)
p(1− t)2fkk
− 3t(1− p)
2(1− αt)
p(1− t)4fkk +
2α(1− p)2(1− αt)
p(1− t)3fkk −
α(1− p)2
p(1− t)2fkk
= − (1− p)
2
p(1− t)4fkk [2(1− αt)
2(1− t) + 2α2(1− t)3 − 2α(1− αt)(1− t)2
+ 3t(1− αt)− 2αt(1− αt)(1− t) + αt(1− t)2]
1See footnote 15 in the main text for further discussion.
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Rearranging terms and simplifying, we finally get
φ = − (1− p)
2
p(1− t)4fkk [2(1− α)(1− αt)(1− t) + 2α
2(1− t)3 + αt(1− t)2
+ 2αt2(1− αt) + (3− 2α)t(1− αt)] > 0, (D.4)
which is unambiguously positive.
Alternative scheme. Analogously to (D.2), the multiplier φ˜ is defined as
φ˜ ≡ −
(
Ω˜i +
∂B˜i
∂t˜i
+
∂B˜i
∂t˜j
+ t˜i
∂Ω˜i
∂t˜i
+ t˜i
∂Ω˜i
∂t˜j
)
. (D.5)
To sign φ˜, we derive from (4.22) (assuming, as before, that fkk is a constant):
∂2k˜j
∂t˜i∂t˜j
= 0,
∂2k˜j
∂t˜2i
=
2(1− α)(1− p)
p(1− t˜i)3fkk
. (D.6)
Using (4.21), (4.22), and (4.24) gives:
φ˜ = −2(1− p)
2(1− α)(1− αt˜i)
p(1− t˜i)3fkk
− (1− p)
2(1− α)2t˜i
p(1− t˜i)4fkk
− 2(1− p)
2(1− α)(1− αt˜i)t˜i
p(1− t˜i)4fkk
.
(D.7)
After rearranging terms, we finally get
φ˜ = −(1− α)(1− p)
2
p(1− t˜i)4fkk
[2(1− αt˜i) + (1− α)t˜i] ≥ 0. (D.8)
Benchmark scheme: Extension with home ownership of MNEs. The
multiplier φW is defined analogously to (D.2). Using the symmetry condi-
tion, (4.2), (4.3), (4.7) and (4.34) gives, after rearranging terms:
φW = − (1− p)
2
p(1− tW )4fkk [2(1− α)(1− αt
W )(1− tW ) + (2− λ)α2(1− tW )3
+ αtW (1− tW )2 + 2α(tW )2(1− αtW ) + (3− 2α)tW (1− αtW )
+ λα(1− αtW )(1− tW )2] > 0. (D.9)
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D.3 The model with endogenous success probabilities of
firms
Benchmark scheme. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions (4.2)
and (4.37) leads to the following equation set:[
γ1 γ2
γ2 γ3
]
×
[
dki
dpi
]
=
[
γ4
γ5
]
dtj +
[
γ6
γ7
]
dti, (D.10)
where
γ1 = (1− tj)pifkk < 0, γ2 = (1− tj)[fki − 1 + pifkp] + 1− αti
γ3 = (1− tj)(2fpi + pifpp) < 0, γ4 = pi(fki − 1) ≥ 0
γ5 = f(pi, ki) + pifpi − ki < 0, γ6 = −α(1− pi) ≤ 0
γ7 = αki ≥ 0 (D.11)
In this setting, the sign of γ2 is ambiguous. We assume that a higher success probability
reduces the marginal productivity of capital, implying fkp < 0, and that this effect
is sufficiently strong to make γ2 negative. This is a sufficient, but not a necessary
condition to unambiguously sign the comparative static effects that follow.
Applying Cramer’s rule to the equation system (D.10), the effects of taxes on invest-
ment levels and success probabilities in each country can be signed as:
dki
dti
=
γ3γ6 − γ2γ7
γ1γ3 − γ22 > 0,
dki
dtj
=
γ3γ4 − γ2γ5
γ1γ3 − γ22 < 0, (D.12)
dpi
dti
=
γ1γ7 − γ2γ6
γ1γ3 − γ22 < 0,
dpi
dtj
=
γ1γ5 − γ2γ4
γ1γ3 − γ22 > 0. (D.13)
The effects on ki in (D.12) correspond to the baseline model. Eq. (D.13) shows that
an increase in country j’s tax rate leads to the subsidiary of firm i choosing a higher
success probability pi. In contrast, an increase in the tax rate of country i decreases
the optimal success probability by firm i’s subsidiary when the loss offset parameter
α is strictly positive.
The optimal tax rate is determined analogously to (4.8). We denote variables by a
‘hat’ symbol and assume the multiplier φˆ to be positive. The change in country i’s tax
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base following an increase in α is given by
∂Bˆi
∂α
= −(1− p)k − (1− α)(1− p)
2t
(1− t)γ1 −
(1− α)k2t
(1− t)γ3 . (D.14)
As in the benchmark model, the effect can only be signed when cross-border loss offset
is almost complete (α → 1) and countries are symmetric. In this case all indirect
effects operating through induced changes in ki and pi cancel out, leaving only the
negative direct effect of α.
The effects of a change in α on Ωˆi are also ambiguous, in general. The total change is:
∂Ωˆi
∂α
=
∂γ4
∂α
dkj
dti
+
∂γ5
∂α
dpj
dti
+
∂γ6
∂α
dki
dti
+
∂γ7
∂α
dpi
dti
+ γ4
∂(dkj/dti)
∂α
+γ5
∂(dpj/dti)
∂α
+ γ6
∂(dki/dti)
∂α
+ γ7
∂(dpi/dti)
∂α
. (D.15)
For α→ 1, this expression can be unambiguously signed. Evaluating (D.15) at α = 1
and using γ4|α=1 = (1 − pi), γ5|α=1 = −ki, γ6|α=1 = −(1 − pi), γ7|α=1 = ki and the
symmetry condition ti = tj gives
∂Ωˆi
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
−4tiγ2
N2
{[(1− pi)γ3 + kiγ2] + [kiγ1 + (1− pi)γ2]}
+
(1− pi)γ3 + kiγ2
N
[
2− 3tj
1− tj (1− pi) +
(γ2 + 1− tj)tjki
(1− tj)γ3
]
+
kiγ1 + (1− pi)γ2
N
[
2− 3tj
1− tj ki +
(γ2 + 1− tj)tj(1− pi)
(1− tj)γ1
]
, (D.16)
where N = γ1γ3 − γ22 > 0. A sufficient condition for the terms in squared brackets,
and therefore for the entire derivative, to be negative is that tj ≤ 2/3. Hence we get:
dΩˆi
dα
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
< 0 ⇔ t ≤ 2
3
. (D.17)
In comparison to the benchmark model [eq. (4.12)] the range of tax rates for which
Proposition 1a obtains is thus enlarged, due to the endogenous choice of firms’ success
probabilities.
To analyze the total change in equilibrium tax revenues, we need to determine the tax
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externality. This is given by
∂Tˆi
∂tj
= ti
[
γ4
dkj
dtj
+ γ5
dpj
dtj
+ γ6
dki
dtj
+ γ7
dpi
dtj
]
> 0. (D.18)
As in the baseline model, the tax externality is positive, implying that Proposition 1c
carries over to this model extension. In comparison to the baseline model, a rise in tj
further expands country i’s expected tax base through a lower success probability, but
a higher expected return, chosen by the subsidiary of firm j. Moreover, the subsidiary
of firm i chooses a higher success probability and this reduces the expected tax rebates
that have to be paid by country i’s government.
Alternative scheme. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions under the
alternative scheme, eqs. (4.21) and (4.38), gives the equation set:[
γ¯1 γ¯2
γ¯2 γ¯3
]
×
[
dki
dpi
]
=
[
γ¯4
γ¯5
]
dtj, (D.19)
where variables for the alternative scheme are indicated by a bar and
γ¯1 = (1− tj)pifkk < 0, γ¯2 = (1− tj)[fki − 1 + pifkp] + 1− αtj < 0
γ¯3 = (1− tj)(2fpi + pifpp) < 0, γ¯4 = (1− pi)(1− α)/(1− tj) ≥ 0,
γ¯5 = −(1− α)ki/(1− tj) ≤ 0. (D.20)
Following (4.8), we assume that φ¯ > 0. The effect of α on country i’s tax base is given
by
∂B¯i
∂α
= −(1− p)
2(1− αt)t
(1− t)γ¯1 −
k2(1− αt)t
(1− t)γ¯3 > 0. (D.21)
The effect of an increase in α on Ω¯i is
∂Ω¯i
∂α
=− (1− α)t+ (1− αt)]k
2
(1− t)2N¯ γ¯1 −
2(1− p)k[t+ (1− αt)N¯ ]
(1− t)2N¯ γ¯2
− (1− p)
2[(1− α)t+ (1− αt)]
(1− t)2N¯ γ¯3 −
2(1− α)(1− αt)tk
(1− t)2N¯2 γ¯1γ¯2
− 2(1− α)(1− αt)t(1− p)
2
(1− t)2N¯2 γ¯3γ¯2 −
4(1− α)(1− αt)(1− p)tk
(1− t)2N¯ γ¯
2
2
− (1− p)(1− α)(1− αt)(1 + t)k
(1− t)2N¯ , (D.22)
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with N¯ = γ¯1γ¯3 − γ¯22 > 0. The first three terms on the right hand side of (D.22)
are positive, the last four are negative. However, if cross-border loss offset is almost
complete (α→ 1), these effects are negligible. Hence, for α→ 1, the total effect on Ω¯i
is positive and therefore also the overall effect of α on the tax rate.
Finally, deriving the tax externality by analogy to (4.28) gives
∂T¯i
∂tj
=
α
(1− αt)
[
(1− t)B¯i − (1− αt)(1− p)k
] ≥ 0, (D.23)
where B¯i is given in (D.21). Hence tax revenues unambiguously rise in both countries
when dti/dα is positive.
D.4 Simulation results for asymmetric countries
Table D.1: Cross-border loss compensation with asymmetric countries
benchmark scheme alternative scheme mixed scheme
α t1 t2 T1 T2 t1 t2 T1 T2 t1 t2 T1 T2
0.0 0.33 0.41 3.89 5.55 0.33 0.41 3.89 5.55 0.33 0.41 3.89 5.55
0.2 0.32 0.38 4.20 5.54 0.37 0.43 4.13 5.89 0.35 0.41 4.16 5.73
0.4 0.29 0.33 4.13 5.20 0.41 0.46 4.45 6.35 0.36 0.41 4.40 5.89
0.6 0.24 0.27 3.42 4.23 0.48 0.54 4.88 7.00 0.36 0.41 4.55 5.88
0.8 0.17 0.19 2.20 2.78 0.58 0.63 5.58 8.12 0.35 0.41 4.53 5.47
1.0 0.11 0.13 1.09 1.46 0.68∗ 0.71∗ 6.20∗ 9.16∗ 0.32 0.41 4.29 4.59
Notes: G1 = 0.5, G2 = 5.0; A = 5, ε = 0.8, p = 0.5.
∗ values for α = 0.9 (no interior solution for α = 1)
133
Bibliography
Allingham M.G., Sandmo A., 1972. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis.
Journal of Public Economics 1, 323-338.
Altshuler R., Auerbach A.J., 1990. The significance of tax law asymmetries: An
empirical investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 61-86.
Altshuler R., Hubbard G., 2003. The effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the
location of assets in financial services firms. Journal of Public Economics 87,
109-127.
Antra`s P., 2003. Firms, contracts, and trade structure. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118, 1375-1418.
Arezki R., Bru¨ckner M., 2012. Rainfall, financial development, and remittances:
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of International Economics 87,
377-385.
BartelsmanE.J., BeetsmaR.M.W.J., 2003. Whypaymore? Corporate taxavoidance
through transfer-pricing in OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics 87,
2225-2252.
Beck T., Levine R., Loayza N., 2000. Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of
Financial Economics 58, 261-300.
Becker J., Fuest, C., 2010. Taxing foreign profits with international mergers and
acquisitions. International Economic Review 51, 171-186.
Bergin T., 2012. Tax-free latte. Starbucks slips the UK tax hook. Reuters Special
Report, Thomson Reuters.
http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/10/Starbucks.pdf
134
Bibliography
Bernard A.B., Jensen J.B., Schott P.K., 2006. Transfer pricing by U.S.-based multi-
national firms. NBER Working Paper No. 12493.
Blomstro¨m M., Kokko A., 1998. Multinational corporations and spillovers. Journal
of Economic Surveys 12, 1-31.
Blouin J., Huizinga H., Laeven L., Nicode`me G., 2014. Thin capitalization rules and
multinational firm capital structure. CESifo Working Paper No. 4695.
Bond R.S., 2000. Levelling up or levelling down? Some reflections on the ACE and
CBIT proposals, and the future of the corporate tax base. In: Cnossen, S. (Ed.),
Taxing capital income in the European Union. Issues and options for reform.
Oxford University, 161-179.
Boulogne F., Slavnic N.S., 2012. Cross-border restructuring and “final losses”. Eu-
ropean Taxation 10-2012, 486-495.
Brueckner J.K., 2000. A Tiebout/tax-competition model. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 77, 285-306.
Bucovetsky S., 1991. Asymmetric tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics 30,
167-181.
Bucovetsky S., Haufler A., 2008. Tax competition when firms choose their organi-
zational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed? Journal of
International Economics 74, 188-201.
Bucovetsky S., Wilson J.D., 1991. Tax competition with two tax instruments. Re-
gional Science and Urban Economics 21, 333-350.
Bu¨ttner T., Overesch M., Schreiber U., Wamser G., 2012. The impact of thin-
capitalization rules on the capital structure of multinational firms. Journal of
Public Economics 96, 930-938.
Bu¨ttner T., Wamser G., 2013. Internal debt and multinationals’ profit shifting -
empirical evidence from firm-level panel data. National Tax Journal 66, 63-95.
Buslei H., Simmler M., 2012. The impact of introducing an interest barrier - evidence
from the German corporation tax reform 2008. DIW Discussion Papers 1215.
Chang E., Taylor M.S., 1999. Control in multinational corporations (MNCs): The
case of Korean manufacturing subsidiaries. Journal of Management 25, 541-565.
135
Bibliography
Cheng L.K., Kwan Y.K., 2000. What are the determinants of the location of foreign
direct investment? The Chinese experience. Journal of International Economics
51, 379-400.
Chinn M. Eichengreen D.B., Ito H., 2014. A forensic analysis of global imbalances.
Oxford Economic Papers 66, 465-490.
Clausing K., 2003. Tax-motivated transfer-pricing on intra-firm trade. Journal of
Public Economics 87, 2207-2223.
Collins J.H., Shackelford D.A., 1995. Corporate domicile and average effective tax
rates: the cases of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
International Tax and Public Finance 2, 55-83.
Cooper M., Knittel M., 2006. Partial loss refundability: how are corporate tax losses
used? National Tax Journal 59, 651-663.
Davies R., Voget J., 2008. Tax competition in an expanding European Union. Work-
ing Paper 08/30. Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
Desai M.A., Foley C.F., Hines J.R., 2004. A multinational perspective on capital
structure choice and internal capital markets. Journal of Finance 59, 2451-2487.
De Simone L., Seidman J.K., 2013. Unprofitable affiliates and income shifting be-
havior. Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper Series No. 157.
Devereux M.P., Griffith R., 1998. Taxes and the location of production: evidence
from a panel of US multinationals. Journal of Public Economics 68, 335-367.
Devereux M.P., Keen, M., Schiantarelli, F., 1994. Corporation tax asymmetries and
investment: Evidence from U.K. panel data. Journal of Public Economics 53,
395-418.
Devereux M.P., Lockwood B., Redoano M., 2008. Do countries compete over corpo-
rate tax rates? Journal of Public Economics 92, 1210-1235.
Dischinger M., Knoll B., Riedel N., 2014. There’s no place like home: the profitability
gap between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries. Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, forthcoming.
Dischinger M., Riedel N., 2011. Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets
within multinational firms. Journal of Public Economics 95, 691-707.
136
Bibliography
Dourado A., de la Feria R., 2008. Thin capitalization rules in the context of the
CCCTB. Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, WP08/04.
Dreßler D., Overesch M., 2013. Investment impact of tax loss treatment - empirical
insights from apanel of multinationals. InternationalTaxandPublic Finance20,
513-543.
Dreßler D., Scheuering U., 2012. Empirical evaluation of interest barrier effects.
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 12-046.
Eeckhoudt L., Gollier, C., Schlesinger, H., 1997. The no-loss offset provisions and
the attitude towards risk of a risk-neutral firm. Journal of Public Economics 65,
207-217.
Egger P., Eggert W., Keuschnigg C., Winner H., 2010. Corporate taxation, debt
financing and foreign-plant ownership. European Economic Review 54, 96-107.
Egger P., Keuschnigg C., Merlo V., Wamser G., 2014. Corporate taxes and internal
borrowing within multinational firms. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, forthcoming.
Egger P., Wamser G., 2011. The impact of controlled foreign company legislation
on real investments abroad: A two-dimensional regression discontinuity design.
CEPR Working Paper No. 8460.
Ernst & Young, 2013. Worldwide corporate tax guide.
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/Global-tax-guide-archive
European Commission, 2001. Towards an internal market without tax obstacles. A
strategy for providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their
EU-wide activities. Document COM(2001) 582 final, Brussels.
European Commission, 2006. Tax treatment of losses in cross-border situations.
Document COM(2006) 824. Brussels.
European Commission, 2011. Council directive on a common consolidated corporate
tax base (CCCTB). Document COM(2011) 121/4. Brussels.
European Tax Handbook, 2013. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation,
Amsterdam.
137
Bibliography
Eurostat, 2011. Taxation trends in the European Union. Data for the EU member
states, Iceland and Norway. 2011 edition. Luxembourg.
Eurostat, 2013. Taxation trends in the European Union. Data for the EU member
states, Iceland and Norway. 2013 edition. Luxembourg.
Evers L., Miller H., Spengel C., 2013. Intellectual property box regimes: effective
tax rates and tax policy considerations. ZEW Discussion Papers No. 13-070.
Feenstra R.C., Hanson G.H., 1997. Foreign direct investment and relative wages:
evidence from Mexico’s maquiladoras. Journal of International Economics 42,
371-393.
FerrazC., FinanF., 2008. Exposingcorruptpoliticians: theeffectsofBrazil’spublicly
released audits on electoral outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 703-
745.
Fischer E.O., Heinkel R., Zechner J., 1989. Dynamic capital structure choice: theory
and tests. Journal of Finance 44, 19-40.
Fo¨rster G., Schmidtmann D., 2004. CFC legislation in Germany. Intertax 32, 476-
486.
Fuest C., Hemmelgarn T., 2005. Corporate tax policy, foreign firm ownership and
thin capitalization. Regional Science and Urban Economics 35, 508-526.
Fuest C., Hemmelgarn T., Ramb F., 2007. How would the introduction of an EU-
wide formula apportionment affect the distribution and size of the corporate
tax base? An analysis based on German multinationals. International Tax and
Public Finance 14, 605-626.
Fuest C., Spengel C., Finke K., Heckemeyer J., Nusser H., 2013. Profit shifting and
’aggressive’ tax planning by multinational firms: issues and options for reform.
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 13-044.
Ge´rard M., Weiner J., 2003. Cross-border loss offset and formulary apportionment:
How do they affect multijurisdictional firm investment spending and interjuris-
dictional tax competition? CESifo Working Paper No. 1004.
Ge´rard M., Weiner J., 2006. Comment la compensation internationale des pertes et
la re´partition proportionelle des revenues imposables peuvent affecter les choix
des multinationales et la concurrence fiscale. Economie et Pre´vision 174, 65-77.
138
Bibliography
Gilson S.C., 1997. Transaction costs and capital structure choice: evidence from
financially distressed firms. Journal of Finance 52, 161-196.
Girma S., Greenaway D., Wakelin K., 2001. Who benefits from foreign direct invest-
ment in the UK? Scottish Journal of Political Economy 48, 119-131.
Global Corporate Tax Handbook, 2013. International Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion, Amsterdam.
Go¨x R.F., Schiller U., 2007. An economic perspective on transfer pricing. In: C.S.
Chapman, A.G. Hopwood and M.D. Shields (eds.). Handbook of Management
Accounting Research Vol. II. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 641-672.
Gramlich J.D., Limpaphayom P., Rhee S.G., 2004. Taxes, keiretsu affiliation, and
income shifting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, 203-228.
Gresik T.A., 2001. The taxing task of taxing transnationals. Journal of Economic
Literature 39, 800-838.
Gresik T.A., Osmundsen P., 2008. Transfer pricing in vertically integrated industries.
International Tax and Public Finance 15, 231-255.
Grubert H., 2003. Intangible income, intercompany transactions, income shifting,
and the choice of location. National Tax Journal 56, 221-242.
Grubert H., Goodspeed T., Swenson D., 1993. Explaining the low taxable income
of foreign-controlled companies in the United States. In: A. Giovannini, R.G.
Hubbard and J. Slemrod (eds.). Studies in international taxation. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 237-270.
Grubert H., Mutti J., 1991. Taxes, tariffs and transfer pricing in multinational
corporate decision making. Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 285-293.
Gouthie`re B., 2005. A comparative study of the thin capitalization rules in the
member states of the European Union and certain other countries. European
Taxation 45, 367-451.
HamiltonR.D., KashlakR.J., 1999. National influencesonmultinational corporation
control system selection. Management International Review 39, 167-189.
Hanlon M., Heitzman S., 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 50, 127-178.
139
Bibliography
Harris D.G., 1993. The impact of U.S. tax law revision on multinational corporations’
capital location and income-shifting decisions. Journal of Accounting Research
31, 111-140.
Haufler A., Mardan M., 2014. Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Forthcoming.
Haufler A., Mardan M., Schindler D., 2014. An economic rationale for controlled-
foreign-corporation rules. Mimeo, University of Munich.
Haufler A., Norba¨ck P.-J., Persson L., 2014. Entrepreneurial innovations and taxa-
tion. Journal of Public Economics 113, 13-31.
Haufler A., Runkel M., 2012. Firms’ financial choices and thin-capitalization rules
under corporate tax competition. European Economic Review 56, 1087-1103.
Haufler A., Mardan M., Schindler D., 2014. An economic rationale for controlled-
foreign-corporation rules. Mimeo, University of Munich.
Haufler A., Schjelderup G., 2000. Corporate tax systems and cross country profit
shifting. Oxford Economic Papers 52, 306-325.
Head K., Mayer T., 2004. Market potential and the location of Japanese investment
in the European Union. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 959-972.
Head K., Ries J., Swenson D., 1995. Agglomeration benefits and location choice: ev-
idence from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States. Journal
of International Economics 38, 223-247.
Helpman E., Melitz M.J., Yeaple S.R., 2004. Export versus FDI with heterogeneous
firms. American Economic Review 94, 300-316.
Hines J.R., Rice E.M., 1994. Fiscal paradise: foreign tax havens and American
business. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 149-182.
Hong Q., Smart M., 2010. In praise of tax havens: international tax planning and
foreign direct investment. European Economic Review 54, 82-95.
Hopland A.O., 2014. Voter information and electoral outcomes: the Norwegian list
of shame. Public Choice, forthcoming.
Hopland A.O., Mardan M., Schindler D., 2014. Tax avoidance strategies in (proba-
bly) loss-making affiliates. Mimeo, University of Munich.
140
Bibliography
Huizinga H., Laeven L., Nicode`me G., 2008. Capital structure and international debt
shifting. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 80-118.
Jacob J., 1996. Taxes and transfer pricing: income shifting and the volume of in-
trafirm transfers. Journal of Accounting Research 34, 301-312.
Janeba E., Smart M., 2003. Is targeted tax competition less harmful than its reme-
dies?. International Tax and Public Finance 10, 259-280.
Kalamov Z., Runkel, M., 2012. The implications of cross-border loss offset: Should
the EU really implement it? Paper presented at the IIPF 2012 in Dresden.
Keuschnigg C., Ribi E., 2013. Profit taxes and financing constraints. International
Tax and Public Finance 20, 808-826.
Keuschnigg C., Devereux M.P., 2013. The arm’s length principle and distortions to
multinational firm organization. Journal of International Economics 89, 432-
440.
Kind H.J., Midelfart K.H., Schjelderup G., 2005. Corporate tax systems, multi-
national enterprises, and economic integration. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 65, 507-521.
Klassen K., Lang M., Wolfson M.A., 1993. Geographic income shifting by multi-
national corporations in response to tax rate changes. Journal of Accounting
Research 31, 141-173.
Kobetsky M., 2008. Transfer pricing measures and emerging developing economies.
Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 14, 363-377.
Ko¨thenbu¨rger M., Stimmelmayr M., 2013. Taxing multinationals in the presence of
internal capital markets. CESifo Working Paper No. 4353.
Korteweg A., 2010. The net benefits to leverage. Journal of Finance 65, 2137-2170.
KPMG, 2008. Controlled foreign company taxation regimes in selected countries.
Report prepared for the advisory panel on Canada’s system of international
taxation. KPMG International.
Krautheim S., Schmidt-Eisenlohr T., 2011. Heterogenous firms, ‘profit shifting’ FDI
and international tax competition. Journal of Public Economics 95, 122-133.
141
Bibliography
Lang M., 2006. The Marks and Spencer case - The open issues following the ECJ’s
final word. European Taxation 2-2006, 54-67.
Lang M., Aigner H.-J., Scheuerle U., Stefaner M., 2004. CFC legislation, tax treaties
and EC law. Linde, Wien.
Langli J.C., Saudagaran S.M., 2004. Taxable income differences between foreign and
domestic controlled corporations in Norway. European Accounting Review 13,
713-741.
Levin C., McCain J., 2013. Offshore profit shifting and the U.S. tax code - part 2 (Ap-
ple Inc.). Memorandum, May 21, 2013. US Congress Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, Washington.
Lohse T., Riedel N., 2013. Do transfer pricing laws limit international income shift-
ing? Evidence from European multinationals. CESifo Working paper No. 4404.
Manova K., 2013. Credit constraints, heterogeneous firms, and international trade.
Review of Economic Studies 80, 711-744.
Mardan M., 2014. Why do countries differ in thin capitalization rules: the role of
financial development. Mimeo, University of Munich.
Maydew E., 1997. Tax-induced earnings management by firms with net operating
losses. Journal of Accounting Research 35, 83-96.
Mintz J., Smart M., 2004. Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: the-
ory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 88, 1149-1168.
Mintz J.M., Weichenrieder A.J., 2010. The indirect side of direct investment - multi-
national company finance and taxation. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Møen, J., Tropina J., 2013. What happens to taxable income when firms become
multinational? Profit-shifting and unobserved firm specific effects. Mimeo,
Norwegian School of Economics.
Mutti J., Grubert H., 2006. New developments in the effect of taxes on royalties and
the migration of intangible assets abroad. Paper prepared for the NBER/CRIW
Conference on International Service Flows, Washington.
142
Bibliography
Nielsen S.B., Raimondos-Møller P., 2012. Multiple roles of transfer prices: one vs.
two books. In: W. Scho¨n and K. Konrad (eds.). Fundamentals of international
transfer pricing in law and economics. MPI Studies in Tax Law and Public
Finance 1, Springer, Heidelberg, 25-46.
Nielsen S.B., Raimondos-Møller P., Schjelderup G., 2008. Taxes and decision rights
in multinationals. Journal of Public Economic Theory 10, 245-258.
Nielsen S.B., Raimondos-Møller P., Schjelderup G., 2010. Company taxation and
tax spillovers: separate accounting versus formula apportionment. European
Economic Review 54, 121-132.
Niemann R., Treisch C., 2005. Group taxation, asymmetric taxation and cross-
border investment incentives in Austria. CESifo Working Paper No. 1506.
O’Donnell S.W., 2000. Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters or an
interdependent network? Strategic Management Journal 21, 525-548.
OECD, 2013. Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting. OECD Publishing,
Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en
Onji K., Vera D., 2010. Tax law asymmetries and income shifting: evidence from
Japanese capital keiretsu. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
10 (Advances 1/4).
Overesch M., Wamser G., 2010. Corporate tax planning and thin capitalization rules:
evidence from a quasi-experiment. Applied Economics 42, 562-573.
Oyelere P. B., Emmanuel C.R., 1998. International transfer pricing and income
shifting: evidence from the UK. European Accounting Review 7, 623-635.
Pak S.J., Zdanowicz J.S., 2001. Executive summary of ‘US trade with the world:
an estimate of 2000 lost US federal income tax revenues due to over-invoiced
imports and under-invoiced exports’. Mimeo, Florida International University.
Panteghini P., 2001. On corporate tax asymmetries and neutrality. German Eco-
nomic Review 2, 269-286.
Peralta S., Wauthy X., Ypersele T., 2006. Should countries control international
profit shifting? Journal of International Economics 68, 24-37.
143
Bibliography
Rajan R., Zingales L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic
Review 88, 559-586.
Reuters, 2012. Special report: How Starbucks avoids UK taxes. 15 October 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/15/us-britain-starbucks-tax-
idUSBRE89E0EX20121015
Riedel N., Runkel, M., 2007. Company tax reform with a water’s edge. Journal of
Public Economics 91, 1533-1554.
Ruf M., Schindler D., 2012. Debt shifting and thin-capitalization rules - German
experience and alternative approaches. NHH Discussion Paper RRR 2012-06,
Bergen.
Ruf M., Weichenrieder A.J., 2012. The taxation of passive foreign investments:
Lessons from German experience. Canadian Journal of Economics 45, 1504-
1528.
Ruf M., Weichenrieder A.J., 2013. CFC rules after Cadbury-Schweppes. CESifo
Working Paper No. 4461.
Schindler D., Schjelderup G., 2012. Debt shifting and ownership structure. European
Economic Review 56, 635-647.
Schindler D., Schjelderup G., 2013. Transfer pricing and debt shifting in multina-
tionals. CESifo Working Paper No. 4381.
Shackelford D.A., Shevlin T., 2001. Empirical tax research in accounting. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 31, 321-387.
Slemrod J., 2004. Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging? Journal of
Public Economics 88, 1169-1186.
Smith M., 2002. Tax and incentive trade-offs in multinational transfer pricing. Jour-
nal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 17, 209-236.
Strebulaev I.A., 2007. Do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say?
Journal of Finance 62, 1747-1787.
SwensonD., 2001. Taxreformsandevidenceof transferpricing. NationalTaxJournal
54, 7-25.
144
Bibliography
Tirole J., 2006. The theory of corporate finance. Princeton University Press.
UNCTAD, 1994. World investment report: transnational corporations, employment
and the workplace. New York and Geneva.
UNCTAD, 2007. World investment report: transnational corporations, extractive
industries and development. New York and Geneva.
UNCTAD, 2013. World investment report: global value chains: investment and
trade for development. New York and Geneva.
von Hagen J., Zhang H., 2014. Financial development, international capital flows,
and aggregate output. Journal of Development Economics 106, 66-77.
Wamser G., 2013. The impact of thin-capitalization rules on external debt usage
- a propensity score matching approach. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, forthcoming.
Weichenrieder A.J., 1996. Anti-tax-avoidance provisions and the size of foreign direct
investment. International Tax and Public Finance 3, 67-81.
Weichenrieder A.J., Windischbauer H., 2008. Thin-capitalization rules and company
responses: Experience from German legislation. CESifo Working Paper Nr.
2456.
Wildasin D.E., 1989. Interjurisdictional capital mobility: fiscal externality and a
corrective subsidy. Journal of Urban Economics 25, 193-212.
Wilson J.D., 1986. A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of Urban
Economics 19, 296-315.
Zinn T., Riedel N., Spengel C., 2014. The increasing importance of transfer pricing
regulations: a worldwide overview. Intertax 42, 352-404.
Zodrow G.R., Mieszkowski P., 1986. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the
underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics 19, 356-370.
145
